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The legacy of the Union Party, while small, should not be ignored.  Although historians 
have largely disregarded the role of the Union Party in the 1936 presidential election, 
the argument presented in this thesis suggests that the Union Party emerged from a 
wide base of popular political opposition to the New Deal.  Its failures were many, both 
as a party and as a coherent force.  Ultimately, the Union Party faced a considerable 
power in the shape of the New Deal coalition, and the newly formed party proved 
incapable of draining voters away from the incumbent, President Franklin Roosevelt.  
The New Deal, moreover, was singularly successful in galvanising the American 
people.  By turning his 1936 election campaign into a referendum on the success of the 
New Deal, Roosevelt challenged the electorate to choose the nation’s future direction: 
an America where collective prosperity would be maintained, or a return to the divisive, 
individualistic self-interest that had brought about the Depression.  The electorate 
made their choice clear: over 27.5 million Americans voted for Roosevelt – over 10 
million more than for the Republican candidate, Alf Landon.  Only 892,000 voted for 
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Saturday, December 19, 1936, was a typical winter’s day in Chicago.  The snow was 
falling and the temperature hovered around freezing.   The crowds, rushing about their 
last-minute Christmas shopping, barely paused to glance at the headline of the 
Chicago Defender reporting Joe Louis’s record eighteen-second knockout of Eddie 
Simms as they passed the newspaper stand outside the downtown hotel.
1  Inside, seventy-two men and women waited, cramped and silent, for a meeting to be 
called to order.  They had all faced difficulties in travelling there, many from Chicago 
and the cities of Illinois, but others spurning the sunshine of Florida and California to 
ensure their attendance at this inaugural national conference.  Finally, the moment 
arrived, and their attention focused on the podium at front of the room.  As William 
Lemke entered, the eager crowd rose in warm appreciation.  Reaching the small 
platform, the presidential candidate of the Union Party turned to address the audience.  
This was no moment of triumph.  No time to bask in the glow of his adulation.  
Delivered in a tone as chilled as the weather outside, his opening words silenced the 
room.  ‘About two or three million people applauded for me just like you did today but 
they forgot about me on November third.’2 
  Lemke’s words weighed heavily on the dedicated delegates of the Union Party 
convention, but they attracted little attention from the wider world.  This contrasted 
sharply to the wave of publicity that had marked the birth of the Union Party on June 
18, 1936.  Front pages across the nation from New York to Madison to Los Angeles to 
Spartanburg, South Carolina ran with the news that Lemke, Republican member of the 
House of Representatives from North Dakota, had been declared as the presidential 
candidate of the newly formed Union Party.  Standing on a platform of economic and 
social policies that Lemke claimed would ‘save democracy and put an end to the so-
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called Depression,’ the Union Party launched a crusade against the ‘reactionary 
elements of both parties.’3  Speaking to reporters from the Associated Press on the day 
of the launch, Lemke identified Illinois as a state likely to fall to the new party.  Franklin 
Roosevelt had achieved an 18 per cent swing to seize the state for the Democrats in 
1932, but, Lemke explained, with blocks of businesses and residential property in 
receivership, dissatisfaction rife in the mining and agricultural sectors, and both 
traditional parties torn apart by infighting, ‘the situation in the state is ideal for the 
success of our party.’4  The situation described in Illinois was not unique.  The papers 
hesitated to declare Lemke a significant contender for the presidency in November, but 
if the new party was able to harness the discontent of a nation still gripped by the 
Depression, there was a common belief that Lemke might accumulate a large share of 
the popular vote and undermine the president’s chance of re-election.  With Democrats 
possibly voting Union Party in 1936, there was a real and palpable concern among the 
Roosevelt team that Lemke might tip the election in favour of Republican candidate Alf 
Landon, deprive the administration of votes in several swing states, or even force the 
election to a dead heat.  Democratic Representative Martin Sweeney of Ohio 
expressed such a sentiment when he declared that Lemke would ‘garner 20,000,000 
votes and possibly put the election of a president up to the House of Representatives.’5 
 Lemke himself was not an insignificant political figure nor was the threat of the 
Union Party improbable.  An experienced political organiser, in his early career he had 
been responsible for the establishment of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League 
(NPL), which through its exploitation of the primary system had swept aside the 
traditional conservative Republican state leadership and delivered to its followers a 
package of substantial, lasting social and economic reforms.  The political model that 
the NPL pioneered in North Dakota appealed in the western farm states, and in the 
form of the Farmer-Labor Party, remained the dominant political force in Minnesota.6  
Upon his arrival in Congress in 1933, Lemke aligned himself with the bloc of reform-
minded legislators, mainly within the Republican Party.  These so-called ‘insurgents’, 
3 
 
elected mainly from the western states, had risen to challenge the pro-business-leaning 
leadership of the party during the Taft presidency and thereafter had supported 
Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign in 1912 under the Progressive Party banner.  
Defeated, the insurgents had returned to the party coalition and, together with the 
northeastern party leadership, they formed a dominant power bloc in Congress.  
Constant tension remained, however, and in 1932, sympathetic with his pro-reform 
platform, the majority of insurgent legislators supported the Democrat Roosevelt 
instead.   
The insurgents were not a formal voting bloc, but when their individual interests 
aligned, they were a powerful force.  They had no leader, but the longest-serving 
member was Senator William Borah of Idaho.  From Lemke’s earliest days in 
Congress, Borah and the North Dakota representative formed a link based upon their 
shared ideological background.  Lemke’s connections, however, extended beyond the 
insurgent bloc.  In particular, Lemke’s disappointment with the pace and direction of 
Roosevelt’s First New Deal brought him into at first a loose and then subsequently firm 
political alliance with the principal public opponents of the Roosevelt administration: the 
so-called ‘radio priest’ Father Charles Coughlin, the old-age pension campaigner 
Doctor Francis Townsend, and Gerald L.K. Smith, who had taken control of the Share-
our-Wealth movement following the assassination of popular Senator Huey Long in 
1935.  With these powerful backers, Lemke would eventually form the Union Party.  It 
was this combination of political influence and potential mass public support moreover 
that underpinned the Union Party’s potential threat.7  
 The Union Party, however, remained in conception and reality a loose 
conglomerate.  The Republican insurgents, movements such as Long’s Share-our-
Wealth (SoW), Townsend’s Old-Age-Revolving-Pension (OARP) organisation, 
Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice (NUSJ) and Lemke’s NPL all shared loose 
ideological connections.  The Depression, they believed, had been brought about not 
by American failings, but by the manipulation of the U.S. financial system by European 
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banking families.  They sought to free America from interference from international 
affairs and reassert traditional values of independence, isolation and self-
determination.  Finally, they shared a common belief that the state had an active role to 
play in resolving the economic and social crisis.  Their proposed policy solutions were, 
however, entirely different.  This pro-reform thrust placed them within the broad 
ideological tradition in American politics reflected in the Populist and Progressive 
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Historian Michael 
Kazin famously defined populism as: ‘a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary 
people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their opponents as 
self-serving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilise the former against the latter.’  
Populism is, Kazin concluded, ‘a grand form of rhetorical optimism; once mobilized, 
there is nothing ordinary Americans cannot accomplish.’  Just as these earlier 
movements represented a wide spectrum of political interests and no set of commonly 
agreed policy objectives, so too did the mass leaders of the 1930s.8   
 Such is the all-embracing nature of American populism that there is a danger in 
using a simple phrase like ‘populist’ or ‘progressive’ to describe the various individuals 
and formal or informal popular movements that might fall within Kazin’s loose definition, 
as to do so suggests a detailed coherence in policy intentions that was not evident in 
reality.  More problematically, to describe a particular movement as ‘populist’ risks 
confusion with the People’s Party (commonly known as the Populist Party) or the 
Progressive Party that campaigned for the presidential elections in 1892, 1912 and 
1924.  Indeed, even beneath the canvas of these two parties, there was considerable 
variance in motive and policy solutions.  As Kazin suggests, populism is ‘more an 
impulse than an ideology,’ and ‘is too elastic and promiscuous’ to be the basis for an 
individual’s political or social adherence.9  As such, the term ‘populist’ itself becomes 
potentially unhelpful, as it ‘leads to ahistoricial debates about who is or is not a true 
populist, debates that are just an indirect way of announcing one’s political opinions.’10  
In recognition of this difficulty, in this thesis I have not employed the words ‘populist’ or 
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‘progressive’ to describe any individuals or formal or informal movements.  Instead, I 
have adopted the phrase ‘radical reform’ to recognise the breadth of views advocated 
by the formal and informal movements that contributed in both large and small ways to 
the formation of the Union Party: such as the NPL, OARP, NUSJ and SoW; informal 
associations such as the Republican insurgents in Congress; and small third parties 
such as the Farm-Labor Party in Minnesota or the Progressive Party in Wisconsin.  
Each of these movements was loosely politically and ideologically connected by a 
desire to see the implementation of social and economic reforms in the early 1930s to 
ease the nation from the grip of the Depression and to provide citizens with some 
protection from concentrations of power be they industry, the wealthy, banks, or 
indeed, the federal government itself.  They are ‘radical’ because in each case, they 
departed markedly from the usual or customary – they sought thorough-going and 
many respects fundamental and essential reform to the social, economic underpinnings 
of American society.  Their policy solutions were more far-reaching than those adopted 
by the Roosevelt administration in the legislation that made up the First and Second 
New Deals.    
Despite the emergent threat of Lemke and his political backers, the Democratic 
leadership publically remained bullish as to Roosevelt’s prospects for re-election in 
1936.  Arriving for the Democratic National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in mid-July 
1936, party chairman James A. Farley commented that ‘to no degree’ did the 
announcement of the formation of the Union Party alter his opinion that the president 
would carry every state come November.11  Privately, though, Farley exhibited concern.  
Polling data gathered by Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee Emil 
Hurja indicated the extent of the Union Party threat.  His final report issued to the 
Democratic leadership on October 25, concluded that Roosevelt might win the election 
by ninety-five electoral votes, but that a swing of just 1.8 per cent in the five most 
closely contested states would hand the Republicans victory.  Such was the apparent 
closeness of the election that a few thousand votes for the Union Party could influence 
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the overall outcome of the election.  Indeed, in five of the seven states (Ohio, Idaho, 
Iowa, Nebraska and West Virginia), according to Hurja’s data, the difference between a 
Roosevelt and a Landon victory was the size of the potential Lemke vote.  A small 
increase in his support might have handed Landon the election.12   
 Irrespective of its potential power, the Union Party failed spectacularly in 
November.  Its campaign was poorly managed, funded and conducted and its 
candidates for Congress were defeated in every election, both local and national.  
Despite Hurja’s predictions, Lemke failed to get on the ballot in fourteen states 
(including Townsend’s home state of California and Long’s Louisiana).  In addition, 
there were six further states in which the Union Party could not even run for election 
under its own name; instead the party had to operate with other party titles previously 
registered with the electoral authorities.13  In the final count, Lemke registered a 
national total of 891,886 popular votes.  Winning no votes in the Electoral College, he 
received 5 per cent or more of the total votes cast in only five states.14  Summing up 
the new party’s performance, the Washington correspondent of the St. Petersburg 
Evening Independent commented, ‘When you consider all the reams of publicity 
devoted to it and the fact that it commanded the support of some of America’s most 
accomplished “rabble-rousers,” you have to admit that the Union Party…wound up as a 
first rate fizzle.’15   
 In these circumstances, the Union Party did indeed appear as a rather 
insignificant footnote to the 1936 election.  Certainly, Roosevelt achieved a 
considerable victory, securing forty-six states to his Republican opponent Alf Landon’s 
two, as well as a sizeable margin in the popular vote.  The election was indeed historic 
for its overwhelming endorsement of the president; no election, in fact, had been quite 
so one-sided since 1820, when incumbent James Monroe crushed John Quincy 
Adams.  Landslide elections have occurred more frequently since Roosevelt’s 
monumental victory in 1936, notably in 1972 and 1984, but under any justification the 
1936 election proved seminal.16  It cemented Roosevelt’s reputation as the principal 
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architect of the New Deal, it provided a huge popular mandate for his Depression-era 
measures, it established a new electoral base for the Democratic Party (notably among 
African-Americans and organised labour), and it sealed the political fate of Landon, 
Lemke and the rabble-rousing radical reformers of the early 1930s.  Never again would 
Coughlin, Smith and Townsend gain the public support and notoriety they had enjoyed 
during Roosevelt’s first term.   
Despite its ultimate failure, however, the Union Party still emerged as an 
important, albeit transient, third party.  The Union Party developed from the deep 
unease many Americans felt with the direction of the Roosevelt administration.  It 
sprang from the radical protest traditions of Long, Coughlin, Townsend and a group of 
insurgents within Congress, attempting to bring these diverse groups under one 
electoral umbrella.   It was impossible, though, to satisfy such a wide-ranging set of 
ideologies and the Union Party built a weak and inconsistent base from the constituent 
groups that loosely gathered behind the party in its development and in its electoral 
campaign. The party lacked cohesion; it had no core intellectual agenda that captured 
the will of the radical malcontents, and thus it failed to engage the electorate.  It was 
additionally outmanoeuvred and ran a poor campaign.  This analysis of the Union Party 
thus tells us much about the disunity of the radical insurgent reformers of the 1930s; it 
indicates that despite their common dislike of the president, they failed to deliver a 
collective blow to the administration or to organise themselves behind a single 
candidate with a consistent and encompassing message.  Furthermore, the thesis 
shows how in a relatively short period (one presidential term), a third party rose and 
subsequently fell.  I do not suggest that the Union Party was representative of other 
third-party failings, but the party most assuredly struggled to gain acceptance in a two-
party system.  Nevertheless, as Hurja recognised, third parties could indeed pose a 
credible threat, and the actions of the Roosevelt administration indicate how the 
president sought to weaken his political opponents, including Coughlin, Long, Lemke 
and indeed the Union Party itself.   
8 
 
This is a political history of the Union Party.  In the first three chapters, I 
address the myriad groups who contributed to an anti-Roosevelt agenda and consider 
how, over time, they began to coalesce in the loosest of alliances (one marked by no 
small measure of mutual acrimony) and how that weak coalition ultimately fused into a 
party.  As the final three chapters indicate, however, the glue that united the coalition 
proved an unsatisfactory and brittle compound; indeed, the only ones who strictly 
adhered to the party were Lemke himself and the few hundred thousand voters who 
stamped the ticket for Union on November 3, 1936.   
Although there has been a substantial amount of biographical material 
produced on the major figures involved in the 1936 election, the scholarly material on 
the Union Party remains extremely limited.  Indeed, most contemporaries and indeed 
historians have long forgotten the Union Party or relegated it to a few pages on the 
1936 election.17  There has been only one monograph focused entirely on the history of 
the Union Party, David H. Bennett’s Demagogues in the Depression: American 
Radicals and the Union Party 1932-1936, published in 1969.18  In contrast to the 
biographical approach taken by Bennett, I present an analytic view of the origins of the 
party, its competing basis, both ideologically and politically, and, most importantly, a 
critical assessment of both the shortcomings of the alliance and the political party that 
ultimately arose from it. 
This work draws upon a wide body of primary evidence derived from both 
private and public sources.  In the first instance, to consider the motivations for union 
and political alliance, I have utilised the extensive public papers of Borah and Lemke 
and, in the absence of any significant archives, primary material obtained from a range 
of sources relating to the activities of Long, Townsend, Smith and Coughlin including 
autobiographies and private interviews.  Secondly, the Democratic Party view of the 
development and potential threat of the Union Party is derived from the private papers 
of the president and those of the Democratic National Committee, James A. Farley and 
Emil Hurja.  Finally, to gain a national portrait of the reception of the Union Party and 
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the forces that led to its creation, I have drawn upon a range of newspapers, the 
Congressional Record, published speeches and opinion polls produced by the Gallup 
organisation.  Utilising these extensive sources, I attempt to provide an understanding 
of the motivation of the Union Party’s main protagonists and the response of the 
Democratic administration, in particular Hurja, whose papers have been rarely used, to 
garner a detailed understanding of the perception of Lemke’s new party amongst 
political contemporaries and the American electorate as a whole and to explain its 
ultimate failure. 
The Union Party defeat had been near total.  Driven to the very fringes of 
American politics, the Union Party continued to campaign, but its leading protagonists 
would never again achieve the levels of popular support they had enjoyed in the 
summer of 1936.  Lemke instructed delegates at the December convention of that year 
to re-group, ready to ‘sweep the nation’ in 1940, but despite his best efforts he formally 
closed the Union Party in 1939.19  The party’s sad defeat, however, stands in stark 
contrast to the enduring success of the legislation its founders pressed upon the 
administration and which was adopted in the Second New Deal.  It is in this irony that 
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We must tame these fellows and make them useful to us. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932.1 
 
 
Franklin Roosevelt won the 1932 election promising to end the Depression.  Yet 
by December 1934, little progress had been made.  The stock market remained 
stagnant and unemployment was at record levels.  The New Deal that the president 
had offered the nation appeared to be seriously misfiring.  In the face of this failure, 
opposition grew toward the Democratic administration.  Conservative Republicans 
channelled their discontent through existing party structures, but opponents proposing 
social and economic reform more radical than that adopted by the Democratic 
administration had no such structures within the traditional political parties through 
which to vent their frustrations.  Within this vacuum, a diverse range of critics emerged, 
offering radical solutions to the Depression.  These men would together influence the 
formation of the Union Party in 1936.   
Franklin Roosevelt had won the presidential election in 1932 promising to end 
the Depression.  It had taken 20 years for the Dow Jones Industrial Average to double 
from 100 to 200 points, but between spring 1927 and summer 1929, it practically 
doubled again – hitting a high of 381 points in September.  Then, in October 1929, the 
bubble burst and panic selling set in.  The index collapsed, losing 40 per cent of its 
value in one month.2  The crash set off an economic disaster on an unprecedented 
scale.  Between 1928 and 1932, gross national product fell by 30 per cent and 
unemployment rose from 3 to 25 per cent. The severe economic downturn particularly 
affected the banks.  In 1930, 1,345 small rural banks, lacking sufficient reserves to 
14 
 
weather economic fluctuations, closed.  Including both rural and metropolitan 
institutions, 3,747 banks had closed by 1932.  By 1933, the crisis began to impact on 
the credit system of entire states.  In March 1932, 34 states closed all their banks.3  
America was ideologically and practically unprepared for the consequences of mass 
unemployment.  Whereas Germany and Great Britain had put in place sophisticated 
mechanisms of social support including unemployment insurance and old-age pension 
entitlements a generation earlier, America had stuck vigorously to individualistic and 
local solutions.  This placed the federal government apart from substantial intervention 
in the economy and left the provision of welfare to state and local government or 
charitable bodies.  These sources proved inadequate, however, to deal with the sheer 
numbers of Americans seeking relief from the social and economic effects of the 
financial collapse.  For those who had little, the Depression only made their lives more 
difficult.  For those with more to lose, the Depression was a devastating economic and 
psychological blow.  White-collar workers, factory managers, skilled manufacturing 
employees, local shop owners and small farmers had all benefitted from the boom 
years of the 1920s.  Owners had mortgaged their homes and farms to provide money 
for investment in expansion of their businesses.  Their workers had enjoyed increased 
salaries, which in turn they had invested in property.  Most, likely, had savings tied up 
in the banks.  When the economy collapsed, they found their businesses 
unsustainable, mortgages un-payable and savings wiped out.4  United by their common 
suffering, the newly unemployed were willing to come together to protest against those 
they blamed for their economic downfall: big business, banks, international money 
lenders and the government that had slavishly served their interests.  With state and 
charitable donations running dry, as many as two million people took part in some form 
of collective protest in the 1930s.5   
In the election campaign, Roosevelt reached out directly to those 
disempowered lower-middle-class voters most affected by the Depression.  As he 
explained in a national broadcast in April 1932, providing relief to the ‘forgotten man’ at 
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the bottom of the economic pyramid (the farmer, the small banker, the businessman 
and the home owner) would restore buying power to the masses, stimulating demand 
for products and services, increasing employment and, in turn, boosting growth across 
the economy.6  His platform comprised of plans for a series of radical social and 
economic reforms including the destruction of monopoly, strict federal regulation of 
utilities companies and the introduction of unemployment and old-age insurance.  
Offering a diametrically opposed platform to Hoover’s, Roosevelt pledged in his 
acceptance speech nothing less than ‘a new deal for the American people.’7  
Roosevelt’s campaign message was immensely popular.  In November 1932, 
he won an overwhelming victory with 23 million votes to Hoover’s 16 million and a 472 
to 59 margin in the Electoral College.  Yet, despite appearances, a revolution had not 
occurred.  So unpopular was Hoover amongst middle-class voters that any Democratic 
candidate offering some form of relief would have won the election.  Despite the heady 
rhetoric, in November 1932, the Democratic Party remained conventional in its political 
and economic rationale.  The party’s national leadership retained links with big 
business that were as strong as the Republicans’ and Roosevelt, like his predecessor, 
remained committed to balancing the budget.  The Democratic victory was not a result 
of any shift in the electoral or ideological map, but rather a consequence of the 
Republicans’ failure to manage the Depression.8  
Aware that much of his party remained ideologically conservative and that 
policy success necessitated a middle way that incorporated diverse perspectives, 
Roosevelt established his so-called ‘Brains Trust.’  This group of intellectuals 
developed a coherent analysis of the causes of the Depression intended to appeal to 
both liberal and conservative wings of the party and the electorate.  The First New Deal 
created by the Brains Trust and passed by Congress set out a framework not for 
replacement of the existing capitalistic structure, but for its rehabilitation.  The origin of 
the Depression was, they concluded, not international abuse of the credit system, but 
flaws in the domestic economy – a ‘fundamental mal-distribution of income’ that had 
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resulted in a critical loss in consumer purchasing power.  Seeking to keep costs low 
and profits high, industry had abused the economic system – reducing income in the 
farm sector, failing to increase workers’ wages, keeping conditions poor through lack of 
investment, and keeping prices high.  With the nation unable to consume what it had 
the capacity to produce, the economic system collapsed.  The Depression, they 
concluded, could not be cured by implementing reforms to break the control of industry 
and artificially inflate the value of the currency, for large-scale concentrations of power 
were unavoidable within a modern industrial state.  What was needed was not to break 
up the corporations, but to make them more accountable for their actions; to establish a 
new economic system in which the needs and interests of industry, owners and 
stockholders could be balanced directly with the purchasing power of the nation.  To 
achieve this balance, they proposed the creation of a government partnership with 
industry through which businesses could cooperate to regulate themselves.  As Brains 
Trust member Rexford Tugwell explained, ‘[I]t is not proposed to have the government 
run industry; it is proposed to have the government furnish the requisite leadership.’9   
Given the conservative tenor struck by the Roosevelt administration, it is 
perhaps not surprising that when Congress convened, the president’s business-friendly 
reform proposals found support amongst the traditional wealthy leadership of the 
Republican Party (the so-called ‘old guard’), drawn mainly from the northeastern states 
that had remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War.  Twenty-five per cent of old-
guard senators and 35 per cent of old-guard representatives voted in favour of the 
legislation that made up the First New Deal in its entirety.10  The First New Deal found 
less support amongst the president’s more radical supporters.  Radical reforms, 
however, were improbable as any such proposals were unlikely to receive the support 
of business or the substantial minority of conservatives from both parties in Congress.  
For radical reformers, such considerations seemed nonsensical.  North Dakota 
representative and future Union Party presidential candidate William Lemke summed 
up their mood, writing to a close political confidante in early 1934:  
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I sometimes feel rather disgusted with the situation here, as we 
are living in a fool’s paradise.  Those surrounding the 
administration honestly believe everything is coming up lovely.11 
Lemke’s despondent mood was backed up by economic data that 
demonstrated, despite impressive early gains – the Dow Jones reached 109 points in 
June 1932, an increase of over 100 per cent since March – the First New Deal 
appeared to have failed to generate sustained economy recovery.   In spite of the best 
efforts of the administration, by November 1934 the Dow Jones remained stubbornly in 
the 90 to 100 point band and unemployment, had dropped only 9 per cent to 23 per 
cent.12  The First New Deal experiment appeared to have failed.  The actions of the 
Roosevelt administration, Lemke concluded in his letter, reminded him of Hoover in his 
‘balmyist [sic] days,’ when he told the people that the corner had been turned but the 
employment figures continued to rise.  ‘All this C.W.A., and P.W.A, and all the other 
letters of the alphabet,’ he concluded, ‘are doomed to failure unless something more 
substantial is done.’13    
In the face of stuttering progress under the First New Deal, sustained popular 
opposition to the administration emerged from a group of individuals, working 
independently, who would go on to influence, lead or back the formation of the Union 
Party in 1936.  Three came from within the traditional political system: Republican 
Senator William Borah, Republican Representative William Lemke and Democratic 
Senator Huey Long.  The final two, the so-called ‘Radio Priest’ Father Coughlin and the 
pension crusader Doctor Francis Townsend, emerged from outside the traditional 
political system.  Who were these individuals, what were their political philosophies and 
what was the nature of their opposition to the president? 
In the Senate, pressure for reform had historically been driven by an informal 
grouping of western Republican senators.  Shaped by their experiences in small town 
America, these western Republicans had developed a strong belief in individualism and 
social enterprise combined with the realism of dealing with everyday hardship and 
poverty, which often hit even the hardest-working without any fault of their own.  Their 
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willingness to recognise that the state often had a responsibility to assist citizens in 
their moment of need saw them develop policy somewhat in opposition to the party 
leadership dominated by the established industrial and financial interests in the 
northeast.14  The inherent tension between the western and northeastern sections of 
the Republican Party reached its head during a debate on the 1909 Tariff Bill, when a 
group of western Republican senators had aligned with Democrats to oppose President 
Taft’s proposals to protect the interest of wealthy industrialists through an extensive 
increase in tariff levels. The Republican rebels did not form a cohesive bloc and the 
exact number of rebellious senators varied on the various votes throughout the tariff 
debate, but the press identified the loose grouping under the single collective title: 
‘insurgents.’15   
Historians Ronald Feinman and Ronald Mulder have separately suggested 
membership of the senatorial insurgent bloc in 1932 (in order of first 
election/appointment to the Senate) as follows: William E. Borah (Idaho), George W. 
Norris (Nebraska), Hiram W. Johnson (California), Arthur Capper (Kansas), Peter 
Norbeck (South Dakota), James Couzens (Michigan), Lynn J. Frazier (North Dakota), 
Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wisconsin), Gerald P. Nye (North Dakota) and Bronson M. 
Cutting (New Mexico).  Farmer-Laborite Henrik Shipstead (Minnesota) also aligned 
himself with the bloc.  In addition, Ronald Feinman awarded membership to the 
moderate conservative Republican Charles McNary (Oregon), who acted as a bridge 
between the core insurgent bloc and the old-guard Republicans.  With the exception of 
Nye, all had held political office at state level prior to their elevation to the Senate.  Of 
these, seven had achieved high political office: four served as governors (Johnson, 
Capper, Norbeck and Frazier); two as mayors (Couzens and Shipstead); and Norris 
had served for ten years in the U.S. House of Representatives.16     
As the most senior of the senators, William Borah was regarded as the 
insurgent bloc’s informal leader.  He was, however, fiercely independent and had not 
sought out this position.  Borah entered the Senate in 1907, a successful lawyer and 
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acknowledged leader of the economic and social-reforming faction of the Idaho 
Republican Party.  An ardent isolationist, following the end of World War One, he 
opposed further involvement in European affairs and led the senators opposed to 
President Wilson’s plan to establish a League of Nations.  In the 1920s, he became 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and continued his campaigns for 
non-involvement in international organisations, isolation from international affairs, and 
disarmament.  Domestically he was ideologically an economic and social reformer.  His 
reformist credentials surfaced during his first term when he bitterly opposed trusts and 
fought for amendments promoting the direct election of senators and the introduction of 
an income tax.  He was a strong advocate of silver remonetisation, believing that 
exploitation of the abundant supplies of the precious metal in the western states would 
protect the nation from the manipulation of gold prices by the European bankers who 
he believed lay at the root of the economic unrest.  He retained a strong belief in free 
enterprise, but he also recognised that the state had a role to support individuals who 
found themselves unemployed due to natural fluctuations in the economic cycle.  In 
February 1932, during a Senate debate on a bill proposing an appropriation of $375 
million in direct federal aid, Borah’s speech captured the insurgents’ passion.  ‘You 
may call this a dole but hungry people call it something to eat,’ he declared.  ‘A 
government which does not protect its people is flying a flag which is a dirty rag and 
contaminates the air.’17     
In September 1932, six insurgent Republicans formally backed Roosevelt’s 
nomination.18  Borah remained publically neutral, though there was no question he 
opposed the Republican nominee.  ‘I will not advocate a program,’ he wrote in 
response to an Idaho editor who urged him to declare for Hoover, ‘in which I do not 
believe nor prostitute my intellect in defense of policies I believe unwise, if not 
unpatriotic.’19  Further, Borah told reporters in September, ‘The people are looking for a 
constructive program and, take my word for it, when they find that program, they are 
going to vote for the candidate who proposes it.’20  Borah’s observations proved 
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prescient, and across the western states voters backing Roosevelt’s reform proposals 
followed the lead of the elected representatives and switched their presidential 
preference to the Democratic Party.  Whilst the insurgents had played a part in 
Roosevelt’s victory, it was unclear whether the new president would indeed be capable 
of delivering his progressive reform promise.   
Roosevelt’s election campaign had received the support of insurgent members 
of the Republican Party in the Senate; it had been also been significantly boosted by 
the reform-minded senators in the Democratic Party.  The most notable of these was 
Huey Long, the demagogic Governor of Louisiana who had been elected to the U.S. 
Senate in the November 1930, but had chosen to complete his gubernatorial term 
before taking up his Senate seat in January 1932.   
Although the New Republic declared Long in December 1931 ‘a net loss from 
whatever angle he is viewed,’ he had brought unparalleled social change to his state.21  
Elected to the governorship in 1928, Long embraced the state’s responsibility to protect 
and improve the lives of its citizens.  A series of massive, state-funded construction 
projects provided Louisiana with much-needed modernisation and at the same time 
employed tens of thousands in emergency jobs.  He provided free textbooks to all 
children, reducing the cost of schooling and increasing enrolment by 20 per cent.  A 
drive to improve adult literacy halved the number of illiterates, most of them African-
American.22   Upon taking up his Senate seat, Long established himself as one of the 
nation’s leading advocates of radical reform.  In April 1932, in a speech entitled ‘The 
Doom of America’s Dream,’ the senator issued what amounted to a new radical-
reformist manifesto.  If Congress did not react to the needs of its people, Long 
declared, he saw a popular revolution approaching: with ‘my children starving and my 
wife starving,’ the nation’s laws against robbery and looting ‘would not amount to any 
more to me than they would to any other man.’  Long’s solution was a radical 
redistribution of wealth.  ‘I am not asking any man in the United States Senate to do 
anything harmful to the rich people of the country,’ Long said.  ‘If you want to do them a 
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favor, provide some way to put some of that wealth among all of the people.’23  The 
passion and power of Long’s rhetoric surprised the Washington press corps.  ‘No such 
stirring plea for the impoverished masses has been made in the Senate for years,’ 
wrote the Baltimore Sun.24   
As a prominent reformer, Long was an early backer of Roosevelt’s presidential 
candidacy.  He assisted in keeping the southern delegates behind Roosevelt at the 
nominating convention and campaigned for the candidate across the western states, 
where his attacks on the wealthy and his positive message of social and financial 
reform played well with the electorate.  Each of the states Long visited was ultimately 
won by Roosevelt.25  The November 1932 Time magazine featured Long’s picture on 
the front cover along with the prediction that he would be the most influential southern 
Democrat in the Roosevelt administration.26  Despite his overall importance to 
Roosevelt’s campaign strategy, however, Long’s reputation for volatility and potential 
for embarrassment excluded him from the candidate’s inner circle.  Highly personally 
ambitious, Long would quickly plunge himself into opposition to the administration.27   
The difficulties that the new administration would have in dealing with Huey 
Long and Borah and his insurgent colleagues were established on the opening day of 
the lame-duck congressional session on January 3, 1933.  Long spoke for the 
insurgent bloc when he reminded the Senate that Franklin Roosevelt had been elected 
so ‘that he might carry out the one great fundamental necessary principle of the 
decentralisation of wealth.’  When Roosevelt visited Washington later that month, Long 
demanded an appointment, telling reporters, ‘I’m going to ask him did you mean it, or 
didn’t you mean it?’28  Despite supporting Roosevelt’s election, Long and the insurgent 
senators were determined to pressure the president to take a radical approach to his 
reform plans.  The reform-minded senators rejected what they viewed as conservative 
emergency banking legislation, drawn up by the bankers themselves, which would 
establish mechanisms to reopen and sustain banks closed during the financial crisis, 
and an economy bill intended to balance the federal budget and limit inflation.29  This 
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early congressional rebellion intensified around the two significant legislative planks of 
the First New Deal: the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA).  For the radical-minded reformers of both political parties, the 
NIRA and AAA became symbols of folly and disappointment with the New Deal.    
The strength of radical reform-minded congressional opposition to the central 
architecture of the New Deal was evident in the debate surrounding the passage of the 
NIRA.  Presented for consideration in June 1933, the bill allowed the creation of trade 
associations responsible for the establishment of production codes exempt from anti-
trust legislation.  The proposed suspension of the anti-trust laws, however, concerned 
the insurgents and their Democratic allies.  Borah contended that the trade 
associations would be controlled by the existing monopolies and would be used by 
them to undermine the competitiveness of small enterprise.  The recovery of small 
enterprises, he believed, required the destruction of the trusts, not an enhancement of 
their power.  In a series of heated debates on the floor of the Senate, Borah stood 
resolutely in opposition to legislation believed to be ‘a very advanced step towards the 
ultimate concentration of wealth.’30  Joining Borah in mounting a two-hour filibuster 
against passage of the bill on June 7, Long was equally derisory.  ‘Oh yes, you’ll put 
people back to work with this bill,’ he cried.  ‘They’ll all be in jail for violating this 
infernal thing.’31  With Long’s support, Borah successfully incorporated an amendment 
explicitly prohibiting price-fixing and monopolistic practices.  Recognising that the 
amendment rendered the legislation unworkable, however, it was removed by the 
Democratic leadership.  When the report returned to the Senate for final consideration 
on June 13, the highly dissatisfied reformists dominated the debate.  Quoting from the 
250 telegrams he had received overnight in support of his amendment, Borah 
concluded the debate by accusing the traditional parties of having been enslaved by 
the big corporations that had funded their campaigns and now ‘expected something in 
return.’  At the final roll call, Borah, Long and the insurgents united in opposition.  The 
administration found itself dependent upon the support of the Republican old guard, 
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who joined with the administration to favour the NIRA.  It passed on a vote of forty-six 
to thirty-nine.32  ‘I have no apologies,’ Borah announced in a powerful and revealing 
statement during the debate on the NIRA, ‘for the party of which I am occasionally a 
member.’33   
Despite the actions of the administration to ensure passage of the NIRA, it was 
the insurgents pursuing their campaign against the legislation who ultimately emerged 
the victors.  In the summer of 1934, a review board established under pressure from 
the insurgent bloc found, counter to the administration’s claims, that the effects of the 
NIRA had enhanced the power of dominant corporations at the cost of workers, small 
businesses and consumers.  This news fatally undermined the act.34  The partnership 
between government and industry which lay at the heart of the First New Deal, as the 
radical reformers had warned, had not achieved what the Brains Trust had intended.  
Embarrassed, in September 1934, Roosevelt explained in his Fireside Chat that the 
time had come to move the National Recovery Agency (established under the NIRA) 
on to a new second phase and accepted the resignation of its head, Hugh Johnson.35   
Further successful opposition to the administration evident in the debate 
surrounding the passage of the NIRA was also reflected in combined radical reformist 
opposition to the other central plank of the First New Deal, the AAA.  Rather than look 
to methods of increasing production to increase farm incomes, the AAA urged farmers 
to act like businessmen and imitate the production control methods used by the most 
successful businesses to reduce supply and increase demand.  To redress the balance 
between over-production and under-consumption, the act proposed the creation of 
artificial scarcity whereby, in return for a federal benefit payment financed by the 
introduction of a new foods processing tax, farmers would undertake a controlled mass 
destruction of crops and slaughter of healthy animals.36   
The insurgents were convinced of the need to raise prices, but they profoundly 
disliked the AAA.  Firstly, they fundamentally opposed a policy designed to create 
scarcity in a time of starvation.  Secondly, to pay farmers for not undertaking labour 
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was intrinsically problematic for the national character, ran counter to the Protestant 
work ethic and clashed with notions of upward mobility through the fruits of one’s 
labour.  They believed the provision of aid for welfare as an insurance policy against 
times of economic downturn was acceptable as a reward for past taxes paid.  In 
contrast, the payment of federal aid as an encouragement not to work as set out in the 
AAA was unethical and set a dangerous precedent of government interference in 
legitimate free enterprise.  Under what other circumstances, they questioned, would 
citizens be actively discourage from engaging in productive employment?  
Furthermore, they believed the entire proposal was unworkable.  How could the federal 
government ensure that farmers did as they had promised?  Would a federal police 
force roam the country, monitoring production?  On April 11, 1933, Long summed up 
his thoughts on the failings of the Roosevelt administration in the harshest terms.  In 
drafting the laws presented to the Senate for consideration, Roosevelt’s Brains Trust 
and the partners of Morgan & Co., he said, ‘have set us up in a situation that is two-fold 
more the son of hell than what we promised to put out in the election on the eighth day 
of last November.’  The proposed AAA was, he concluded, in its current form ‘very little 
use.’37  Borah summed up the insurgent view, exclaiming, ‘I think this is bureaucracy 
gone mad!’38   
With Long and the Republican insurgents’ in outright opposition to the 
administration’s proposed agricultural plans, they sought an alternative acceptable 
solution.  They found this in the proposals developed by North Dakotan Representative 
William Lemke.  Born in 1878, the son of a wealthy North Dakotan farmer and state 
legislator, between 1915 and 1919 Lemke was the head of the North Dakota Non-
Partisan League.  In this role, Lemke was responsible for the passage of a radical 
package of economic and social reform that delivered real and lasting positive change 
to the population of the poor rural state.39  Elected to the House of Representatives in 
1932, Lemke blamed the economic collapse on the manipulation of government by 
international bankers and wealthy industrialists and believed that to return the nation to 
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prosperity, control over currency should revert back into the hands of American 
citizens.   
Lemke’s position as an important regional politician was recognised by 
Roosevelt.  Personally courted by the presidential candidate, Lemke agreed to back 
the Democratic campaign in exchange for a public statement ‘at the earliest 
opportunity’ detailing the Roosevelt’s commitment to his farm relief proposals, reducing 
the cost of the transportation of farm products, and favouring the appointment of men 
representing agriculture to the positions of Secretary of Agriculture, head of the Federal 
Land Bank, and to the Farm Board.40  When Lemke showed copies of his detailed farm 
relief proposals to Roosevelt, he scanned the material, and said, ‘Yes, yes, I am for all 
that.’41 When Roosevelt emerged victorious in November 1932, Lemke’s supporters 
concluded that they saw a great future for the new congressman.  ‘The character and 
courage you displayed in the campaign were admirable,’ wrote one correspondent, 
‘and I am sure that the Roosevelt administration will rely upon your judgment as to 
Federal appointments and other matters touching North Dakota.’42  However, Lemke, 
blinkered by his overwhelming desire for passage of his reform proposals and flattered 
by the attention of the Democratic leadership, had misunderstood the nature of 
Roosevelt’s commitment.  Following their meeting, Roosevelt had written to clarify his 
understanding.  Writing in the most general terms, he expressed support for legislation 
to relieve the situation faced by farmers – but avoided specific mention of Lemke’s 
proposals.  Lemke, however, with the president’s earlier statement, ‘Yes, yes, I am for 
all that,’ at the forefront of his mind, read the letter as an absolute commitment.43  With 
the AAA legislation before the House, Lemke realised he had been misled.  ‘We have 
before us an idiotic farm relief bill,’ he wrote to a North Dakota constituent in the spring 
of 1933.  ‘I think the president will hear from the farmers that Wall Street must not write 
bills for the farmer.’44  During the month of March, Lemke repeatedly sought access to 
the president, but was blocked on every occasion.45  On March 25, 1933, his 
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relationship with the Roosevelt administration having reached breaking point, he wrote 
bitterly to a friend in North Dakota:   
It seems there is less intelligence in Washington, D.C., than in 
any other place in the United States.  Any three persons of 
ordinary intelligence could solve the problems confronting this 
nation, and end the depression, but we have been getting 
nowhere.46 
Accepting that his attempts to reconcile himself with the administration had 
failed, Lemke sought to force the passage of his alternative agricultural plans through 
Congress.  His ‘cost of production plan’ which found the support of Long and the 
insurgent bloc in the Senate proposed that the government should fix prices on basic 
farm products for sale within the United States with the remaining crop sold overseas 
for whatever price it achieved.  In contrast to administration attempts to limit 
production, he proposed farmers should be able to grow as much as they could and 
sell as much as they grew.  He believed increased prices would provide financial 
stability to farmers and in the process create inflationary pressure within the domestic 
market that would contribute towards the national economic recovery.47   
Generating substantial support on both sides of the Senate, an amendment 
encapsulating Lemke’s plan was incorporated into the AAA on April 13 by a vote of 47 
to 41.  Significantly, support for the plan was bi-partisan with a slight majority of both 
Democrats (28 voting in favour and 27 in opposition) and Republicans (19 in favour 
and 14 in opposition).  Notably, the majority of support in favour of the amendment 
came from the agricultural states of the west and the south.  Both Long and Borah 
backed the amendment.  However, under heavy pressure from the Democratic 
administration, it was removed at the conference stage.48  The AAA finally passed the 
Senate on May 10 with a substantial minority of reform-minded senators (12 
Republicans and 21 Democrats), including Long and Borah, resolute in opposition.49   
Though defeated, Long believed that the opposition from the insurgent bloc to 
the AAA and NIRA could provide him with a launching pad from which to gather 
support amongst the wider electorate.  In February 1934, in an NBC radio broadcast, 
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he presented to the nation his political alternative.  Building on the theme of wealth 
redistribution that he had rehearsed in his Senate speeches, he accused Roosevelt of 
betraying the people’s trust.  America, he said, faced a challenge.  It had more wealth, 
more goods, more food and more houses than ever.  It had everything in abundance, 
yet it was in the depth of an economic depression.  People were homeless and 
starving, and children went unclothed.  The problem was not that there was not 
enough for everyone, but that too much was concentrated in the hands of a few.  ‘We 
have in America today,’ he explained, ‘a condition by which about ten men dominate 
the means of activity in at least 85 per cent of the activities that you own.’  They owned 
the banks, the steel mills, the railroads, the bonds, the mortgages and the stores.  By 
this total domination, ‘they have chained the country from one end to the other until 
there is not any kind of business that a small independent man can go into and make a 
living.’  The time had come, he said, for them to take the future into their own hands.50   
To those ‘new unemployed,’ the discontented middle-class voters desperate for 
a return to economic stability, Long offered the earth.  His most radical proposal, 
however, was to guarantee an annual income of $5,000 to every family.  This amount 
would be enough, Long said, to provide families with ‘a fairly comfortable home, an 
automobile, a radio, other reasonable home conveniences, and a place to educate their 
children.’  These reforms, he concluded, would be funded by the federal government 
taxing all millionaires to reduce their combined wealth to around $50 million.  Proudly 
displaying his political heritage, he ended the speech by directly quoting three-time 
Democratic candidate and People’s Party hero William Jennings Bryan: the effect of his 
plan, he said, would be a new America, where ‘Every man would be a King.’51   
Economists quickly dismissed Long’s proposals; there were simply too many 
poor and not enough millionaires for his plan to provide enough wealth to be 
redistributed from the latter to the former.  Such criticism bothered Long little.  His 
‘Share-our-Wealth’ (SoW) plan offered hope to a desperate nation.  In private, Long 
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admitted that it would not work, but confided, ‘When they figure that out, I’ll have 
something new for them.’52   
To take forward his wealth redistribution plan, Long encouraged his supporters 
to form SoW societies.  Within a month, 200,000 members had registered with the 
Washington office.  By the end of 1934, Long boasted 3 million members.53  Following 
official registration, each club received a pamphlet containing suggested operational 
instructions, educational material detailing the aims of the organisation, a copy of 
Long’s autobiography and a subscription to the new national newsletter, American 
Progress.  The creation of SoW gave Long a potentially powerful national voice outside 
of the traditional political system.54   
With SoW demonstrating his growing power outside of Congress, Long 
determined to enhance his prestige amongst his reform-minded colleagues by 
supporting Lemke in his continued campaigns to force the passage of new agricultural 
policy in opposition to the AAA.  With the Democratic administration, in which he had 
placed his personal trust and political credibility, having rejected his cost-of-production 
plan, Lemke presented to the House an alternative farm mortgage refinancing plan.   
Under this proposal, a federal farm credit agency would be established to refinance all 
farm mortgages.  Private banks would be removed from the farm loan business and 
control passed to the federal government.  The farmer would then pay the agency 3 
per cent of his loan annually.  Half of the payment would cover interest, and half would 
contribute towards the repayment of the loan.  The long repayment period would 
enable the farmer to pay his debts in small, affordable amounts at a lowered, fixed 
interest rate.  The most radical element was the proposal that the farm credit agency 
sell bonds to raise the finance necessary to provide the loans.  Lemke anticipated that, 
should the bonds not prove saleable, the Federal Reserve banks should issue notes 
not backed by gold to purchase the bonds up to a total of $3 billion.  The injection of 
this new money into the economy would provide inflationary pressure, increasing farm 
prices and restoring the farmers’ financial position.  Lemke believed that placing $3 
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billion of farm debt into the hands of the federal government and weakening the link 
between circulating money and the gold supply, moreover, would weaken the power of 
the international bankers to control the economy.   In relieving the farmer, Lemke 
believed the entire economy would be placed upon a stable footing.55    
Again Lemke received support for this campaign from the insurgent bloc.  Borah 
expressed his belief that government action to relieve mortgage interest rates was the 
farmers’ highest priority.  ‘It is the most vital part of the farm question as I see it,’ he 
informed the press in early March 1933.56  Once again, however, Lemke found his path 
blocked by the administration.  Opposed by the congressional leadership, the bill was 
allocated to the Committee on Agriculture for consideration under strict instructions that 
it be pigeon-holed.57  Believing that an open debate on the farm mortgage refinance 
measure would consolidate the strong cross-party opposition to the president’s farm 
plan, Lemke set about gathering the signatures of the 145 congressmen required on a 
petition to discharge his bill onto the floor of the House.  As Lemke’s campaign to 
gather signatures continued into the spring of 1934, the president’s advisors began to 
worry that the congressman’s personal crusade would end not only in the discharge 
petition’s success, but also in the bill’s passage.  Tensions reached a head on April 9, 
1934.  With Lemke now needing only eleven more names, Roosevelt’s private 
secretary, Stephen Early, sent a flurry of telegrams to the president, who was out of 
Washington, seeking instructions as to how to proceed.  Roosevelt, clearly irate, 
replied:  
I not only have never endorsed Frazier-Lemke Bill but am 
getting tired of such preposterous stories….  If this type of wild 
legislation passes, the responsibility for wrecking recovery will 
be squarely on the Congress, and I will not hesitate to say so to 
the nation in plain language.58 
On April 10, Speaker Homer Rainey hastily arranged a press conference to 
inform reporters of the president’s opposition to Lemke’s plan.  Lemke, however, was 
unimpressed: ‘We are going ahead and expect no difficulty in getting the necessary 
145 signatures on the petition.’59  Lemke proved to be as good as his word.  On June 2, 
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in clear defiance of the administration, with the signatures gathered, the motion to 
discharge the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill from the Agriculture Committee was 
placed before the House.  Victory was short-lived however as the Democratic majority 
leadership used parliamentary rules to stop Lemke and his supporters from bringing 
the bill to the floor for debate.60  On June 18, Lemke made his complete opposition to 
the administration clear.  ‘The battle is on,’ he announced to the House, and would 
continue until the people ‘win a final and complete victory.’61   
The publication of the discharge petition itself, however, marked a significant 
moment in the gathering opposition to the First New Deal.  According to congressional 
rules, the names on the petition remained strictly secret until the date of publication.  If 
the majority of signatories were Republicans, the administration could simply dismiss 
the petition as political mischief.  Given the strength of administration opposition to the 
proposals, however, should the majority be Democrats, the publication of the petition 
would potentially be a significant embarrassment.  The administration’s worst fears 
were confirmed.  Out of the 145 signatures, 63 per cent were Democrats.  What was of 
more concern was the heavy concentration of Democratic dissenters (74 per cent) from 
the western states.  In all, including Republicans and other small parties, 74 per cent of 
total signatories came from the west.  Lemke had failed to achieve the passage of his 
bill, but by revealing the level of general opposition to the administration within the 
western Democratic bloc and the general dissatisfaction of the western representatives 
as a whole, the discharge petition in itself was of political importance.  How Lemke and 
his radical reform-minded colleagues would capitalise upon this knowledge and how 
the administration would respond would lead the representative directly on the path to 
the Union Party nomination.62  
Lemke’s failure to bring his Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill to the floor of the 
House did not end his campaign to force amendments to the administration’s 
agricultural reform plans.  Rather, with the support of Long, insurgent support was 
mobilised behind Lemke’s alternative plan to extend to farmers the rights available to 
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businesses under the Bankruptcy Act.  Under Lemke’s ‘farm bankruptcy’ proposal, 
existing bankruptcy laws would be made more lenient towards farmers whose total 
debt so exceeded the value of their property that there was little possibility they would 
ever return to a sound financial footing.  The legislation proposed the establishment of 
legal machinery in each county to value the property of farmers heavily in debt.  The 
federal courts would also follow a new bankruptcy procedure to reduce the debts of the 
farmer to a level comparable to the value of the property.  The farmer would thus 
continue to work on the land until the re-valued debt was cleared.  At this point, 
ownership would return to the farmer.  The federal government would gain an element 
of control over private financiers by setting interest rates and reducing loan 
repayments.  In addition, relief to the farmer offered though the bankruptcy legislation 
would cause a trickle-up effect, reducing deflationary pressures on the wider 
economy.63   
A combination of pressure from the House, public support and the committee’s 
sympathetic view towards legislation that equalised access under the law meant that 
the Farm Bankruptcy Bill was quickly reported and passed out of the Judiciary 
Committee.  In debate, Lemke rallied representatives to pass legislation that would 
protect home ownership and weaken the power of the international banker.  ‘No one,’ 
he finished, ‘should be permitted to destroy society in order to exact the last pound of 
flesh.’  With minimal opposition, in June 1934, the Farm Bankruptcy Bill was passed by 
the House with an overwhelming majority of 133 votes to 16.64  The fate of the bill now 
rested with the Senate, and Long set himself the challenge of driving it through.  Lemke 
had not sought out Long’s support, but the senator offered tremendous personal and 
political value in backing the representative’s campaign.  Driven into opposition by the 
administration and keen to articulate their own political visions (and careers), Long and 
Lemke found themselves working together to achieve their individual aims.  
When the Senate convened on Saturday, June 16, Long addressed the chair, 
announcing that he would not sit down until Lemke’s Farm Bankruptcy Bill had been 
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referred to a joint conference committee for debate.  With the congressional session 
rapidly drawing to a close, and fearing a filibuster would hold up the passage of 
important administration legislation, the congressional leadership agreed to Long’s 
demands.  On Monday, June 18, the Senate passed the bill by sixty votes to sixteen.65  
With the bill overwhelmingly supported in Congress, Roosevelt signed the Farm 
Bankruptcy Bill into law.   
The passage of the Farm Bankruptcy Act marked an important moment in the 
evolution of radical opposition to the New Deal and in the political alliance of two 
prominent opponents of Roosevelt.  Long’s personal achievement in pushing the bill 
through was widely recognised.  ‘Nobody would have bet a nickel on the chances of 
the...bill as late as six o’clock Saturday afternoon,’ wrote the New York Times.  Yet 
despite this, with his ‘endurance, gall and indifference to being considered a nuisance, 
Mr Long put his bill through.’66  In doing so, Long strengthened his national support, 
demonstrated particularly his commitment to the principles of his SoW plan and 
garnered the respect of the Senate reformist bloc.  In the last hours of the 
congressional session that had seen the passage of the First New Deal legislation, the 
disparate forces of radical opposition had for the first time started to coalesce around a 
core set of individuals and ideological objectives.  These objectives were expressed in 
Lemke’s comments upon the passage of the Farm Bankruptcy Bill.  He told the House: 
I have confidence in the future.  We are going back to the 
democracy of Jefferson and Lincoln – forward to a happy, 
prosperous, self-reliant, and self-governed people, a people 
with hopes and aspirations; forward to the true grandeur of this 
Nation, where every man is a King.67 
Long’s battle cry had become Lemke’s own.  Through economic nationalism, 
self-governance and reliance, opportunity would be restored to the new mass middle-
class unemployed.   
Borah and Lemke were insurgent Republicans, whilst Long was from the 
president’s own party.  All three had used their positions of political influence in 
Congress to oppose the reforms implemented during the First New Deal and had 
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achieved some success in forcing amendments to them despite the wishes of the 
president.  Long, seeking to enhance his position as a leading opponent of the 
administration, had built upon his campaigns within Congress by establishing a national 
independent quasi-political opposition movement.  Like Long, the remaining two men 
who would unite to back the formation of the Union Party in 1936 had taken different 
paths to their positions of national influence.  Both Francis Townsend and Charles 
Coughlin were representatives of a new media age in which popular support generated 
through the press or the radio substituted for votes at the ballot box.   Despite the 
alternative route to power, their influence over the electorate was no less extensive 
than their future congressional colleagues and their moves to oppose the 
administration no less a concern.   
Broadcasting his Sunday afternoon sermons from his church in Detroit, 
Coughlin was one of the first stars of the new media age.  It was his popular message 
that caught the imagination of his listeners.68   Coughlin’s basic political beliefs could be 
traced to his religious education.  The writings of St Thomas Aquinas and Pope Leo 
XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum: The Condition of the Working Classes taught 
that governments should raise living standards for the poor and that through ‘charity 
and a recognition of the mutuality of capital and labour, all members of society should 
work to reduce class divisions.’69  In 1931, Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadregesimo 
Anno: After Forty Years called upon Catholics ‘to oppose the unjust economic 
conditions that had created the present crisis.’  The responsibility for the economic 
malaise, Pope Pius claimed, lay with the ‘dictatorship’ of those who ‘control credit…and 
the rule of lending money.’  Pius called his philosophy ‘Social Justice.’70  Coughlin’s 
interpretation of ‘Social Justice’ was informed by his central belief, as with Long, Borah 
and Lemke, that manipulation of the currency by international bankers was the root 
source of the Depression.  By carefully controlling supply, Coughlin claimed, the wealth 
of the nation had become concentrated into the hands of a few international bankers, 
who were able to use this power to manipulate economies, bringing about cycles of 
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inflation and recession through which they increased their personal wealth.  It was time, 
Coughlin suggested in a sermon in October 1930, for the power of the international 
banker to be broken.  ‘Governments exist primarily to protect human rights and not 
financial rights,’ he declared.  ‘Governments are for the people and not for the 
colleagues of Carnegie!’71  Linking Rerum Novarum to long-standing belief in ‘the 
money problem,’ Coughlin’s alignment of Catholic theology with traditional reformist 
beliefs was a powerful mix of forces and, among the lower and lower-middle classes – 
rural and urban, Protestant and Catholic – he was able to galvanise a feeling of 
common class discrimination.  The scope for influence was large.  In 1930, two out of 
five American families had a radio.  At the height of his fame, he claimed an audience 
of thirty to forty-five million listeners.72   
Coughlin’s status as a national celebrity and opposition political commentator 
attracted Roosevelt.  At the candidate’s personal invitation, Coughlin delivered a 
speech at the Democratic Convention that he described as ‘very enthusiastic for Mr. 
Roosevelt.’  This speech helped to shore up Democratic and Catholic delegates who 
might have favoured the re-nomination of conservative candidate, and prominent 
Catholic, Al Smith.73  When Roosevelt won the nomination, Coughlin telegrammed to 
congratulate him on his victory: ‘I am with you to the end.  Say the word and I will 
follow.’74  True to his word, in the month before the presidential election, Coughlin 
delivered a series of enthusiastic broadcasts in support of the Democrat.  However, 
although Coughlin’s influence over his massed radio audience assisted Roosevelt win 
the election, his outspoken behaviour and unrestrained personal ambition quickly made 
him a liability to the administration.  
Coughlin had long been an advocate of inflation and linked this explicitly to the 
gold standard.  The Detroit priest believed what he called the national ‘money famine’ 
could be ended through legislation to revalue gold at a ratio of two to one of its current 
value.  This would, Coughlin believed, raise the level of currency in circulation, and the 
increased purchasing would weaken the grip of the Depression.  Further, he proposed 
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that all gold be nationalised, with the government compensating current holders with 
paper money.  This would, he said, remove the power of the international banker to 
control the supply and value of gold, and further increase the total amount of paper 
currency in circulation.75  Seeking to reward the priest for his support on the campaign 
trail, Coughlin’s plan was embodied in an administration-backed amendment to the 
AAA presented to the Senate in April 1932.  
Despite Coughlin’s popular support outside of Congress, within the Senate he 
found his proposal strongly criticised by the insurgent bloc who presented an 
alternative series of amendments to remonetise silver.76  The power of silver to boost 
the economy was a long-standing insurgent belief.  In the depths of the agricultural 
depression of the 1890s, Americans grew increasingly fascinated by the potential of 
silver to solve the nation’s problems.  The insurgents wanted the federal government to 
set its value at sixteen grains of silver to one part gold and demanded that the currency 
be minted free of charge.  They viewed the plentiful supply of silver in the mountains of 
the western states as a counter to the deflationary gold standard manipulated by the 
wealthy eastern bankers and controlled by the gold families of western Europe.  Silver 
was America’s metal; they believed that adoption of the silver standard would break 
international ties and assert the nation’s economic freedom.77  Concerned that the 
continuing debate on the inflationary element of the bill was holding up passage of the 
entire AAA, the administration supported the passage of an uncomfortable compromise 
– an inflationary amendment authorising the president to choose between the gold and 
silver manipulation plans.78   
The passage of the AAA had an immediate effect, and agricultural commodity 
prices quickly moved above pre-1914 levels.  In July, however, as the effect of the 
Economy Act increased deflationary pressures on the economy, the price of wheat 
started to fall back sharply.79  Believing that a small amount of controlled inflation might 
kick-start the economy, Roosevelt declared in his Fireside Chat on October 22 that, 
despite the progress made, he was unsatisfied with the ‘amount and the extent’ of the 
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increase in farm income.  ‘If we cannot do this one way,’ he promised, ‘we will do it 
another.  Do it, we will.’80   
Choosing between the options presented to him in the AAA, Roosevelt elected 
to bring about inflation through the purchase of gold.  The Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) was authorised to purchase all newly minted gold in the United 
States and, if necessary, all gold available on the open world market.  By creating 
scarcity in the market place the theory was that the RFC would be able to push up the 
price of gold.  As the amount of paper currency in circulation was matched by the total 
value of the gold held by the Federal Reserve, increasing the price would enable 
further paper currency to be issued.  Increasing the amount of currency in the system 
would hypothetically increase buying power.  Increased buying power would increase 
demand and, thus, prices.  However, the gold purchasing policy was ultimately a 
failure.  An element of inflation was introduced in the economy but prices slowly began 
to fall once more.81  Opponents of the president, including former mayor of New York 
and Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith, ridiculed Roosevelt for his actions, 
writing in an open letter: ‘I’m for gold dollars as against baloney dollars.  I am for 
experience against experiment.’82  In late November, seeking to protect himself from 
criticism, the president distanced himself.  It was characteristic of Roosevelt to 
determine how far to back a policy.   On January 30, 1934, having fired Dean Acheson, 
who as undersecretary at the Treasury Department had taken responsibility for 
implementing the plan, Roosevelt ended his extraordinary powers and the Gold 
Purchase Act pegged the value of gold at $35 an ounce, half its pre-1933 value.  With 
this action, Roosevelt’s brief flirtation with inflation ended.83   
 Coughlin, however, misinterpreted Roosevelt’s actions and also became a 
casualty of the gold purchase experiment.  Believing that he had been instrumental in 
forcing the administration to adopt the gold purchase policy which was now being 
abandoned due to pressure from the president’s misguided advisors and Roosevelt’s 
opponents in the Democratic Party, the priest directly challenged the authority of the 
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administration.  In a November 27 speech before 7,000 supporters at the New York 
Hippodrome, Coughlin demanded, ‘Stop Roosevelt from being stopped!’  Accusing Al 
Smith of being merely ‘a puppet,’ he declared: ‘Are we forgetful that Mr. Smith is a 
wealthy banker?’  ‘My friends, this is but part of the organised attack on our leader who 
is trying to redeem us from the money changers.’  Explaining his motivation to 
journalists following the event: ‘When anyone stands in the way of President Roosevelt, 
and it’s Roosevelt or ruin, I’ve got to take a stand.  This is war.’84  Roosevelt, still 
smarting from the embarrassment of the experiment’s failure, reacted badly to 
Coughlin’s public efforts on his behalf.  Coughlin had not been asked to defend the 
administration and the president wanted no such defence.  Furious, Roosevelt fumed 
to Democratic Party Chairman Jim Farley: ‘He should run for the Presidency himself.  
Who the hell does he think he is!’85  The failure of the gold purchase experiment 
marked a turning point in the priest’s relationship with the administration.  Having 
inadvertently defied the president, he too found himself in opposition.   
The election of Roosevelt as president marked a moment of triumph for Borah, 
Long, Lemke and Coughlin.  Each had in their own individual way contributed to the 
downfall of the Hoover administration and ushered in what they now believed to be a 
new age of reform.  By contrast, the political career of Townsend, the last of the 
prominent Union Party backers in 1936, had yet to begin.  Yet, Townsend’s quasi-
political powerbase established in 1933 would prove a threat to the administration in 
excess of Long’s. 
Born in 1867, Townsend’s climb to national power was not meteoric.  In 1929, 
aged 62, the doctor saw his entire life savings wiped out in the stock market crash.  By 
the summer of 1933, he was, aged 66, unemployed and in a desperate financial 
position.  Roosevelt had been elected upon a platform that itself had explicitly 
committed the administration to ‘advocate unemployment and old-age insurance under 
state laws.’86  In accordance with this commitment, Roosevelt had indicated that he 
wished to introduce unemployment insurance and an old-age pension system.  The 
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Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) was established in May 1933, 
charged with distributing federal funds to support directly the neediest in the population.  
FERA distributed $3.25 billion in less than three years, including substantial payments 
to the aged.  Early in 1933, seeking to place these emergency measures on a 
permanent footing, Roosevelt urged Senator Robert Wagner of New York and 
Representative David Lewis of Maryland to put forward their draft bill on unemployment 
insurance and pension provision.87  Frustrated at the apparent lack of progress from 
the administration and seeking to find a solution to his problems and those of millions 
of elderly Americans, Townsend, in a letter to the Long Beach Press-Telegram 
published on September 30, 1933, outlined proposals to solve unemployment by the 
removal of the elderly from the workforce.  It was fundamentally wrong, he believed, 
that those responsible for the economic prosperity of the nation did not receive financial 
assistance from the state in their old age.  Without this support, Townsend argued, the 
elderly were forced to stay in employment far beyond their most effective years.  By 
doing so, they barred the entry of the young to positions of rightful employment and 
thus were a direct cause of both mass unemployment and the nation’s fall in economic 
effectiveness.  ‘It is just as necessary to make some disposal of our surplus workers, 
as it is to dispose of our surplus wheat or corn,’ he explained.  The central plank of the 
plan was a monthly pension of $200 to be distributed to every eligible person over the 
age of 60 in return for their removal from the workforce.  The pension would be 
financed by a national transaction tax on all goods and services.88 
Like his future Union Party colleagues, Townsend believed that the root cause 
of the Depression lay with the international banking corporations.  ‘The power over the 
circulation of money,’ Townsend explained, ‘cannot, must not, be subject to the timidity 
or cowardice of a few men who have it in their power to order the business world to call 
its loans and restrict its credit.’  This power, he concluded, ‘must become the sole 
property of the citizenry of the nation.’  Thus, the ingenious part of his plan was that 
every pensioner would be required to spend their pension in the month they received it.  
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This would, Townsend estimated, ensure ‘an even distribution throughout the nation of 
two or three billions of fresh money each month.’  Pumping millions of dollars a month 
into the economy exert inflationary pressure and might help restore a healthy 
economy.89  ‘The plan is only incidentally a pension plan,’ Townsend concluded, ‘the 
old people are simply to be used as a means by which prosperity will be restored to all 
of us.’90  Economists doubted, however, that it would work.  They estimated that 
roughly 10 million Americans would be eligible for the pension, requiring an annual 
expenditure of $24 billion.  If any administration were foolish enough to attempt to put 
the plan in action, the imposition of such a huge tax would plunge the country even 
further into depression.91   
Townsend’s letter of September 30, 1933, was not written with the intention of 
setting up a pension movement but simply, as he later recalled, ‘an idea which might 
restore hope.’  His simple message, however, immediately connected with elderly 
Californians’ pent-up demand for action.  By November 1933, supporters of his newly 
formed ‘Old-Age Revolving Pension’ movement (OARP) had gathered 75,000 
signatures on a petition to lobby Congress to consider the Townsend pension plan.92   
Seeking to turn this pressure in coordinated action, Townsend established a 
partnership with California real estate agent Robert Clements.  It was through 
Clements that the true power of the movement was revealed.   
In January 1934, sensing an opportunity to turn the OARP into a for-profit 
business, Clements persuaded Townsend to hire local organisers to mount door-to-
door petition campaigns providing funds through the sale of pamphlets, memorabilia 
and, later, a newspaper.  Motivated by their sales commission, these professional 
organisers were hugely effective in spreading the movement outside of its California 
base.  By the summer of 1934, local OARP clubs had been formed in 30 states, most 
notably in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, North and South 
Dakota, Washington, Wyoming and California.93  Townsend claimed that by December 
1934 there were 2,000 OARP clubs with 300,000 members.  The organisation’s 
40 
 
financial records suggest that the numbers were in reality smaller, although still an 
impressive 150,000.94  By December 1934, Clements was employing 300 locally based 
OARP organisers.  Dependent on his commission-based professionals and local 
volunteers to sustain the continued growth of the organisation, Clements exerted tight 
control from the centre.  Local organisers were required to stick closely to their scripts.  
No local member had a say in the operation of the national OARP.95  So successful 
was the company financially that Clements and Townsend awarded themselves a $100 
monthly remuneration package including salary and expenses.96   
What had begun as a letter-writing campaign quickly took on considerable 
popular and political momentum.  Throughout 1934, Townsend repeatedly requested a 
personal meeting with the president to discuss the OARP plan.  Roosevelt, preferring 
to develop his own proposals free of the undue influence of others, rejected the 
approach out of hand but in a confidential letter to his nephew James Davis, expressed 
clearly his concerns at the true threat of the pension movement.  Not only would the 
pension plan simply not work, he wrote, it would ‘bankrupt the Government.’97  In 
March 1934, frustrated at the lack of progress of the Wagner-Lewis Unemployment Bill 
through Congress, Roosevelt publicly backed the bill and challenged legislators to 
pass it before the end of the session.98  However, in June, with it mired in committee, 
Roosevelt abandoned hope of its passage.  In its place, he announced the 
establishment of a cabinet-level Committee on Economic Security to develop a new 
plan for ‘Social Security.’  Roosevelt warned his new committee of the need to solve 
the old-age pension problem.  ‘We have to have it,’ he said.  ‘The Congress can’t stand 
the pressure of the Townsend plan unless we have a real old-age insurance system.’99  
Seeking to establish permanent distance between his own plans and the OARP, on 
October 12, 1934, Townsend was informed via telegram that Roosevelt was 
uninterested in any form of cooperation: ‘No chance of personal interview for you or 
any other for that matter.’100  Rejected, the elderly doctor mobilised his supporters to 
force passage of his alternative pension plan.  
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By the autumn of 1934, the Roosevelt Administration found itself under 
considerable pressure – not from the old-guard Republican right, which in Congress 
had found itself largely aligned with the New Deal reform package, but from a group 
seeking reform more radical than that implemented by the administration.  Together 
Townsend’s pension plan, Long’s wealth redistribution proposals, Lemke’s farm 
reforms, and Borah’s and Coughlin’s currency manipulation ideas represented a set of 
popular alternatives to the New Deal.  Where their anti-New-Deal campaigns had 
generated momentum, they represented a serious annoyance to the administration.  
Townsend had not at this stage enjoyed the national exposure of his future Union Party 
colleagues, but the truth was that his well-organised grassroots movement represented 
at that stage a potentially more significant foe.  Should Townsend continue to mobilise 
the population behind his cause, in the absence of a viable alternative, he might 
pressure Congress to pass his plan.  In this circumstance, Roosevelt had no alternative 
but to challenge his opponents directly.  He could not let their campaigns generate 
enough support to derail his reform agenda. 
In 1946, Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s close personal friend and Secretary of 
Labor throughout his presidency, looked back upon their long relationship in her book 
The Roosevelt I Knew.  To Perkins, Roosevelt was not an economic radical.  Rather, 
she wrote, he ‘took the status quo in our economic system as much for granted as his 
family.  They were part of his life, and so was our system; he was content with it.’  That 
was not to say the president considered it perfect.  The challenge of the New Deal, he 
believed, was to see ‘adjustments’ made ‘so that that the people would not suffer from 
poverty and neglect, and so that all would share.’  But in doing so, Perkins was certain 
Roosevelt ‘had no dream of great changes in the economic or political patterns of our 
life.’  To those outspoken reformers who had emerged in opposition to the president, 
however, the First New Deal’s limited ‘adjustments’ were simply not enough.  They 
believed the economic system required fundamental change.  With the support for 
42 
 
these alternative policy agendas gathering speed, the administration embarked upon a 
series of actions to determinedly limit the support for the radical reformers.101   
As the only prominent Democrat amongst Roosevelt’s radical reformist critics, 
Long found himself the first targeted by the administration.  In late June 1933, 
Roosevelt ordered the Treasury Department to reopen an investigation into income tax 
evasion in Louisiana instigated by the Hoover administration in 1932 and informed 
Long that he would no longer be consulted on issues related to the distribution of 
federal patronage.102  As part of New Deal relief measures, moreover, states were 
required to match each dollar of federal relief with three of state money.  In retaliation 
for Long’s alienation, and at the senator’s direction, Louisiana defaulted on its 
obligation.  In May 1934, Long was warned that federal support for relief would be 
withdrawn if the state did not meet its financial commitments.  On August 1, all federal 
unemployment benefit to Louisiana ceased.  The 400,000 citizens dependent on 
federal benefits (roughly a fifth of the state’s population) found themselves once again 
solely dependent upon charity.103   
The strength of the administration’s determination shocked Long.  Clearly, 
Roosevelt was willing to play hard to defeat his rivals.  Aware that he needed to regain 
the initiative at home in Louisiana and in his conflict with Roosevelt, Long told a FERA 
official, ‘Hereafter I’ll be giving you…and that fucker in the White House unshirted hell 
every day!’104  Long recognised that when offered the choice between relief and 
politics, the starving chose relief.  In a two-pronged assault, the senator regained 
control of federal spending within Louisiana.  In a series of special legislative sessions, 
the legislature obediently transferred nearly every vestige of authority away from the 
towns and the parishes to state-appointed boards controlled by Long’s loyal governor, 
Oscar K. Allen.  Allen had been hand-picked by Long and was no more than a 
figurehead for the senator’s continued control over Louisiana politics.  Under the state-
appointed boards, so tight became the governor’s grip over Louisiana that no municipal 
officer – policeman, fireman, teacher – could hold a job without his (and thus Long’s) 
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approval.105  In this skirmish, it appeared that although tested, Long had emerged 
bruised but victorious.   
As the administration had turned against Long, they also turned against Borah 
and his insurgent colleagues in the Senate.  The administration’s main target in the 
insurgent bloc was Republican Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico.  Elected in 
1928, Cutting quickly commanded the respect of the insurgent bloc.106  In the insurgent 
challenges to the legislation that made up the First New Deal, he closely aligned 
himself with Borah.   The senior and junior senators shared a common political agenda 
and voted similarly in support and opposition to all New Deal legislation.  By 1934, the 
two men had become so closely aligned that the New York Times suggested that 
Cutting had taken on the role of ‘Whip’ for the elderly senator, bringing together 
supportive colleagues from across the political spectrum behind Borah’s anti-New Deal 
campaign.107  
Cutting had supported Roosevelt’s candidacy in 1932, but the administration 
grew quickly frustrated by his subsequent opposition.  In March 1934, with Cutting 
seeking re-election, Farley informed the senator that the president would only support 
his candidacy if he ran as a Democrat.  ‘Otherwise,’ Cutting wrote, ‘all the 
administrative strength’ would be used to beat him.  Refusing Roosevelt’s demand, 
Cutting found himself facing the direct opposition of the administration.  For the 
Democrats, attacking Cutting was a proxy for attacking Borah.  It was a direct warning 
that when the older senator faced re-election in 1936, he would find little support from 
the Democratic Party.108  Roosevelt found an unlikely ally in his campaign against 
Cutting in the old-guard-controlled Republican National Committee (RNC).  In July 
1934, seeking revenge for Cutting’s support for Roosevelt’s election campaign, it was 
surprisingly announced that the RNC would join the administration in their campaign to 
elect his Democratic opponent, Dennis Chavez.   
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With both the Roosevelt administration and the RNC against him, Cutting 
mobilised the support of the insurgent bloc behind his campaign, receiving 
endorsements from Borah and seven more Republican senators.109  Senator Hiram 
Johnson from California pleaded with Jim Farley to end the campaign against Cutting.  
‘I really think it unjust and unfair to endeavor to smash a man,’ he wrote, ‘who rendered 
such invaluable services and displayed such a magnificent courage in thirty two.’110  
Despite these interventions, Roosevelt and the RNC refused to back down.  ‘This is a 
fine statesmanlike attitude for a New Deal to take,’ Cutting observed bitterly.111  The 
effect of the insurgents’ alienation from both the Democratic and Republican Party 
leadership was clear.  Without recourse to the support of either of the national parties, 
and lacking their own independent political movements to provide them an alternative 
base for support at the grassroots, they were potentially easily defeated.   
As the Cutting and Lemke incidents suggest, Roosevelt was clearly prepared to 
confront his opponents in Congress directly, but the president also attempted to use his 
political authority against Townsend and Coughlin outside of the traditional political 
system.  Coughlin’s rise in public notoriety and the support of his radio audience 
proved particularly problematic for the White House.  In late 1933, the priest continued 
to advocate the president’s inflationary gold plan.  By early November, with the plan 
faltering, Coughlin backed a proposal to advocate both the continuation of gold value 
manipulation and the compulsory purchase and re-monetisation of silver.112  By 
January 1934, his plan of ‘bymmetalism’ was gaining public support.  On January 14, 
he embarked upon a campaign to generate ten million letters to Congress advocating a 
new plan to ‘make America a land of financial independence.’113   
Coughlin’s new monetary campaign provided Roosevelt with the perfect 
opportunity to assert his authority.  Background research had been undertaken by the 
U.S. Treasury Department during the senatorial debate on the silver purchase plan to 
determine current purchasing activity and the largest holders of the metal.  Clearly, 
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these individuals stood to profit significantly from any policy that might increase the 
metal’s value.  The investigation revealed that two individuals closely connected with 
Coughlin had made substantial recent silver purchases.  Indeed, Amy Collins, the 
treasurer of the organisation the priest had established to manage donations from his 
radio supporters, had invested Coughlin’s funds in a total of 600,000 ounces of silver, 
making him one of the nation’s largest holders of the metal.  It appeared that Coughlin 
was using his radio pulpit to promote a policy that, if adopted, would make his 
organisation extremely wealthy.  Naturally, exposure of this information would be highly 
damaging to Coughlin’s personal reputation and the effectiveness of his political 
campaign.  On April 25, seeking to undermine support for the silver advocates in 
Senate and destroy Coughlin’s reputation, Roosevelt personally authorised Secretary 
of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to release the list of names of significant silver-
holders to the press.  Despite Ms Collins’s claims that she had invested the League’s 
funds in silver of her own volition, without Coughlin’s knowledge, the coincidence of 
one of America’s most public advocates of silver being one of the nation’s largest 
speculators could not be ignored.  Coughlin was subjected to widespread ridicule and 
gossip.  The New York Times ran a caustic editorial on April 30, 1934, opening with 
Henry Morgenthau’s observation that a part of the clamour for remonetising silver is 
‘not entirely disinterested’ and ended by describing Ms Collins’s explanation of her 
$20,000 purchase as ‘most innocent and touching.’114   
In his next radio broadcast, Coughlin denounced Morgenthau for his actions.  
‘Mr Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,’ he said, ‘has completed his clumsy effort to protect the 
gold advocates, the Federal Reserve bankers, and the international bankers of ill 
repute.’115  Despite his protestations of innocence, Coughlin’s treatment by the 
Roosevelt administration opened his eyes to the nature of his erstwhile alliance with 
the president.  Interviewed in 1970, Coughlin bitterly explained the situation as he had 
realised it:   
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We were supposed to be partners.  He said he would rely on 
me.  That I would be an important advisor.  But he was a liar.  
He never took my advice.  He just used me and when he was 
through he double-crossed me on that silver business.116 
The truth behind Coughlin’s silver purchase is difficult to determine.  He 
vehemently denied knowledge of the actions of his staff.  Yet, it is difficult to believe 
that he was not aware of Ms Collins’ actions.  As with his treatment of Long, Roosevelt 
was unafraid of taking dramatic and, or, decisive action where he believed it necessary.  
His highly effective pre-emptive strike inflicted a significant blow upon Coughlin’s 
credibility.  
Roosevelt, Frances Perkins later wrote, ‘believed in leadership from the office of 
the president.’  This was a leadership informed by access to ‘immense sources of 
information and analysis’ that the Executive Department had and that were available to 
the president.  His New Deal had been born not from parliamentary debate, but from 
the minds of intellectuals and academics.  Challenged by the representatives of the 
people, sometimes this central belief in the power of the Executive led him to exhibit a 
certain frustration with the other arms of government.  Perkins observed that, whilst he 
supported the congressional system, Roosevelt often ‘wished at times that the people 
of the country would be more careful about whom they sent to Congress.’117   When 
this frustration boiled over into outright opposition as it had with Lemke, Cutting and 
Long, there was a real danger that in attempting to silence his opponents, in fact the 
president exacerbated discontent.  This was also true for his opponents outside of 
Congress.  When combined, this discontent led ultimately to the formation of the Union 
Party. 
In the twelve months between the inauguration of the president and the spring 
of 1934, a series of significant shifts occurred amongst those cross-party radical 
reformers who would go on to form the Union Party leadership.  Having first supported 
the political aims of the administration, each rose to directly challenge its authority.  As 
a result, Long, Borah, Lemke and Coughlin found themselves directly opposed by the 
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president, with Townsend rejected out of hand.  These initially unconnected rebellions 
revealed a great deal about the nature of radical opponents to the New Deal: not only 
the personal determination, zeal, political ambition and ability to hold on to power 
among the leaders, but also the deep-seated support for alternative radical reform 
agendas amongst their followers in each of their regional constituencies.  The president 
had attempted to limit many of his opponents, but none had been dealt a knock-out 
blow.  Each had reacted to being knocked down by going on to the offensive.  Despite 
the many skirmishes that had occurred during the first two years of the Roosevelt 
administration, the mid-term elections of 1934 were the first true test of the New Deal’s 
popularity with the electorate.  It was the results of these elections that would 
determine the future course of the Roosevelt administration and ultimately lead to the 
formation of the Union Party in 1936. 
Although a consistent proportion of Republican old-guard congressmen had 
supported the passage of First New Deal legislation, they believed that the faltering 
recovery afforded them the opportunity to achieve significant gains in the mid-term 
elections.   Signalling this change of approach, in June 1934, the RNC issued a 
‘Declaration of Principles’ attacking the New Deal ‘dictatorship’ and placing the 
Republican Party in a position of strong opposition to the administration’s recovery 
plans.118  They were buoyed in this campaign by the formation of the American Liberty 
League in the autumn of 1934.  Its leadership brought together a powerful alliance of 
conservative Democrats from the northeastern states who had originally opposed 
Roosevelt’s nomination in 1932, including former presidential candidates John Davis 
and Al Smith, as well as former executives of the Democratic National Committee John 
Raskob and Jouett Shouse.  Functioning as a pressure group within the Democratic 
Party, the American Liberty League was intended to act as a rallying point for its 
traditional conservative values.  By the autumn of 1934, although the Liberty League 
was populated by Democrats, their criticism of Roosevelt mirrored that of the 
Republican old guard.  Hardly any New Deal policy escaped the League’s disapproval.  
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Amongst a long list of charges, the League accused the Roosevelt administration of 
‘endangering the Constitution,’ of a tendency towards ‘tyranny and dictatorship,’ of 
‘dangerous and deceitful economic planning’ and of ‘ultimately retarding natural 
recovery.’119   
 Despite their optimism, the RNC and the Liberty League had misjudged the 
mood of the middle classes.  Where radical opponents to Roosevelt such as Long and 
Townsend had been successful in galvanising middle-class support for their reform 
campaigns, it had not been because they opposed his drive for reform per se, but 
because they criticised the First New Deal for not going far enough in restoring the 
economy.  In the only mid-term election in modern history in which the majority party 
increased their standing, the Republican Party was crushed.  Winning 26 out of 35 
Senate races, the Democrats increased their majority to 44.  Now holding 74 per cent 
of the seats, the Democratic majority in the House increased to 219.  The 1934 mid-
term elections categorically demonstrated that the 1932 presidential election results 
had not been an anomaly.   Americans demanded economic and social reform, and in 
November 1934, they backed candidates who promised to deliver them what they 
wanted.120   
 The 1934 mid-terms were a clear endorsement of the demand for reform, but 
they cannot be considered a referendum on the success of the First New Deal.  The 
truth was that the Democratic victory concealed a more complex message for the 
administration.  Analysis reveals that where the election had been a straight fight 
between a pro-New-Deal Democrat and a conservative Republican, the New Dealer 
usually won.  However, in those contests where an opponent was supportive of reform 
more radical than that advocated by the administration, that candidate often emerged 
victorious.  The balance of the results demonstrated that a sizeable number of voters 
favoured political candidates more radical than the New Deal alliance.121   
 Evidence of this radicalisation of American politics was evident particularly in 
the western states, where local third parties rose to challenge traditional party 
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dominance.  In Minnesota, reacting to mass protests on the streets of Minneapolis, the 
local Farmer-Labor Party adopted a radical social and economic reform platform for its 
mid-term campaign.  In November, it retained the governorship, 3 of its 4 seats in the 
U.S. House and re-elected Henrik Shipstead to the U.S. Senate.  In comparison, pro-
New-Deal Democrats experienced no increase in their representation.122  Similarly, in 
Wisconsin, Governor Philip La Follette and insurgent Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., 
left the Republican Party in protest at their hardening anti-reform stance, but rather 
than join the Democrats, formed their own Wisconsin Progressive Party.  On many 
points the new party aligned itself with the New Deal, but its platform, calling for the 
redistribution of wealth, aligned it with Roosevelt’s other radical reformist opponents.  
In November, the new Progressive Party won 7 seats in the U.S. House and saw La 
Follette re-elected to the U.S. Senate.  Wisconsin Democrats lost 3 of their seats in the 
House.123 
 In addition, the election marked a significant moment in the development of the 
Townsend movement in California.  Seeking to establish a spokesperson for the 
movement in Washington, Townsend mobilised the movement behind Los Angeles 
Times columnist John McGroarty in his campaign for the 11th Congressional District 
seat on behalf of the Democratic Party.  McGroarty had been an early supporter of the 
Townsend movement.  In a seat which the New York Times described as a 
‘Republican stronghold’ (it had been held by the Republicans since 1918), the 
McGroarty defeated the sitting candidate with a 20 per cent swing of the vote.124   
In the west, Republican Party representation in the Senate dropped from 19 to 
14, but the 4 insurgent reformist senators seeking re-election won – including, despite 
the opposition of the RNC, Bronson Cutting – on platforms advocating a need for more 
radical reform than that offered by the First New Deal.  In the House, the Republican 
insurgent bloc increased their membership to 55.  Despite their isolation from the 
Republican leadership and the Roosevelt administration, the loose insurgent bloc had 
increased its power within the Congress.   Altogether, it is estimated that the new 
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Congress contained 35 senators who advocated reform more radical than that 
supported by the president.125  The 1934 mid-term elections thus redefined the nature 
of opposition to the ruling Democratic party.  The conservative Republican Party and 
Democrat-backed Liberty League had failed to generate electoral support.  In contrast, 
radical reformers (whether Republican, Democrat or third parties) had taken a 
significant step forward in their representation.  The administration could count on a 
significant majority in both the Senate and the House, but with the Congressional 
opposition now likely to call for more reform, the Democrats would be placed 
uncomfortably on the defensive, forced constantly to justify the reasons why they were 
not pursuing a more radical reform agenda.  With the 1936 election two years away, 
the challenge for the Roosevelt administration was now not to convince the American 
public of the need for reform, but to stem calls for radical reform, particularly from the 
west, which went beyond the carefully balanced legislation that formed the First New 
Deal. 
In the wake of the 1934 mid-term election results, the potential vulnerability of 
the Roosevelt administration to the public’s demand for a more radical reform agenda 
was seized upon by Coughlin and Borah.  With Long and Townsend already having 
taken positions of leadership with their national radical opposition movements, in the 
winter of 1934, Coughlin and Borah moved to establish their own independent 
powerbases. 
 In a radio address the Sunday following the mid-term elections, Coughlin 
announced that he had established a new organisation, the National Union for Social 
Justice (NUSJ).126  ‘Its purpose,’ he explained, would be to tell elected officials ‘what 
laws you want passed’ with a view to ‘breaking down the concentration of wealth’ and 
‘eliminating the abuses identified with capitalism.’127  The platform of the NUSJ 
contained 16 proposals linked directly to the theological guidelines set down in Rerum 
Novarum and Quadregesimo Anno, and shared the general social and economic 
reform ideology advocated by Borah, Long, Lemke and Townsend.  These ranged from 
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Coughlin’s monetary reform proposals to nationalisation of public resources, and finally 
a promise, like Long’s, that every citizen willing to work ‘shall receive a just, living, 
annual wage.’128 
Upon its launch, Coughlin established an initial goal of 5 million NUSJ members 
for the NUSJ.  In the two weeks following the initial broadcast, he claimed he received 
over 200,000 requests for membership.  Like SoW, the NUSJ provided Coughlin with a 
national network of supporters.129  The spread of NUSJ membership was impressive.  
Largely mirroring the strongest reach of his broadcasting audience, the NUSJ 
established powerful footholds in the western states (particularly Ohio, Minnesota, 
Illinois, Iowa and Missouri), where Coughlin’s radical reform proposals met with great 
support, and the northeastern states (particularly New York, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), where he attracted support from the 
desperately poor, largely Catholic immigrant workers.  Importantly, this strengthened 
the foothold of anti-New-Deal opposition beyond the west and out nationally into the 
most populated areas of the country.130 
 As the results of the mid-term elections had spurred Coughlin into formal 
political action, they represented the final straw for Borah.  During his long career, the 
senator had frequently been a thorn in the side of the Republican Party.  Borah 
previously had been content to limit his challenge to individual opposition; in December 
1934, however, hardened against both the New Deal administration and the RNC, 
Borah proposed a complete reorganisation and rebuilding of the Republican Party 
along radical reforming lines.131  Borah wrote in November to a Republican candidate 
who had failed to win election, ‘Yes, Simmons, I thought I had a program and you had 
a program.  But it was not the Republican Party’s program.’  He concluded, ‘Those who 
now hold the places of power and influence in the Republican organization did not, and 
do not, stand for the things you and I stood for.’132  Borah informed the press that it was 
his view that the party must re-establish itself if it hoped to win the presidency and 
regain control of Congress.133  Borah’s statement received support from both his 
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senatorial colleagues and, as reflected by the letters that poured into his Washington 
office, the wider public.  ‘The time has arrived for our leaders to stop attacking the 
opposition and preaching fear, under the guise of “saving our great country,”’ wrote 
one supporter, ‘and start saving the Republican Party.’134   
 On December 13, 1934, in a speech broadcast live on national radio, Borah 
demanded that younger, more liberal elements be allowed to take over the Republican 
Party.  The party could survive as a viable alternative to the Democrats, he declared, 
only if it stood for ‘protection of the rights, liberties and economic privileges of the 
average man and woman’ against monopoly and privilege.  He presented no detailed 
campaign pledges, but his overall ambition for his new movement was clear.  ‘We must 
be prepared to adopt a system of economic and social justice,’ he said.  ‘We must be 
prepared,’ he concluded, ‘to adopt a system for more equitable distribution of the 
wealth of this country.’135  His use of language was precise and deliberate.  Social 
justice and wealth redistribution, the core shared elements of the Long, Coughlin and 
Townsend ideologies were to be the focus of Borah’s new political movement.     
 Without access to the financial resources required to establish alternative 
structures within the party to deliver his reform agenda, Borah attempted to drive his 
reforms from the grassroots.  Following his national broadcast, he wrote to the leaders 
of Young Republican clubs across the nation, suggesting that they organise state 
conferences to debate his proposals for party reform.  Having established support at 
state level, he then intended to call a national conference of Young Republicans to 
endorse his proposals formally.  Under such pressure, he believed, the old guard 
would have little alternative but to accept his reform plans.136  ‘I sincerely hope,’ he 
wrote to one student supporter, ‘we may be able to arouse sufficient interest to bring 
about a real reorganization, an organization with a liberal outlook.’137  Chicago Daily 
News publisher Frank Knox, who had taken leadership of Borah’s reform campaign in 
the western states, wrote to the senator in December 1934 to report rapid progress.  
With the general opinion strongly behind Borah’s proposals, ‘there will be no difficulty, I 
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think, in securing a skeleton of an organization of the younger Republicans in 
substantially every state in this section.’138  Like Long, Townsend and Coughlin before 
him, Borah had set about building his own network of grassroots support outside of 
Congress from which to target the administration. 
 Against the background of economic stagnation, it is not surprising that Borah, 
Lemke, Long, Townsend and Coughlin, questioning the conservative and limited 
reforms contained within the First New Deal, had been quickly able to generate support 
amongst the electorate.  The platforms of the SoW, NUSJ, OARP and Borah’s skeletal 
Republican youth movement were different in their detailed reform proposals, but were 
united in a common belief that it was the abuses of the economic system that had 
triggered the Depression and, left unchecked, would perpetuate it.  Their separate 
solutions to America’s problems were intended to wrest power from the centre and 
return it to the people.  They charged Roosevelt and his New Deal with neglecting to 
alter the structure of American society for the renewed good of the individual.  They 
believed the New Deal had failed to curb the power of the super-rich, had not re-valued 
the currency and had refused to redistribute wealth.  What the First New Deal had 
done, they concluded, was counterproductive, limiting the power of the individual by 
creating programmes of ‘overbearing intrusiveness’ and a huge bureaucracy that 
existed only to interfere in matters that were properly for the individual and his local 
community.139  With millions of middle-class Americans having lost their jobs and 
homes in the Depression and having so far failed to see a restoration of their position 
from the agencies of the New Deal, the reformers offered individual messages of hope 
that fell on open and willing ears.  To date, motivated by their individual goals, the men 
had not attempted to work together in a co-ordinated, strategic effort to achieve a 
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Wrong will find a voice.  It is useless to try and hush the voice; 
the wise thing is to right the wrong.  
Archibald Stinson Coody, April 7, 1935.1 
 
 
Until November 1934, those men who would go on to influence the formation of the 
Union Party were working in isolation in their campaigns against the New Deal.  
However, from January 1935, in various combinations, Charles Coughlin, Francis 
Townsend, William Borah, William Lemke, Huey Long and Gerald Smith began 
collaborating or were regarded by the public as working together to achieve similar 
goals.  This chapter will consider the factors that drove this convergence, looking 
particularly at how important the actions of the administration were in bringing its 
opponents together.   
The convergence was set in motion during the January 1935 senatorial debate 
over a resolution of adherence for the United States to join the World Court.  This 
debate brought Borah, Coughlin and Long into a loose coalition working for a single 
aim: to defeat the resolution.  Although they had no pre-planed strategy, with Long and 
Borah leading the opposition within the Senate, Coughlin rallied his listeners to 
challenge their senators to defeat the administration.  So effective was this political 
coalition that in May 1935, only months after Roosevelt had led the Democrats to an 
overwhelming victory in the mid-term elections, Democratic Party Chairman James 
Farley recorded in his private file notes his belief that ‘a considerable change in 
sentiment has taken place in the last few weeks relative to the president’s popularity.  I 
think that right now, the president is weaker that at any time since inauguration.’2   
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The diverse radical reformers opposed to the New Deal had, to date, concerned 
themselves solely with domestic issues; however, there was an intimate connection 
between Borah, Coughlin and Long’s core ideological beliefs and their opposition to 
U.S. membership of the World Court.  The Depression, they believed, had been 
brought about not by American failings, but by the manipulation of the U.S. financial 
system by European banking families.  Their proposed policy responses to this, 
particularly their currency manipulation plans, sought to free America from interference 
from international affairs and reassert traditional values of independence, isolation and 
self-determination.  It was, therefore, consistent with their beliefs that they should 
oppose membership of a court that might require the U.S. to support collective 
judgements on the actions of other nations that might not be in the best interests of 
American citizens.  Worse, membership of the World Court made the U.S. vulnerable 
to binding judgements on its own foreign policy actions by those very powers, 
particularly in Europe, whom the radical reformers blamed for the failure of the 
American economy.3  
The initial resolution for the U.S. to join the World Court had been presented to 
the Senate in 1926 but with Borah leading the opposition it proved impossible to muster 
the two-thirds majority required for passage.  In the autumn of 1934, faced with the 
growing threat to world peace from European fascist states, Democratic Senate 
Majority Leader Joe Robinson persuaded President Roosevelt that the time had come 
for American action to restore order to international security.4  Membership of the World 
Court, Robinson believed, would provide the first stepping-stone for greater American 
involvement in world affairs.  The debate on membership of the World Court thus 
presented two alternative visions for the future involvement of the nation in global 
politics.   
Despite minority opposition within the Senate, the Democrats’ forty-four 
member majority suggested that passage was likely.  An informal poll of senators 
published in the New York Times on January 12, 1935 found only twelve likely to 
65 
 
oppose the final resolution.  ‘“Bitter-end” opposition’ to the adherence resolution, they 
concluded, ‘had largely evaporated.’5  Two days later, when the resolution was 
presented to the Senate, the New York Times reported that Borah had ‘served notice 
that he will make a determined stand’ in opposition, but predicted the issue would be 
‘answered soon and in the affirmative.’6  Considering the issue no more than a 
technicality, the New York Times and, more importantly, the Roosevelt administration 
underestimated the strength of feeling amongst insurgent senators against the 
resolution and their ability to rally uncertain Democrats to their side.  For the leaders of 
the radical reform movements, the World Court debate offered a high-profile platform 
for their campaign against the failings of the Roosevelt presidency.  Borah, Long and 
the other insurgent senators focused their opposition around a set of well-articulated 
arguments that clinically demonstrated the potential threat the court presented both to 
American independence and the nation’s economic recovery.  This changed the entire 
tenor of the debate and surprised the administration. 
On January 7, Long began his campaign against the World Court resolution in a 
speech delivered to a crowded Senate, but his words were directed not only to those 
present in the chamber, but to the wider American people too.  He first attacked the 
president for his duplicity toward those reform-minded supporters of his election: ‘Were 
we fighting because of our personal love of Franklin Delano Roosevelt?  Were we 
fighting because we wanted the Democratic emblem above the White House?’  No, he 
explained, they were fighting because Roosevelt had pledged that there must be a 
redistribution of wealth.  However, rather than reward them, Roosevelt had turned on 
his erstwhile allies.  ‘I have never yet been taught the line,’ Long challenged, ‘by which 
you allow your friend to pull you as far up the hill as he can and then stab him in the 
back so you can put somebody else in his place.’  To applause, the Louisiana senator 
concluded, ‘I will not be found in that kind of politics.’7  Following his Senate speech, 
Long delivered a series of national radio addresses elaborating on his themes and not 
hiding his intent:  ‘We must now be awakened!  We must know the truth and speak the 
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truth.  There is no use to wait three more years.  It is not Roosevelt or ruin, it is 
Roosevelt’s ruin.’8 By fusing the president’s deficiencies, and the perceived 
shortcomings of the First New Deal with the apparent folly of entry into the World Court, 
Long connected the concerns of his supporters, and those of the other independent 
radical reform movements, with the political question being set before the Senate.  
Having taken the debate to the nation through the power of the radio, Long had 
extended the debate beyond the constraints of Congress and challenged the American 
public to oppose entry into the court.  
 Long set out his formal opposition to the World Court resolution on the third day 
of debate; ‘waving his arms and shouting at the top of his voice,’ he condemned the 
administration’s proposal in a three-hour attack promoting his values of American 
isolation and independence.  The countries of Europe had spent the last one hundred 
years in the development of pacts and treaties that had resulted in the Great War, he 
said, but the American continent had largely remained at peace.  ‘America has to 
decide now,’ he finished, ‘how it will regard its rights.  Will we say: “We remain here 
willing to be friendly, but without you to pass upon the question of whether or not we 
are maintaining the proper friendly attitude?”’9   
 The approach taken by Long was followed directly by other senatorial 
opponents to the resolution.  Four days after Long’s intervention, Borah presented his 
case.  Most of his speech was devoted to a carefully presented review of the court 
opinion that had ruled against the 1931 Austro-German tariff treaty.  This opinion, 
Borah warned, had not been reached because Austria or Germany had breached 
international law, but ‘to accomplish a political end.’  Borah concluded that ‘political and 
economic questions and national feeling will inevitability intrude in the advisory 
opinions of the court,’ because they were open to corruption caused by national 
political interests.  Why should the U.S. be forced to back a court ruling upon the 
interests of another continent?10  Fellow Republican insurgent Senator Hiram Johnson 
of California backed Borah’s argument in the simplest terms.  ‘The question is, shall we 
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go into foreign politics,’ he said.  ‘Once we’re in, we’re in.  Europe wants us on any 
pretext, and it will be hard to get out.’11  
These isolationist appeals to American nationalism unsettled the Senate.  By 
the end of the first week of debate, the New York Times reported that the number of 
senators in favour was estimated to have fallen below the required two thirds to enable 
passage.12  This marked a significant victory for Long, Borah and the other opponents 
to court membership.  Well aware that the administration would use its influence to rally 
those senators who supported the World Court resolution, congressional opponents 
attempted to generate their own pressure against wavering colleagues through a direct 
appeal to the American public.  Here Father Coughlin proved a significant ally.  Taking 
to the air for his regular sermon on January 20, Coughlin expressed outright opposition 
to American membership of the World Court.  Presenting the administration proposal 
as ‘crude internationalism,’ he challenged the Senate to think of the common man: it is 
‘neither the farmer nor the laborer,’ he said, ‘who is anxious that we go international.’  
Membership of the World Court was merely a distraction.  To the minds of the common 
man, ‘our struggle is to preserve the American standard of living, or rather to restore it,’ 
he concluded, ‘rather than to enmesh ourselves with the debasements of the 
standardized poverty of Europe.’13 By connecting the ‘new’ unemployed lower middle-
class voters’ discontent with the perceived failing of the First New Deal directly to the 
World Court debate, Coughlin touched a raw nerve.  To the priest’s radio audience, the 
administration’s push for membership of the World Court became symbolic of 
Roosevelt’s alleged distance and detachment from the will of the electorate.  Defeat of 
the resolution thus took on a broader political significance.   
The escalation of the World Court opponents’ campaign against the resolution 
outside of Congress had not been anticipated by the administration.  With Roosevelt 
criticising the ‘devious ways’ of his opponents, the administration found it difficult to 
present an argument that countered these direct appeals for American self-
determination and economic self-interest.14  Following a further week of debate, with 
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the final vote scheduled for January 29, over the weekend of 26-27 January, the 
administration sought to regain the upper hand in the debate and it made a series of 
direct radio appeals to the electorate.  To demonstrate its commitment to the court, the 
administration aired radio talks from First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Senate Majority 
Leader Joe Robinson, Democratic Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, Monsignor 
John Ryan of Catholic University in Washington, D.C., U.S. Army General John F. 
O’Ryan and former Democratic Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.  Each sought to 
persuade the nation that the World Court was needed to ensure global peace and 
security.  ‘The World Court,’ concluded General O’Ryan, is ‘simply the legal machinery 
for the settlement of international disputes by reason and justice, instead of war and 
homicide.’15   
To Coughlin and the opponents of the court, however, the threat of war was not 
a primary concern.  They believed that the World Court debate was a distraction from 
the administration’s primary goal of solving the economic crisis and easing the 
everyday national problems caused by mass unemployment and poverty.  In response, 
seeking to exploit this alleged disconnection between the administration and the 
electorate, Coughlin, in his sermon broadcast on January 27, dismissed all arguments 
in favour of the court and appealed directly to ‘every solid American who loves 
democracy, who loves the United States, who loves the truth,’ to support the ‘tried and 
true’ senators in their ‘fight to keep America safe for Americans and not the hunting 
ground of international plutocrats.’  In a show of strength, he rallied his audience 
against the supposed destruction of the American way of life: ‘Today – tomorrow may 
be too late – today, whether you can afford it or not, send your senators telegrams 
telling them to vote “No” on our entrance into the World Court.’16  The response was 
overwhelming.  Western Union reported an immediate overnight increase in the 
number of telegrams directed to the Capitol Building; by Tuesday, over 40,000 
telegrams had been received in Washington, D.C.17  Attempts by the administration to 
generate public support for the resolution appeared to have failed.   
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Coughlin’s speech delivered Long the mandate he needed, and he entered the 
Senate on Monday morning with a strict agenda.  The New York Times described him 
hurrying ‘around the Senate floor, exhorting senators on the doubtful list.’18  Long took 
every opportunity over the next two days to detail his objections.  Accepting likely 
defeat, Joe Robinson’s final statement to the Senate directly attributed the influence of 
Coughlin and Long on the outcome of the debate.  ‘There has been unfair, unjust, 
unreasonable propaganda,’ he said.  ‘Appeals have come through more than 40,000 
telegrams, every one prompted by inflammatory statements.’  There was no conspiracy 
to enter the World Court on behalf of the international bankers: ‘That sounds like the 
senator from Louisiana, does it not?’ he asked.  ‘If there be conspiracy at this hour,’ he 
concluded, ‘it is in the methods pursued by those who seek to mislead the judgement 
of the American people.’  When the roll was called, 52 senators voted in favour and 36 
against.  The resolution had failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority.  By 
appealing directly to the general public, Long, Coughlin and Borah brought about a 
substantial and embarrassing defeat.  Voting in opposition, a hardcore of insurgent 
Republican senators and their allies had joined with a bloc of 20 Democrats (including 
Huey Long) to openly defy the will of the administration.19   According to the New York 
Times, Borah ‘uttered a fervent “Thank God!” and declared it the most important 
decision since the U.S. entry into the First World War.’20   
The high profile senatorial debate established a political relationship between 
Long, Borah and the priest.  Immediately after the Senate vote, Borah telegrammed 
Coughlin: ‘How deeply indebted we are to you for this great victory.  Thank you again 
and again.’21  Thereafter, Coughlin and Borah kept in close touch, corresponding in 
detail on issues relating to the increasing national debt and Coughlin’s campaign to 
remonetise silver.  In addition, Borah was made aware of developments within the 
NUSJ through meetings with Coughlin’s Washington agent, Louis B. Ward.22  
Immediately following the World Court vote, Long ‘expressed satisfaction and pleasure’ 
to the press and credited the joint attack he had developed with Coughlin for the 
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defeat.23  Commentators reflecting upon the reasons for the administration’s defeat 
directly attributed it to the strategy developed by Coughlin, Long and Borah.24  By 
focusing their arguments on issues that broke through party lines and generating a 
national debate outside of the closed political cauldron of the Senate chamber, 
according to the New York Times, the individual leaders of the radical reform 
movements opposed to the New Deal successfully relieved Democratic senators ‘of 
any obligations of loyalty to the president or to the party platform pledge on which the 
president based his call for adherence.’25 Further, the telegrams generated by 
Coughlin’s direct public appeal, Krock observed, ‘played a significant part in swinging 
enough senators into the negative to muster more than the necessary one-third against 
the court.’26  By connecting their opposition to the World Court resolution with 
dissatisfaction at the pace of reform under the First New Deal, Roosevelt’s opponents 
successfully capitalised on the shift in public opinion revealed in the mid-term election 
results and inflicted a major defeat on the president.  Senatorial opposition had been 
successfully allied to the priest’s populist communication agenda with powerful effect.  
Coughlin recognised the power that his radio pulpit provided him and, in his next radio 
broadcast, set out this new agenda for the nation:  
Your excursion into the affairs of the World Court politics has 
demonstrated to you a newer concept of democracy.  Through 
the medium of radio and the telegraph, you possess the power 
to override the invisible government, to direct your 
representatives on individual matters of legislation.27  
Press commentators, directly attributing the defeat to the efforts of Coughlin 
and Long, enhanced their national political credibility.  The president’s attention to the 
World Court made him appear out of touch with the material causes of poverty.  By 
contrast, appealing directly to the will of the voters, Long and Coughlin offered the 
nation a new form of more direct, relevant leadership.   The success of Coughlin’s 
communication campaign can be measured by the volume of letters reaching the White 
House in the wake of the defeat directly criticising the president for his pursuit of 
membership of the court.  ‘We might better be dead, than living as we are, you have 
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failed us so far,’ wrote one.  ‘Go to Hell,’ wrote another.  ‘Huey Long is the man we 
thought you were when we voted for you,’ wrote a Long supporter.  ‘I hope you will 
support him for president in 1936.’28   
On March 3, 1935, Coughlin, riding on a wave of support, marked the second 
anniversary of Roosevelt’s inauguration with an attack on the president’s compromises 
with the ‘money-changers’ and ‘monopolistic industry’ that he alleged had corrupted the 
New Deal.  The World Court defeat was just the beginning, he warned, of a larger 
struggle with the Roosevelt administration.  ‘In the past there was no compromise,’ he 
concluded. ‘In the present there can be no compromise, if a new liberty, a further 
freedom shall be born.’29  Reflecting upon the impact of the World Court vote on the 
president, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman commented that the tide 
of public opinion was now running strongly against the administration and that ‘unless 
the president did something to change the current mood during the next thirty days,’ he 
would not be re-elected in 1936.30  Roosevelt himself conceded: ‘These are not normal 
times; people are jumpy and very ready to run after strange gods.’31 Decisively 
outmanoeuvred on the court agenda, the president needed to seize back the initiative.     
On February 12, 1935, meeting for their national convention, the American 
Bankers’ Association announced a series of steps to counter ‘public hostility’ towards 
them.  ‘Constructive articles about banking and sound financial policies’ had been 
distributed to 6,000 newspapers, the association reported, banks had been encouraged 
to work more closely with local communities, and the association’s advertising 
department had been expanded.  James W. Anderson, Vice-President of the First and 
Merchants National Bank of Richmond, Virginia, explained to reporters that the 
purpose of this investment was to ‘set up a defense against the various forms of 
interference or attack that from time to time assail our banks.’  ‘In recent months 
bankers have been widely misrepresented,’ said G. M. Hubbard, President of Doremus 
& Co.  These ‘so-called experts,’ commented Dr. Harold Stonier, Director of the 
American Bankers’ Association Graduate School of Banking at Rutgers University, 
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New Jersey, exacerbated the continued economic problems of the country.  In fact, Dr. 
Stonier concluded, unfounded ‘money theories’ were having a ‘dangerous’ impact, 
particularly in the capital markets, where investment was being undermined by the 
‘impact of fear’ more than ‘the outcome of economic theory.’32  Coughlin and Long 
could afford to scoff at the concerns of the banking community, but Roosevelt could 
not.  Having been able to generate public and political force behind their individual 
campaigns, the leaders of the individual radical reform movements threatened the 
president’s re-election, now less than two years away.  In March 1935, Roosevelt, 
cognisant of the political threat posed by opponents advocating reform more radical 
than that contained within the First New Deal, sanctioned a series of actions intended 
to undermine their credibility and regain the centre ground.  In turn, these actions 
helped bring the men together in the mind of the public, and increasingly, in reality.   
In the wake of the comments made at the American Bankers’ Association 
conference, former National Recovery Agency Director Hugh Johnson approached 
Roosevelt with a suggestion that he should respond to the criticisms from Long and 
Coughlin on behalf of the administration.  With the president in agreement, Johnson’s 
response came on March 4, 1935, in a speech broadcast over the NBC network.  What 
the national radio audience heard was ‘unheralded, unexpected but welcomed,’ 
commented the New York Times.33 
Two years ago, Johnson began, the president had taken office with the nation 
under a gloom not experienced since Valley Forge.  Roosevelt had shone a beam of 
light, and offered hope to the people.  Now, he concluded, malicious figures motivated 
by selfishness and self-interest had cast their own shadow over the nation.  ‘It is my 
purpose here,’ he explained, ‘with what force God has given me to smash at two of 
them.’  Driven only by their quest for power and self-aggrandisement, Long and 
Coughlin were, he said, exploiting a nation too emotionally weak to distinguish fact 
from fiction.  Placing them in direct contrast to Roosevelt, Johnson painted a graphic 
picture for his listeners of two men who were ‘raging up and down this land preaching 
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not construction, but destruction, not reform, but revolution, not peace but a sword.’  If 
poverty could have been eradicated by such simple schemes as Long and Coughlin 
advocated, he said, it would have been done decades ago.  The two radical reformers 
had become leaders of an ‘emotional fringe’ joined in an ‘open alliance’ to remove the 
president and place Long in the White House. ‘You can laugh at Father Coughlin – you 
can snort at Huey Long,’ he warned, ‘but this country was never under a greater 
menace.’34  
The press response to the speech was astonishing.  The New York Times 
commented that it was ‘like the break-up of a long hard winter.’35  The story featured 
prominently on the front page of all of the major national and regional newspapers.  
Most, including the New York Times, included the full text of Johnson’s speech 
alongside their report.   ‘General Johnson Flays Father Coughlin and Huey Long,’ 
declared the Pittsburgh Press.  ‘Hugh S. Johnson hits Coughlin, Long as Menace,’ 
wrote the Chicago Tribune.  The Milwaukee Journal described the speech as ‘bitingly 
effective.’  ‘Whether one agrees with Gen. Johnson or not,’ the Milwaukee Journal 
commented, ‘his fearlessness, his clearness of statement, and his readiness to “take it” 
as well as “dish it out” arouses admiration.’36   
Placed surprisingly on the defensive by the actions of the administration (in the 
Senate the next day, Long declared the speech ‘abusive and indecent’), the Louisiana 
senator and the priest sought an immediate opportunity to respond.37  Recognising the 
potential of the story, NBC radio offered the two men slots in which to offer their 
rebuttals.  Long’s March 7 speech and Coughlin’s of March 11, 1935, were similar in 
tone and message.  Where Johnson had used the melodramatic to illustrate his 
address, Long and Coughlin responded with uncharacteristically reasoned and rational 
argument.  To an audience of 25 million listeners, Long used his time for a full 
exposition of his Share-our-Wealth programme.  He called upon the president to ‘admit 
the facts’ and confess that the present policies were making conditions ‘worse and not 
better.’  In his speech, Coughlin explained that Johnson was merely a pawn in a game 
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controlled by the international bankers.  He appealed to his listeners to bear no ill will; 
Johnson, he concluded, was ‘to be pitied and not condemned.’38 By juxtaposing 
Johnson’s rhetoric with reasoned argument, Long and Coughlin directly disproved his 
central message that they were dangerous extremists motivated only by their hatred of 
Roosevelt and a quest for personal power.  With large sections of the electorate 
apparently willing to back Coughlin and Long, Johnson’s speech only served to 
reinforce how apparently detached the administration was from a section of public 
opinion.  Roosevelt had seriously misjudged Long and Coughlin’s abilities.  There was 
no doubt who had won this skirmish.  ‘The excommunication of Huey Long and Father 
Coughlin,’ said the Nation, ‘has turned into a demonstration of political feeble-
mindedness.’  A week ago, the New York Times explained, Long ‘might have been 
written down as a bumptious clown seeking mainly personal attention.’  Now ‘there is a 
strong feeling, at least in Washington, that the “Kingfish” may have to be taken 
seriously.’  Johnson’s attack had provided Long and Coughlin with a national platform, 
raised their profiles and effectively designated them as leaders of those Americans 
seeking more radical reforms than those included in the First New Deal.  ‘Whether they 
willed it or not,’ commented the New York Times, General Johnson ‘then and there 
probably transformed Huey Long from a clown into a real political menace.’  Nothing, 
The Nation concluded, could now stop Long, except ‘the one likelihood he himself 
mentions on every possible occasion – that Roosevelt will keep his promises!’39 
In March 1935, Long and Coughlin were at the very height of their public fame.  
Yet whilst their use of the radio provided them with a national pulpit to preach their 
message, it was an ineffective medium of control and provided no basis from which to 
manage an active political organisation.  Although Long and Coughlin shared their 
vocal skills with the populist rabble-rousers of the past age, if they were to turn their 
words into mass action, they needed to step out from behind the microphone and 
engage directly with their supporters.  Thus throughout the spring of 1935, Coughlin 
and Long sought to capitalise upon their national media status by increasing their 
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public campaigning.  In a series of large-scale public events, the two men individually 
toured the country spreading their messages.  On March 14, Long, speaking before 
16,000 people assembled in the convention hall in Philadelphia, denounced the 
Roosevelt administration, charging that the president had ‘betrayed’ the people.  It was, 
the New York Times observed, one of the ‘most adroit political moves [Long] has 
shown in the national arena.’  Long followed the Philadelphia rally with a speech before 
the 10,000 delegates of the convention of the National Farmers’ Holiday Association in 
Des Moines, Iowa, on April 27.  ‘The Lord has called America to barbecue,’ he cried, 
‘and 50 million people are starving.’40 
On April 24, Father Coughlin similarly responded with a presentation before the 
Michigan Unit of the NUSJ in the Olympia Auditorium, Detroit.  Fifteen thousand people 
filled the hall, whilst thousands more gathered outside to listen over loudspeakers.  In 
his main address, Coughlin charged Roosevelt with failing the American people.  
‘Against this immorality,’ Coughlin declared, ‘the NUSJ raises its voice and stands 
prepared to throw its unlimited force.’41  On May 8, Coughlin followed the Michigan 
event with a speech before 25,000 people, the largest crowd ever assembled in the 
Cleveland Public Auditorium.  Another 3,000 listened outside over loudspeakers.  
Finally, on May 22 Coughlin ended his tour in front of 23,000 paying attendees packed 
into Madison Square Garden, New York City.  Having built himself up to a fever pitch, 
Coughlin concluded by declaring that ‘this plutocratic capitalistic system must be 
constitutionally voted out of existence.’  As the New York Times reported, there was a 
moment’s silence while these words sank into the consciousness of the crowd.  Then a 
roar broke out and lasted with almost deafening intensity for one full minute.  Coughlin 
finished his tour before a capacity audience of 18,000 in St Louis, Missouri.42  
Johnson’s speech was a grave political misjudgement.  Linking together the 
names of Long and Coughlin in the public consciousness, the Roosevelt administration 
singled them out from amongst a number of the New Deal critics and ironically justified 
their credentials as protest leaders of America.  Rather than diminishing their standing, 
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it enhanced both their coverage in the national press, and provided a platform for the 
men to launch a public campaign against the failures and excesses of the 
administration.  Most significantly, however, by criticising Long and Coughlin together, 
the administration helped to further a strategic union between them that had not clearly 
existed before Johnson’s speech.  Having stated it as a fact, however, the existence of 
the ‘open alliance’ was reinforced by the nation’s press.  Where the detail of every 
Long and Coughlin speech filled the pages of the nation’s newspapers, articles on one 
of the men increasingly referenced the other.  ‘You are bound to compare Father 
Coughlin with Huey Long,’ wrote Walter Davenport in Collier’s Magazine.43  The most 
significant example of the press linking the independent radical reform movements and 
their leaders, however, was published by the New York Times on March 17, 1935.  In a 
full-page article run under the headline ‘Three ‘Pied Pipers’ of the Depression,’ the 
Times analysed the appeal of Coughlin and Long but, significantly, also the ‘shadowy’ 
Doctor Townsend, who had been excluded from Johnson’s criticism but whom the 
Times considered potentially the most powerful of the three.  By doing so, the New 
York Times helped to extend and enhance the coherence of the president’s radical 
reforming opponents – explicitly linking the three movements, political ideologies and 
their motivations.  ‘Call them spellbinders, rabble-rousers, demagogues, or what you 
will,’ the article concluded, ‘they cannot be dismissed in the present temper of the 
country.’44   
Most importantly, the ‘open alliance’ started to take on a genuine form. 
Thereafter, Coughlin visited Washington regularly and would meet Long in his hotel 
suite for many hours of discussions.  One Long bodyguard revealed in an interview 
with historian T. Harry Williams that Coughlin would talk to Long every week before he 
would go on the air for his Sunday talk.45  Furthermore, supporters of the distinct 
protest organisations established by Long and Coughlin began to merge the two 
leaders into one.  ‘I am just home from a trip out over parts of this state,’ a Wisconsin 
man wrote to Harold Ickes, ‘and I was surprised to find life-long Democrats and 
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Republicans saying bluntly, we are all done with both of the old parties, and we are for 
Senator Huey Long, and for Father Charles E. Coughlin’s National Union for Social 
Justice.’  At an organisational level, the loose confederation of clubs began to work 
together.  A local SoW society in Chicago joined together with the NUSJ to lobby for 
permission to use Soldier’s Field, Chicago, for an additional stop on Coughlin’s tour.46  
On March 11, 1935, the New York Times, reflecting on the rise of Roosevelt’s radical 
reformist opponents both nationally and at state level in the west, reported a bold 
projection from one Republican Party strategist.   Long and Coughlin, the source 
concluded, ‘were the centre of a movement around which it is hoped to combine all 
dissatisfied into a new party next year.’47  
Observing the growth of Long and Coughlin’s power from Mississippi, former 
Secretary of the State Tax Board, Archibald Stinson Coody despaired at the botched 
action taken by the administration to confront the men.  ‘Those who oppose Huey only 
make him stronger,’ he explained in a letter to Mississippi Democratic Senator 
Theodore Bilbo.  ‘The trouble is not with Huey but with the conditions.  If we were in 
good shape, Huey would not get a listener.’  The solution that Stinson Coody offered 
was simple but prophetic.  ‘Wrong will find a voice,’ he concluded.  ‘It is useless to try 
and hush the voice; the wise thing is to right the wrong.’48   
In the spring of 1935, President Roosevelt began to evaluate the progress that 
had been made in dealing with the fundamental problems of the Depression during his 
administration.  He also began to map out a course towards the 1936 presidential 
election.  However, with men like Long, Coughlin and Townsend making inroads into 
his political support and the progress of his reforms challenged by the Republican 
reformist insurgent bloc in the Senate led by Borah, Roosevelt made what the New 
York Times called ‘a definite and highly important shift in [his] technique.’  If Roosevelt 
was to win re-election, he needed to get a grasp on the political situation and drain the 
support of his opponents.49   
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 The time for academic assessment and detailed planning had passed.  As the 
New York Times headlined on March 24, 1935, there was to be a ‘Dramatic Fade-out 
of the Brain Trust.’ (‘The mental giants had never been schooled in the ungentle art of 
practical, cut-throat politics,’ the newspaper commented in reference to Rexford 
Tugwell and Arthur Moley).  Instead of relying on an eclectic group of intellectuals, the 
president turned, as the Times concluded, to the ‘old-fashioned practice of relying on 
the judgement principally of practical politicians.’  During the early months of 1935, 
Roosevelt distanced himself from the more academic members of the Brain Trust, 
favouring the advice of his more practical and seasoned advisors such as Felix 
Frankfurter, Harry Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau and Henry Wallace. Together, between 
January and August 1935, Roosevelt and his new team of advisors developed a 
Second New Deal that incorporated elements of the platforms of the radical reform 
movements within his own agenda.  In this way, Roosevelt responded directly to the 
unresolved issues of former middle-class voters who remained impoverished by the 
Depression and diminished his opponent’s appeal.50 
Even as late as November 1934, Roosevelt’s approach to resolving the 
Depression had been typified by the First New Deal’s focus on appeals for what 
historian James Holt called ‘national unity, cooperation and social solidarity.’  In the 
spring of 1935, however, as the administration backed legislation that would form the 
Second New Deal passed through Congress – the Social Security and the National 
Labor Relation Acts, redistributive tax proposals, and the Works Progress and National 
Youth Administrations – such appeals diminished and were replaced by what Holt 
called ‘assaults on privilege and social injustice.’  Many of these proposals had in fact 
been presented within the Democratic platform in 1932, but had been largely absent 
from the First New Deal.   The Second New Deal did not therefore mark a rejection of 
the philosophy that underpinned the first, for a fundamental belief in the need to 
rehabilitate the existing capitalist structure remained.  What emerged, however, was a 
new legislative framework that accommodated elements drawn from the radical 
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reformers’ independent policy platforms including old-age pensions and wealth 
redistribution, within the structure of the Brain Trust’s original plans.  The more socially 
inclusive shift in the New Deal’s focus was a gamble worth taking if Roosevelt could 
secure the support of a much wider range of voters who had been wooed by the 
political appeal of his opponents.51   
The first plank of the Second New Deal was the Social Security Bill presented 
to Congress by the president’s Committee on Economic Security in January 1935.  
Designed to replace the temporary Federal Emergency Relief Act, the bill included 
proposals for the introduction of unemployment and old-age insurance.  The intention 
of the bill was to provide workers with basic insurance against the unpredictable effects 
of the economic cycle that might leave them temporarily unemployed, as well as a 
pension entitlement to enable aged workers to remove themselves entirely from the 
workforce.  Designed to be sustainable, the provisions of the bill were not huge: for 
example, the old-age pension entitlement was pegged at $30 a month rather than 
Townsend’s proposed $200.  It furthermore excluded medical insurance and certain 
categories of workers, including some of the poorest.  Funded through a combination of 
new income and sales taxes rather than a federal grant, the legislation was 
complicated and deflationary, but despite its potential limitations, it found general 
support in the nation.52   
Representatives of all political parties hailed the president for his bold move in 
bringing forward social security legislation: ‘First rate,’ commented Republican Senator 
George Norris of Nebraska.  Some insurgent senators, however, criticised the 
proposed pension provision for not going far enough and for its regressive and 
deflationary tendencies: ‘Inadequate,’ commented Republican Senator Charles McNary 
of Oregon. ‘Wholly inadequate,’ declared Borah, predictably.53  Like his radical reform 
minded colleagues in the Senate, Townsend rejected the moderate Social Security Bill 
and sought to use the congressional debate to seek the incorporation of his alternative 
plan within the final act.  On January 24, 1935 Borah, commenting upon the Townsend 
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Plan’s ‘widespread support,’ demanded a ‘full and open’ debate on the proposal.54  
Later that month, in response to Borah’s political pressure and the general success of 
Townsend’s movement, the elderly doctor was called to appear before a congressional 
committee considering the administration’s Social Security plans.  These hearings 
provided a congressional forum for Townsend, but they also exposed his limited 
abilities on the political stage. 
Townsend had never claimed to be a politician.  Indeed, a considerable amount 
of his appeal had been generated by his very distance from the political machine.  His 
key advisor, Robert Clements, was a supreme and efficient salesman, but was no 
political advisor.  Neither Townsend nor Clements was prepared for exposure to 
congressional politics.  Ill-advised and unaware of the protocol of Washington, the 
doctor performed poorly.  Called in front of the committee, spokespersons for the 
administration repeatedly characterised the Townsend Plan as ‘a fantastic dole’ 
(Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins), a ‘cock-eyed’ proposal depending on miracles 
(Federal Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins), and ‘not within the structure of our 
present economic or governmental system’ (Dr E. E. Witte, Executive Director of the 
Committee on Economic Security).55  Asked whether billionaires John D. Rockefeller 
and Henry Ford would be eligible for the pension, Townsend replied: ‘Certainly, if they 
want it.’  Asked whether use of the pension would be restricted, he replied:  ‘We won’t 
limit it at all.  The pensioner can buy whisky with it if he chooses.  Let him kill himself off 
if he likes.’  When questioned whether his tax proposal would raise the necessary 
funds to pay the pension, he replied, ‘I’m not in the least interested in the cost of the 
plan.’56  Reporting on events, the New York Times focused its comments on 
Townsend’s inexperienced and politically naive performance.  Summing up the 
session, the Times observed that the committee had ‘literally laughed the Townsend 
Plan out of Congress.’57   
When administration supporters on the House Ways and Means Committee 
issued strong criticisms of the Townsend Plan’s viability, Borah met with the doctor to 
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discuss possible amendments that might satisfy the committee’s concerns. Thereafter, 
Borah worked privately on Townsend’s behalf to rally representatives behind the 
Townsend’s pension proposal.58  His efforts, and those of representatives such as 
Republican James Mott of Oregon who issued a plea that when 20 million have said 
that they wanted something more drastic than the administration’s proposals, ‘you 
cannot ridicule or laugh this thing out of existence,’ achieved little.  On a division vote 
(a simple counting of hands) an amendment to the Social Security Bill embodying the 
Townsend Plan failed by 206 votes to 56.59  With the radical pension plan discredited, 
the overwhelming majority of U.S. Representatives supported Roosevelt’s moderate 
Social Security Bill and in April 1935 it passed by 372 votes to 32.60  ‘For months,’ 
reflected the New York Times, ‘the nation has been hearing about the threat of the 
Townsend Plan,’ but that threat simply had not translated into genuine political 
pressure in Washington.  By responding quickly and with ‘perfect party discipline,’ the 
administration had ‘swamp[ed] the advocates of the Townsend Plan.’61   In the absence 
of a formally recorded roll-call vote, it is not possible to undertake a detailed analysis of 
those supporting the amendment, but it is notable that all 6 representatives speaking in 
favour of the OARP plan in the debate were from western states, including 3 from 
Townsend’s native California.  Despite the doctor’s claims of far-reaching support for 
his movement (Townsend told the New York Times on April 21st that he had 1,000 
clubs located outside of the western states), his political power in Washington seemed 
to be limited largely to his most loyal, local representatives.62   
Upon its passage Robert Doughton, Democratic Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, declared the Social Security Act ‘probably the most far-
reaching piece of legislation ever considered by the American Congress.’  By contrast, 
a bitter Townsend attempted to rally his supporters. ‘Nothing,’ he said, ‘will so 
crystallize sentiment and be such a tremendous aid to the Townsend Plan as the 
passage of the administration’s social-security pauper pension bill.’63  Outmanoeuvred 
by politically experienced congressmen, Townsend – ridiculed and found wanting – 
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was plunged into open opposition to the legislation he had led a national movement to 
see enacted.  But although it had been relatively easy for Townsend to generate mass 
public support behind a national pension entitlement, it would prove far more difficult to 
sustain and enhance his movement now that the pension goal had been largely 
achieved.  Borah’s public and private actions in support of the movement, however, 
found great favour with Townsend’s supporters.  Borah’s private correspondence 
included a report of one mass meeting of the OARP in California where, upon the 
reading of a number of the senator’s letters in support of Townsend’s pension plan, the 
‘determined,’ ‘conscientious’ and ‘sincere’ crowd had risen and ‘cheered.’64  Townsend 
himself offered sincere personal appreciation for Borah’s commitment to the 
organisation.65  In defeat, the collaboration between Roosevelt’s opponents had once 
again been strengthened with Townsend and Borah publicly allied over the 
shortcomings of the Social Security Act and the progress of Townsend’s programme.   
The passage of the Social Security Act was followed by two significant 
measures intended to reduce unemployment and improve the conditions of workers.  
These measures were introduced as a result of evidence that Coughlin’s and Long’s 
criticisms of the administration’s apparent lack of economic progress was broadening 
their appeal beyond disenchanted former middle-class voters and out into the 
unionised workforce.  In January 1935 Daniel Tobin, leader of the Teamsters Union, 
wrote to Roosevelt’s close advisor Louis Howe expressing concern that he had 
received dozens of letters from members ‘inquiring about and asking me if they should 
proceed to organise [SoW and NUSJ] clubs, etc., and forward donations.’  Long and 
Coughlin’s broadening appeal was a great concern to Howe and he warned the 
president that ‘it is symptoms like this I think we should watch very carefully.’66 
Responding directly to concerns expressed by Tobin and Howe, in his first 
fireside chat of 1935, delivered on April 28, Roosevelt backed the passage of 
legislation proposed by Democratic Senator Robert Wagner of New York that would 
form the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Roosevelt’s adoption of labour relations 
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legislation was designed to reverse the effects of the employer produced industrial 
codes previously given legal protection under the administration’s National Recovery 
Administration.  Under these codes, the president explained, workers without control 
over their hours or conditions, had overproduced for their employers at very low wages.  
By doing so they had created a glut of products which they, as consumers, could not 
afford to buy.  Roosevelt concluded that, counter to his industrial policy of the First New 
Deal, he now believed that providing workers with the right to organise closed shops 
and the ability to bargain effectively would place the economy on a more stable footing, 
thus protecting the interests of both producers and consumers.67 
The passage of the NLRA was accompanied by two new programmes, the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) and National Youth Administration (NYA), 
designed to reduce unemployment.  These were not wholly new innovations, however.  
Roosevelt had established the Civil Works Administration (CWA) in the spring of 1932, 
but had dismantled it in autumn 1934, concerned that mass federal employment 
created a culture of dependency that held back normal economic recovery.  The 
closure of the CWA had not led to a boost in economic growth.  Thus, in a reversal of 
his position, in April 1935 Roosevelt proposed the passage of the Emergency Relief 
Appropriation Act (ERAA) with the intention of providing $5 billion of funding for the 
WPA and NYA to fund federal employment projects.  Lacking confidence, and without 
funds, consumers were not making purchases; without demand, industry was not 
creating jobs.  If confidence could be improved by increasing the numbers of workers 
on the federal payroll, it was believed, the growth in consumer demand would itself 
lead to the recovery of industry.  By the summer of 1935, six million Americans were 
employed on the federal payroll as workers for the new administration agencies or the 
publicly funded work projects.68  
Like Social Security, the passage of the NLRA and the ERAA was designed in 
the first case to deliver recovery and at the same time weaken electoral support for 
critics such as Coughlin and Long calling for more radical solutions.  Intended to 
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provide a temporary injection of purchasing power into the economy, WPA salary levels 
were set high enough to be attractive to unemployed workers, but low enough to 
encourage the pursuit of private sector employment once the economy had recovered 
sufficiently to generate new jobs.  These ‘poverty’-level wages provided the rallying 
point for Coughlin and Long.  The Louisiana senator accused Roosevelt in the chamber 
of being a ‘scrooch owl’ (an owl that seduced its partner before eating it), and 
succeeded in pushing through an amendment by a margin of one vote (though 
removed in the final bill) raising wage levels above those acceptable to the 
administration.  Outside of Congress, Charles Coughlin, speaking before 23,000 
supporters at Madison Square Garden, accused the WPA of being nothing less than a 
‘breeder of communism.’  Coughlin’s emerging anti-communist rhetoric was not 
directed particularly in opposition to the socially oriented policy outcome of the 
president’s new initiatives.  Indeed, many of these policies were shared in some form 
with planks of the radical reform movements’ diverse platforms.  Rather, these 
accusations of ‘communism’ reflected a significant difference between the radical 
reformers’ social policies, which were rooted in self-determination and individualism 
and which they contrasted to the centralised state control of the New Deal which 
diminished personal social responsibility.  Moreover, in his public comments, Coughlin 
became increasingly critical of what he saw as the president’s mistrust in democracy.  
Coughlin accused the ‘Dictator’ president of the creation of a cult of personality 
governing not through Congress but via agencies answerable only to him and exempt 
from the checks and balances central to the American political system.69  Despite this 
shrill criticism, the reality was that Roosevelt had positioned himself squarely in the 
centre ground.  He had been able to outmanoeuvre Long, Coughlin and Townsend by 
delivering legislation that found widespread appeal, robbing them of their support.  In 
the process he pushed his recalcitrant opponents into increasingly extreme appeals 
that moved them towards the fringes of the political spectrum.  
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The final piece of the jigsaw of legislation that formed the Second New Deal 
was a programme of tax reforms.  In place of the voluntary industrial codes instituted in 
the First New Deal overseen by the National Recovery Agency, Roosevelt moved to 
use the federal tax system to restrain corporations through the redistribution of wealth.  
By doing so, the president removed the basis of his critics’ strongest and most 
consistent attacks upon him.  On June 19, 1935, in a surprise announcement designed 
to wrong-foot his opponents, Roosevelt presented his new taxation programme to 
Congress.  Despite the potentially radical nature of his proposals, in contrast to the 
rabble-rousing of Coughlin and Long, Roosevelt sought to pacify his audience through 
the use of moderate language and a calm tone.  ‘Our revenue laws,’ he explained, 
‘have operated in many ways to the unfair advantage of the few and have done little to 
prevent an unjust concentration of wealth and economic power.’70  To address this, he 
called for a package of new wealth taxes including an inheritance tax, higher taxes on 
gifts, increased rates on very large incomes, and a graduated scale of corporation tax 
rates to replace the existing flat rate.  ‘It seems only equitable,’ he concluded, ‘to adjust 
our tax system in accordance with economic capacity, advantage and fact.’71   
 The president’s proposals received the warm support of Congress – the House 
cheered the announcement – but the president’s political motivation was not missed by 
newspapers across the nation.  The Hartford Courant ran with the headline ‘Tax Plan 
Aimed at Kingfish,’ and the New York Times reported that, through his tax plan, 
Roosevelt had ‘counteracted a host of “fantastic movements” headed by Huey Long, 
Father Coughlin and others.’  ‘It is clear,’ the Times concluded, ‘that [Roosevelt] is 
adroitly and effectively reasserting his leadership.’72    
As the press recognised, the decision to bring forward legislation to share 
wealth placed Long on the defensive.  In response, he attempted to claim credit for 
Roosevelt’s actions in bringing forward wealth redistribution proposals, and, at the 
same time, criticised the tax measures for being woefully inadequate.  In a radio talk on 
July 8, 1935 Long accused Roosevelt of being ‘a liar and a faker’ and defying the 
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administration to ‘indict him for that.’  He finished, ‘Why, he’s copying my share-the-
wealth speeches now I was writing when I was 14 years old.  So he’s just now getting 
as smart as I was when I was in knee breeches.’73  On July 22, Long took once again 
to the airwaves to mark the third anniversary of the president’s nomination.  In his radio 
address, the senator listed the many failings of Roosevelt’s presidency.  Firstly, 
whereas the New Deal had been established to reduce unemployment, figures 
prepared by the American Federation of Labor demonstrated that unemployment rates 
currently ran at the highest-ever levels.  In the previous year alone, 754,000 people 
had lost their jobs.  The national income had fallen from around $100 billion to $42 
billion under Roosevelt, but at the same time, Long alleged, more had been spent in 3 
years than in the previous 124.  With less income and more spending, the national debt 
had soared.  The Roosevelt presidency had promised an end to the Depression, the 
Louisiana senator regaled his listeners, instead it had dragged the nation close to 
destruction.  ‘I have,’ Long concluded, ‘no faith whatever in the pledges of this 
administration.’74  The truth was, however, that the president’s positive, decisive and 
swift actions rendered his opponents largely impotent.  A noted opponent of the First 
New Deal legislation, Long voted in favour of Social Security and the NLRA and 
abstained from the vote on the ERAA.  On August 15, 1935, rather than be seen to 
vote in favour of the administration’s tax plans, Long was forced once again to 
abstain.75   
 Long’s agenda had been effectively emptied of political material, while 
Coughlin’s call for worker unionisation and Townsend’s pension plans had been co-
opted by Roosevelt.  Nationally recognised leaders, however, were not alone in facing 
a more activist president.  Long’s senatorial colleagues in the insurgent bloc were also 
tested by a greater political challenge.   
 The Republican insurgent bloc had been notable for its opposition to the 
passage of the First New Deal legislation.  In response to this opposition, the bloc was 
directly targeted, particularly through attacks upon the electoral legitimacy of one of its 
87 
 
brightest members, Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico.  Although Cutting had 
successfully been re-elected in November 1934 despite the opposition of the 
administration and the RNC, his small majority of 1,200 was disputed on the grounds of 
potential electoral fraud.  The administration, supporting his opponent, Democratic U.S. 
Representative Denis Chavez, contested the result in the New Mexico Supreme Court 
and then, having failed to overturn Cutting’s victory, presented allegations of election 
irregularity to the Senate Privilege and Elections Committee.  The senator’s treatment 
by Roosevelt distressed him greatly.  ‘The dahm [sic] situation is getting no better fast,’ 
he wrote.  ‘Meanwhile F. D. calls me up personally (and most effectionally [sic] – “Dear 
Bron” or “Brons”) and asks me why I never come to see him.’  ‘Yet I know that all the 
time he is urging on my colleagues to unseat me.’76  Seeking to resolve the issue, the 
committee called Cutting to present evidence in his defence.  Cutting began an 
arduous series of aeroplane journeys from Washington to New Mexico ferrying the 
required evidence.  Tragically, on May 6, 1935, returning from an evidence-gathering 
trip, Cutting’s plane crashed and he was killed.77   
Shocked by the news, the insurgent bloc united in blaming Cutting’s death on 
the Roosevelt administration.  In his private correspondence, Lemke observed: ‘Farley 
went out there with his money bag and corroded patronage system, and did his best to 
defeat Cutting, for a spineless, knock-kneed, cringing individual, whom Farley was 
assured he could control, and who would carry out his dictates.’78  When Chavez was 
sworn in as Cutting’s successor in the Senate, the insurgents walked out of the 
chamber in protest.  Insurgent George Norris of Nebraska called the ‘disgraceful and 
unwarranted’ campaign to unseat Cutting ‘the greatest case of ingratitude in history.’79  
For Borah, Roosevelt’s and the RNC’s treatment of Cutting was the final straw that 
broke his links with the administration and with his party’s leadership.  The senior and 
junior senators were close friends and had shared a common political agenda.  At the 
news of Cutting’s death, Borah openly wept on the floor of the Senate.80  But the 
impact was political as well as personal.  By replacing Cutting with Chavez, Roosevelt 
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increased the Democratic majority in the Senate, but he also fired a warning shot to 
incumbents.  Of the nine remaining insurgent senators, one third faced re-election in 
1936, including Borah.  The Cutting affair left them in little doubt of the lengths that the 
RNC and the Democratic administration would go to ensure their defeat. 
If the death of Cutting had placed the insurgent senators on the defensive, the 
passage of the Second New Deal questioned their continued relevance as a political 
bloc.   Its members sought amendments to various aspects of the key pieces of 
legislation that made up the Second New Deal, but only in one instance did a member 
vote in opposition.81  Borah voted in favour on each occasion.  Indeed, if the First New 
Deal had been notable for the support of the old-guard Republicans, the passage of the 
Second was notable for their opposition.  Whereas Roosevelt had sought through the 
First New Deal to balance the interests of big business and the wealthy with the wider 
social and economic needs of the American population, the Second New Deal’s 
extension of the reach of government through the introduction of federal unemployment 
benefit and pension provisions, the substantially increased federal workforce, 
recognition of unions and worker rights, and new tax measures reduced the appeal of 
Roosevelt’s administration amongst more conservative senators representing the large, 
wealthy urban areas located mainly in the northeast.  It is notable that of the 53 votes 
cast against the Second New Deal, 62 per cent were from northeastern senators (28 
Republicans and 8 Democrats).  Over half of the votes raised in opposition to the 
central Second New Deal legislation came from Virginia, Vermont, Rhode Island, 
Maine and Delaware.82   
The Second New Deal was a political master stroke.  Driven to respond to 
pressure from his radical reformist opponents, Roosevelt had taken their proposals and 
transformed them to make them relevant to his agenda of industrial recovery.  He had 
thus accommodated demands for liberal social reform within the New Deal not by 
radicalising it, but by strengthening its central mission to restore and rehabilitate the 
economic cycle.  Consequently, by August 1935, steps had been taken to restore 
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employment and place the economy on a stronger footing.  These measures brought 
about quick, sustained and dramatic results.  Consumer confidence was boosted by a 
fall in unemployment (down 2 per cent between November 1934 and July 1935) as a 
result of the investment in federal employment and the attempts to retain the young in 
education (which alone accounted for the removal of over 2 million people from the 
unemployment register).  The general improvement in consumer confidence and the 
huge injection of federal funds into the economy (for the first year in peacetime, federal 
spending exceeded total spending by the states) was reflected by the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average rallying in July 1935 to a new Depression high of 119 points.83  
Townsend, Long, Coughlin and Borah remained resolute in their opposition to the 
administration, but Roosevelt had established a connection with a large proportion of 
his discontented electorate who had been enticed by the promises of his opponents.  
Should he retain this support through the election, his challengers’ continued actions 
would be largely irrelevant.   
On September 10, 1935, Long’s opposition was swiftly and finally removed, not 
by the actions of the administration, but by an assassin’s bullet.  Coughlin called the 
senator’s murder ‘the most regrettable thing in modern history.’84  Borah spoke to 
journalists of his sincere regret at Long’s passing.  ‘Those who knew him best,’ he 
explained, ‘entertained the strong belief he was sincere in his desire to accomplish 
worth-while things for the poorer classes.’85  Long’s death removed the most significant 
political challenger of the New Deal and handed the initiative back to the president and 
his advisors.  Any pessimism that remained as to Roosevelt’s electoral strength 
dissolved overnight.  ‘I am convinced that within the last month or so there has been a 
decided swing back to President Roosevelt,’ wrote Jim Farley in his private diary on 
September 24.  Long’s death had ‘changed the political picture materially’ and had 
‘definitely’ removed the likelihood of serious third-party opposition to the president’s re-
election in 1936.86  Farley’s confidence in the recovery of Roosevelt’s popularity was 
boosted by the results of the first Gallup poll of the president’s appeal to voters 
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undertaken in the immediate aftermath of Long’s death.  The poll revealed that 
Roosevelt had the support of 55 per cent of the population – down only 2 percentage 
points from his share of the popular vote in 1932.  Roosevelt looked on course for re-
election in 1936.87  However, despite such evidence, Roosevelt’s continued 
determination to undermine the activities of Coughlin and Townsend increased in turn 
their resolve that the president be defeated in 1936.  They were joined in this continued 
anti-Roosevelt campaign by Long’s protégé, Gerald L.K. Smith.  From the ashes of 
Long’s death, Smith was ultimately the key to convergence.  
Long’s state funeral was unlike anything seen before in Louisiana.  A crowd of 
more than 150,000 gathered on the front lawn of the capitol building in Baton Rouge as 
Smith delivered an emotional eulogy for his fallen leader.  He concluded with a 
challenge to the assembled multitudes: ‘This blood which dropped upon this soil shall 
seal our hearts together.  Take up the torch, complete the task, subdue selfish 
ambition, sacrifice for the sake of victory.’88  Days later, in a circular issued to members 
of the SoW movement titled ‘The Spirit and Purpose of Huey Long Shall Never Die,’ 
Smith announced he had assumed leadership of the organisation.89  Smith’s fiery 
passion grasped the imagination of the national newspapers.  In a feature article, the 
New York Times revealed that in high political circles Smith was being spoken of as 
Long’s replacement in the Senate.  ‘If he can get a foothold with the leaderless Long 
machine,’ the article concluded, ‘he may become as important a factor in national 
politics as Father Charles E. Coughlin or even Long himself.’90   
 Born in 1898 in Pardeeville, a small farming community in Wisconsin, Smith had 
come to Long’s attention when he was appointed pastor of King’s Highway Disciples of 
Christ Church in Shreveport, Louisiana.  His impact on the state’s largest church of that 
denomination was immediate.  When Long announced the creation of the SoW 
organisation, Long capitalised on Smith’s success and appointed him national 
organiser.91  At first Smith was used mainly as a substitute when Long was unavailable 
to speak at a meeting, but the senator soon discovered that Smith was a far more 
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talented speaker than even he.  Journalist H.L. Mencken described Smith as ‘the 
greatest orator of them all, not the greatest by an inch or a foot or a yard or a mile, but 
by at least two light years.’92   
As national organiser of SoW, Smith had established himself as a shrewd 
political operator, sitting in the shadows whilst Long commanded attention.  In this 
position, Smith had acted as an important go-between in discussions between Long 
and Coughlin in the early months of 1935.93  In the wake of the senator’s death, Smith’s 
claim to leadership of the SoW movement did not go unchallenged.  The Long 
organisation split into two camps: the SoW forces coalescing around Smith and the 
state machine falling under the control of Long’s long-time, trusted advisor Seymour 
Weiss.  Smith’s rise to prominence caused concern at the highest levels of the 
Roosevelt administration.  Eleanor Roosevelt wrote to Jim Farley on September 25, 
1935, alerting him that confidential advice had been passed to her that the Republicans 
were ‘planning to stir up another gentleman who is a better rabble-raiser than even 
Huey Long.’  ‘His name,’ she concluded, ‘is General [sic] Smith.’94  There is little 
evidence that Smith had the backing of the Republican Party, but the administration 
treated Smith’s potential threat seriously, and Farley involved himself in directly 
shaping Louisiana’s post-Long future.  In his private diary for September, Farley 
recorded in detail the various meetings and exchanges he had with the rival leadership 
factions.  In the course of these private meetings, he made clear that in return for 
federal assistance, the state must be normalised and all traces of the Long era 
removed.  Furthermore, state support for the SoW movement must end and, most 
importantly, Smith must be isolated and removed permanently from a position of 
power.  ‘I feel that he is talking too much,’ Farley explained, ‘and that he would not help 
the situation.’95 
Smith’s position of leadership of SoW was additionally undermined by his 
inability to access the organisation’s membership list, for the holder of the list, Earle 
Christenberry, had sided with the Weiss camp.  Further, the funds the organisation had 
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used to operate were now controlled by Weiss.  With the powerful federal 
administration allied to those loyal to Weiss, Smith’s candidate was heavily defeated in 
the January 1936 gubernatorial primary election.  With the support of the 
administration, newly elected Governor Richard W. Leche proceeded to implement a 
process of normalisation that removed all Smith supporters from the state machine.  
Federal money began to flow once again toward Baton Rouge, and patronage returned 
to the control of the governor.96  Smith was left a leader without a movement.  As the 
Roosevelt administration had sought to control Long now they had turned upon Smith.  
He described the deal to sell him out as the ‘second Louisiana purchase.’97  In May 
1936, Smith heard a rumour, (eventually proved unfounded) that Christenberry had 
sold the SoW membership lists to the co-founder of the Townsend movement, Robert 
Clements.  Desperate to establish direct contact with SoW members, Smith 
immediately sought to establish contact with the OARP.98   
In the months following the passage of the Social Security Act, Townsend 
strengthened the organisation of the OARP.  In October 1935, the first convention of 
the organisation was held in Chicago.  The 6,000 delegates present represented the 
4,552 chartered clubs from the 48 states and Alaska.  Recognising that they now 
lacked direct influence in Washington following the passage of the pension provision of 
the Social Security Act, the convention authorised Townsend to use the power of the 
movement wherever and however he wished in the upcoming elections.99  The aim 
was, Townsend declared, for the OARP to ‘become an avalanche of political power 
than no derision, no ridicule, or no conspiracy of silence can stem.’100   
Townsend’s attempts to politicise his organisation were tested in a special 
election held in Michigan’s Third Congressional District in November 1935.  One of the 
candidates for the Republican nomination, Vernor W. Main, campaigned on the 
Townsend platform.  Despite the opposition of the regular Republican Party 
organisation, Main captured the primary by a huge majority with the support of local 
OARP clubs and the national leadership.  In the final election Main defeated the 
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Democratic candidate, Howard W. Cavanagh, who centred his campaign upon an 
attack on the pension plan, by a 37 per cent margin (a 26 per cent increase on the 
1934 election result).101  With increasing frequency, letters warning of the strength of 
the Townsend movement arrived at the White House. ‘In my humble opinion the 
Townsendites are gathering strength,’ wrote Ben H. Schwartz to Roosevelt in 
December 1935.  ‘They might become a very dangerous and serious menace in the 
next Election.’102  The passage of the Social Security Act had clearly benefited a large 
proportion of elderly Americans, but the hopes of many desperate citizens continued to 
favour Townsend’s proposed $200 per month pension over the $30 assured by the 
administration.  Townsend’s core agenda, securing pensions, had been addressed, but 
the president nevertheless recognised that the issue of old-age poverty had not been 
entirely resolved by his moderate plan.  The OARP thus remained a potential thorn in 
his side. 
In the end, it was the pension movement itself that provided the impetus for the 
establishment of a formal working agreement between Townsend and Smith.  In the 
autumn of 1935, stirrings from within the membership against Robert Clements’ rigid 
centralisation of the movement began to worry Townsend.  As co-founder of the OARP, 
Clements was largely responsible for its spread and strength.  Ever the salesman, 
however, he remained only truly interested in the income potential of the Townsend 
movement and had little interest in the doctor’s new found political ambitions.  To re-
exert his control, in early 1936, the doctor approached Clements with a set of proposals 
to reform the organisation and, by doing so, dilute his partner’s power.  Clements 
refused to see his position undermined and on March 30, 1936, tendered his 
resignation.103   
The departure of Clements marked a turning point in the history of the 
movement.  With his key professional organiser gone, it was questionable whether 
Townsend alone could keep the OARP together.  In May 1936, Townsend’s political 
abilities were once again found wanting.  Two months after convening the 74th 
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Congress, congressional representatives approved the establishment of a special 
investigating committee to probe the OARP.  The inquiry was directed ‘with special 
reference’ to promoters of the Townsend pension plan, their records and their methods 
of collecting and spending money.  The emphasis placed on the internal organisation of 
the movement, rather than its plan, revealed the inquiry’s true purpose – to discredit 
the OARP and humiliate its leader.  By undermining the confidence of the membership 
in the leadership, the efficacy of the movement might be destroyed. 
When Townsend was called to speak before Congress in May 1936, the 
inadequately advised political novice found himself betrayed and outwitted.  By forcing 
Clements to resign from the movement, Townsend had made a bitter enemy.  
Determined to humiliate the doctor, Clements opened up the internal workings of the 
OARP to the committee.  The financial arrangement under which Clements and 
Townsend had received apparently lavish salaries and expenses from the movement 
were revealed, as was the commission-based payment structure underpinning the 
activities of the regional and local organisers.  Exposed to the public glare, the highly-
profitable commercial arrangements that Clements had used to spread the movement 
seemed ‘dirty.’  The elderly doctor, who had willingly accepted Clements’ guidance and 
the substantial financial payments provided by his impoverished supporters, appeared 
detached and, most damagingly, financially corrupt.104     
In his Congressional hearing, Townsend was challenged to refute Clements’ 
damning evidence.  Had he sanctioned editorials that compared him to Christ, the 
committee asked?  Did he really believe he was the Messiah?  Exasperated and 
unprepared, the doctor struggled to distance himself from the accusations.  Most 
damagingly, he denied amassing a personal fortune from his part ownership of the 
OARP.  Until his resignation, he explained, Clements had taken complete responsibility 
for the organisational and financial affairs of the movement.  Townsend’s role had been 
solely to present the plan to the nation.  With Clements gone, Townsend explained, he 
had reformed the organisation, and strict financial control had been introduced.  The 
95 
 
committee, uninterested in Townsend’s explanations, focused their final line of enquiry 
upon a series of ‘Townsendgrams’ distributed to local groups in March 1936.  Had he 
called for his poor followers to send their ‘nickels and dimes’ to provide for his own 
personal enrichment, the committee asked?  Reading from dozens of letters made 
available to the committee from Clements, Townsend was forced to listen to hours of 
evidence detailing how desperate OARP members had struggled to respond to his 
calls for donations.  Townsend, denying any knowledge of the letters sent out in 
Clements’ name (‘I know nothing about it,’ he said), was simply unable, despite 
repeated requests, to say what had happened to the majority of the $23,000 dollars 
raised during the fundraising campaign.  ‘Flushed,’ ‘fretful,’ and ‘angry,’ Townsend 
demanded to know how the congressmen had access to the evidence presented to 
him.  ‘We happen to have the records from your office,’ replied committee member 
Democratic Representative Christopher Sullivan from New York.  Knowing that the 
congressmen cared little for Clements’ own activities, he had provided the evidence to 
discredit the doctor.105     
Townsend, missing a political advisor on whom he might rely to construct a 
counter case, was unable to respond positively to the overwhelmingly evidence 
presented against him.  On May 22, after three days of hearings, Townsend informed 
the committee he would not answer any more questions.  Lacking the temperament to 
simply ride out the storm, in contempt of Congress, Townsend stood up and walked 
away.  In the official explanation for his walkout, Townsend linked the congressional 
investigation to the Roosevelt administration.  It was, he said, a political move 
undertaken by ‘the present political leadership of this nation to intimidate any who dare 
to oppose the “New Deal.”’106  As Townsend understood it, the administration had laid 
siege to his honesty and integrity, had exploited the weakness and political naivety of 
the movement, and were successfully destabilising the OARP by discrediting his 
authority as its national leader.  ‘Evidently he told us more than he wanted us to know,’ 
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commented the committee chairman, Democratic Representative Charles Bell of 
Missouri.107 
Having been pushed to the edge, Townsend’s radicalisation was completed 
when he formed a personal alliance with Gerald Smith.  In his autobiography, 
Townsend described how, as he exited the congressional committee room, a man he 
had not previously seen grabbed his arm and started hustling him through the crowd 
towards a waiting taxicab.  The man was, ‘I later learned, the Reverend Gerald L.K. 
Smith.’108  In the taxicab, and in the meetings that followed, Smith explained his role in 
establishing and spreading the SoW movement, and his position as key political 
advisor to Long.  Townsend’s experience at the hands of the committee had proven to 
him that he needed to replace Clements as the central point of control within the OARP 
and that he needed an experienced political advisor if he was to mobilise the 
movement effectively against the president.  In Smith he saw the perfect candidate.  
Smith was equally keen to harness Townsend’s considerable influence.  Desperate to 
impress the pension leader, and aware that the weak and vulnerable doctor would find 
the proposition of working with him too tempting to refuse, Smith moved swiftly to 
consolidate his newfound position of power.  The week following the walkout, at 
Townsend’s insistence, Smith became a member of the OARP Board of Directors with 
responsibility for co-ordination of political activities.  In this position, Smith assumed 
Clements’ role as Townsend’s most intimate advisor, travelling with the doctor as he 
toured the country in an attempt to repair the damage wrought by the congressional 
investigation.109   
Isolated from the machinations of congressional insiders and the 
administration’s experienced political advisors, Townsend and Smith had been found 
wanting.  The administration had exploited their weaknesses, leaving their 
organisations damaged and their leadership positions diminished.  Yet, in reflection of 
Smith’s grander political ambitions, the preacher was not content to be viewed as 
Townsend’s employee.  In his mind, his status as the titular leader of the SoW 
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movement made him and the doctor equals.  Their arrangement stipulated that Smith’s 
leadership of SoW would be publicly recognised.  To this end, on May 30, 1936, 
Townsend announced that a formal agreement had been struck between the OARP 
and SoW in a ‘common front against the dictatorship in Washington.’110  Despite their 
strong rhetoric, by May 1936 it was by no means clear whether Townsend and Smith 
could ever genuinely generate the political influence they claimed.  Moreover, their 
parity established, it proved difficult for Townsend to control Smith’s ambitions for 
greater power.  Yet, on this rather weak and unstable basis, an alliance between two of 
the leaders of the diverse radical reform movements had been formed.   
As Townsend and Smith established their formal partnership in May 1936, so 
did Coughlin and Lemke.  The passage of the Second New Deal had seized the 
initiative from the president’s diverse radical reformist opponents.  Coughlin recognised 
that if he was to regain the advantage, he needed an issue, like the World Court 
debate, around which he could rally his supporters against the administration.  One 
significant policy area that had not been reconsidered in the Second New Deal was 
agricultural reform.  By backing Lemke’s renewed campaign for the passage of his 
Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill, Coughlin identified both a new popular cause to push 
forward his movement and formed a strategic alliance with the representative.  
Upon Lemke’s return to Congress for the new session in January 1935, his plan 
to bring his Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill to the floor of the House by circulating a new 
discharge petition met an immediate obstacle.  To avoid the embarrassment caused by 
Lemke’s successful discharge petition in the previous session, Congress, with the 
administration’s support, adopted new rules increasing the number of signatures 
required on a petition from 145 to 220.  Rising to the challenge, Lemke began the 
process of gathering the signatures in support of his proposal, but found congressional 
leaders once again actively opposed to his campaign.111  From the Senate, Borah 
expressed opposition to the administration’s strong-arm tactics and, in a private letter, 
promised Lemke, ‘I shall do everything possible that I can to bring the Frazier-Lemke 
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Bill to a hearing.’112  Using his position of congressional seniority, Borah worked with 
Lemke to persuade representatives to sign the discharge petition to bring the bill to the 
House.113  Their campaign received a serious boost when, on January 6, 1936, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the processing tax and production controls at the heart of the 
AAA were unconstitutional.  General discontent regarding the limitations of the AAA 
among farmers and politicians ensured that alternative policy was openly discussed, 
and by the end of January 1936 Lemke had received the support of thirty-two state 
legislatures for the passage of his Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill.114   
While Lemke continued his campaign against the administration in 1935, 
Coughlin significantly enhanced his operations.  Coughlin had marked the beginning of 
his broadcast season in October 1935 with a scathing attack upon the failures of the 
New Deal.  ‘Today,’ he said, ‘I humbly stand before the American public to admit that I 
have been in error.  Despite all promises, the moneychanger has not been driven from 
the temple.’  The principles of the New Deal and those of the NUSJ, he concluded, 
were ‘unalterably opposed.’115  He followed this speech with an announcement in early 
December that local units should be formed in each congressional district to prepare 
for action in the federal elections.  ‘Long enough,’ he said, ‘have you been satisfied to 
listen to the words of a radio orator who was content to teach.  The hour has struck 
when you must be willing to act in solidified groups to break the chains of your financial 
bondage.  You have challenged me to lead the way.  In turn, I challenge you to follow 
through.’116   To assist Coughlin in communicating with his supporters, in March 1936, 
he launched a weekly newspaper, Social Justice.  Whatever the topic, Coughlin 
retained complete editorial control of what was published.  Recalling the operation of 
the newspaper years later, one employee, Jean Donohue, detailed how Coughlin 
oversaw the writing of all articles and ‘not one line got into that paper that Father didn’t 
want there.’117   
In January 1936 Coughlin, having formalised his network of control over the 
NUSJ, capitalised on the uncertainty over the administration’s agricultural policy.  The 
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priest sent his Washington representative, Louis Ward, to inform the president’s private 
secretary, Marvin McIntyre, that Coughlin favoured the urgent passage of Lemke’s 
Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill.  If Roosevelt refused, Ward informed McIntyre, the 
priest would step up his attacks on the administration.  An angry McIntyre replied that 
the president would not be blackmailed.118  Having failed to influence the president 
privately, Coughlin followed through with his threat.  In his weekly sermon of February 
2, 1936, ‘Shall the Sham Battle Go On?’ the priest announced his formal backing for 
Lemke and confirmed the NUSJ would campaign for the passage of the Farm 
Mortgage Refinance Bill.  Enactment of Lemke’s bill would, Coughlin explained, liberate 
‘our population from economic slavery’ and set the nation on the road to full 
recovery.119  In a further sermon delivered two weeks later, the priest asserted that 
Roosevelt had agreed in a conference with farm leaders in 1932 to support the bill, but 
now was engaged in assassinating the bill through ‘gag-rule.’  ‘Not once have you 
intervened for the bill which you promised to sustain,’ he said.  ‘Meantime, 32 million 
[farmers], defrauded of their time, raise their voices to highest Heaven calling for 
vengeance which God will not deny.’120  
The benefit of Coughlin’s backing was apparent when on April 28, following a 
local campaign focused on support for Lemke’s bill, 12 congressional candidates 
endorsed by the NUSJ were victorious in the Pennsylvania primary election.  Those 
candidates targeted by Coughlin included William Berlin, who had removed his name 
from Lemke’s petition in the summer of 1935 under pressure from the administration.  
Defeated in his primary election, Berlin promptly re-signed Lemke’s discharge petition, 
thus providing the North Dakotan with the 220 signatures he required.121  
Embarrassingly, despite pressure placed upon them by the party leadership, the vast 
majority (72 per cent) of signatures on Lemke’s petition were from Democratic 
representatives.  Half of the Democratic signers were from western states.  In all, 
including Republicans and the small reform-minded parties in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota, 54 per cent of signatories were representatives of western states.  Clearly, 
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the administration’s agricultural plan remained a significant bone of contention for a 
substantial number of western representatives for the largest agricultural districts of the 
nation.  If Coughlin and Lemke could consolidate this vote and build support amongst 
northeastern representatives (which made up a third of signatories to the petition), 
there was a strong likelihood they could force passage of Lemke’s bill.122   
The first two weeks of May presented Coughlin with an ideal opportunity to rally 
his supporters and place pressure upon their congressional representatives.  On May 
11 the House was scheduled formally to receive the discharge petition, starting the 
process that enabled a vote on the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill.  On May 12 Ohioans 
voted in primary elections in which, if the Pennsylvania election was an example, the 
NUSJ would have considerable success.  Coughlin and Lemke were determined to use 
the Ohio elections to pressure congressmen to vote for the Farm Mortgage Refinance 
Bill, and on May 1 Social Justice announced that the men would undertake a state-
wide speaking campaign on its behalf.123 
Coughlin’s hopes that support for Lemke’s Bill would rally his movement proved 
well founded and having addressed an enthusiastic crowd of 10,000 in Toledo on May 
8, the priest culminated his campaign in Cleveland on Sunday, May 10, with a 
gathering of 25,000 supporters.  In a speech broadcast over his national radio network, 
Coughlin offered them a choice between the ‘road to apathy,’ which included the hand-
picked candidates of political machines, or the militant ‘road to action,’ which would put 
on the ballot candidates ‘definitely nominated by the people and obligated to no political 
machines or bosses.’124  Ohio voters apparently backed his cause and in the final 
count, 15 NUSJ-endorsed congressional candidates emerged victorious in 13 of the 18 
districts that Coughlin’s organisation had targeted.  In 2 congressional districts, NUSJ 
candidates were victorious in both of the party primaries.  The New York Times 
reported that the NUSJ’s strength was one of the biggest surprises of the election: 
‘Democrat and Republican leaders had an inkling that the organisation’s influence 
would be felt,’ they explained, ‘but never suspected its actual strength.’125 
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When on May 11, 1936, Congress formally discharged the Farm Mortgage 
Refinance Bill, Lemke predicted to the New York Times that a majority of 100 would 
pass the measure.126  Yet Coughlin’s support was beneficial only up to a point.  Like 
Townsend, Coughlin was not a Washington politician.  As he operated outside of the 
formal party system, the sharp limitations of his control over Congress were apparent 
when the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill came to the House for final consideration on 
May 12. In fact, the success of the discharge petition strengthened the determination of 
the administration leaders in the House to defeat Lemke’s bill.  On the direction of the 
Democratic Majority Leader, William Bankhead of Alabama, and the Chair of the 
Agriculture Committee, Democrat John Jones of Texas, the Farm Credit Administration 
(FCA) issued a hostile summary to all members, concluding that fewer than 15 per cent 
of farmers would benefit from the passage of the legislation, at the expense of the other 
85 per cent.  The Democratic Whip sent out a call for every absentee to be present in 
the House on the afternoon of May 13 for the final vote.127     
The debate on the bill revealed the sharp divide between Lemke’s supporters 
and the administration.  Democratic Representative Harold Cooley of North Carolina 
condemned the bill as a ‘fantastic monetary scheme.’  Democrat David Lewis of 
Maryland declared that the bill would ‘destroy all we have done in the last three years’ 
and bring about ‘financial anarchy.’128  Pronouncing the FCA summary ‘erroneous and 
false’ and ‘unjust, unfair propaganda’, Lemke assailed opponents of his legislation.  
‘Remember,’ he stated, ‘we are not doing anything that the Government has not 
already done, nothing that the Federal Reserve banks have not been authorised to do, 
and that this Congress and the Government had not already authorised the Federal 
Reserve banks to do.’  The aim of his legislation was simply, he concluded, to 
‘liberalize’ existing legislation so that funding could go ‘direct to the people without the 




The turning point in the debate came in the early hours of the second day.  
Lemke and his supporters, under pressure to demonstrate widespread support for his 
agricultural reform proposal, had contended on numerous occasions during the debate 
that ‘no objection’ had been received for the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill from the 
trades unions.  ‘You will find no record from the American Federation of Labor,’ 
commented Democrat William Connery from Massachusetts, a Lemke supporter, 
‘placing it on record against’ the bill.’130  This point of challenge, however, revealed a 
potential weakness which, using its influence, the Democratic administration exploited.   
In early April 1936, labour representatives had joined together to form Labor’s 
Non-Partisan League with the immediate aim of re-electing President Roosevelt – ‘the 
greatest statesman of modern times,’ according to labour leader John L. Lewis.  
Although the President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), William Green, 
remained outside the League, he strongly supported Roosevelt’s actions to enhance 
the power of labour and did not want to see economic progress halted by a turn 
towards radicalism.131  On May 13, as the debate on the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill 
reached its final stages, Democratic Speaker Joseph Byrns from Tennessee 
interrupted proceedings to read a letter from Green received that morning by courier.   
Green’s letter revealed, counter to Lemke’s claims, that the executive council of 
the AFL opposed passage of the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill.  Green presented a 
destructive argument against the bill.  Inflation, he argued, would increase prices, thus 
benefiting farmers, but employers, seeking to keep costs down, would not necessarily 
increase workers’ wages.  Calling upon the friends of labour to vote against the 
legislation, Green concluded, ‘we are confident that the best interests of the wage 
earners of the Nation would suffer very greatly if by any chance the Frazier-Lemke Bill 
would be enacted into law.’132  Faced with the determined and effective political 
machines of the AFL and the Democratic administration, the limitations of Coughlin’s 
political power were immediately evident.  Pressure for Lemke’s bill in Congress 
evaporated.  By splitting the potential for unified support for the bill across the farming 
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and urban communities, the administration’s allies in the labour movement destroyed 
Lemke’s coalition and ensured the bill’s defeat.  Speaker Byrnes summed up the 
choice facing the House in his final statement: 
As a representative…pledged not only to the farmers but to all 
classes, I cannot vote for a bill which makes a clear 
discrimination in favor of one class as against other classes of 
our people in this country, and the people whom I represent 
neither expect nor want me to do so.133  
To those representatives who had signed the bill from the large northeastern 
industrial districts, the Green letter challenged their continued support.  The success of 
the administration’s strategy was demonstrated in the final vote when the bill failed by 
235 votes to 142.  Although support for the Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill remained 
resolute amongst Minnesota Farmer-Labor and Wisconsin Progressive 
representatives, between the presentation of the discharge petition and the final vote 
on the bill, Democratic and Republican support fell by over a third.  The largest single 
group of representatives deserting the bill were those from the northeastern states.  
Support from southern and western states fell by 24 and 30 per cent respectively, but 
support from northeastern representatives fell by 59 per cent.134 
The extent of, and cause for, the defeat was best summed up by Lemke 
supporter, Minnesota Farmer-Labor Representative Richard Buckler.  ‘You big shots 
will get credit for killing this bill,’ he commented, ‘but you little fellows will just get hell.  
You will find someone else warming your seats here next year, while you run around 
begging a ticket to get in.’  In public Lemke expressed only ‘disappointment,’ at his 
defeat, but, in private he also directed his anger squarely at the administration.  They 
had, he wrote, ‘become frightened and got in touch with the reactionary Republicans 
and the reactionary Democrats and the two of them ganged up on us including an 
unholy alliance with Bill Green.’135  Overestimating his influence within Congress, 
without access to the extensive resources and influence afforded to the administration, 
Coughlin, the Washington outsider − like Townsend and Smith before him − had been 
exposed and defeated.  His attempt to utilise the power of his movement to bring about 
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a change in administration policy had failed.  However, rather than sit back and reflect 
rationally upon the reasons for his defeat, the ego-damaged priest responded 
immediately with a shrill attack upon the president.  In his May 29 Social Justice 
editorial ‘The Last Straw,’ Coughlin in plainly militaristic language, called for the NUSJ 
to overthrow the government: ‘More recruits!  More reserves!  More battalions!  More 
units in every congressional district!  We must be able to do our part doubly by next 
November.’136  In the face of this new determination, the question was where Coughlin 
saw his next move.  How would he turn his challenging words into political action?    
Coughlin and Lemke had been defeated by the actions of the resurgent 
administration.  Almost concurrently, on May 30, 1936, Townsend and Smith had 
announced a symbolic alliance of the OARP and the SoW movements to oppose the 
re-election of President Roosevelt.  The two pairs of dissidents had been brought 
together by political expediency.  There were weak ideological links between all four 
men, but the strongest connection was their resolute, outspoken opposition to the 
president.  It was this common bond that brought the men into a loose convergence of 
forces opposed to Roosevelt’s re-election in 1936. 
For the malcontents, including Townsend and Coughlin, the political tide 
appeared to be ebbing away.  Between March and May 1935, President Roosevelt 
significantly realigned the Second New Deal to embrace many aspects of the reform 
proposals developed and advocated by his opponents.  By doing so, Roosevelt 
ensured that his erstwhile rivals grudgingly supported his reform proposals.  Some, 
such as Borah, who had consistently voted against First New Deal legislation, 
remained critical of the administration but voted in favour of all Second New Deal 
legislation.  Long and Cutting’s deaths reduced the number of challengers to the 
administration’s left in Congress.  Townsend and Coughlin, who continued to oppose 
from outside Congress, were subjected to significant, concentrated and effective 
attacks by the administration that reduced their political reach.  With positive signs of 
consumer recovery (stock market rises, increases in consumer confidence and growing 
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employment), the insurgent political agenda appeared to be waning quickly.   Although 
the NUSJ’s successes in the Ohio and Pennsylvania primary elections were 
impressive, in reality, they were the result of local political anomalies.  Nevertheless, 
relying on results such as these as evidence of their national support, Townsend and 
Coughlin significantly overestimated their appeal and influence.   
In Ohio, which Roosevelt had won by only 3 per cent of the vote in 1932, local 
politics provided an exceptional opportunity for the NUSJ.  In the 1934 mid-term 
elections, Ohio had elected a Democratic governor, Martin L. Davey.  Unlike his 
Democratic gubernatorial colleagues, however, Davey supported the state legislature 
in its opposition to the allocation of state funding to match federal funds as required 
under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.  He believed that unemployment 
would soon decline and that the federal government would solve the problem at little 
cost to the state.  As a result, in 1935, Ohio’s expenditures on relief totalled only $8 
million, leaving the federal government with responsibility for providing relief to a 
monthly average of 1.2 million men and women.  By the spring of 1936, despite the 
introduction of the WPA, only 190,000 Ohioans had been moved onto work relief, and a 
large number of the state’s residents remained dependent on the federal government 
for support.  With their elected representatives, both Democratic and Republican, 
providing little tangible aid, voters turned against the traditional parties in search of 
political representation that reflected their needs.  In the 1936 primary elections, local 
NUSJ units backed candidates in 18 electoral districts, each deemed by the 
organisation to uphold the principles of the organisation.  These reform-minded, NUSJ-
backed candidates won primary victories in 13 electoral districts.  The reality was, 
however, that the voters of Ohio were so desperate for reform, they were likely to vote 
for any candidate that offered it, even without the NUSJ’s backing.   
The unusual political situation in Ohio was mirrored in Pennsylvania, a strongly 
traditional, Republican state that had voted for Hoover in 1932.  In 1934, the 
Democrats had gained the governorship and the lower house of the state legislature, 
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but were unable to take control of the Republican-dominated state Senate.  In 1936, 
the state Senate rejected Governor George Earle’s request for $71 million to fund relief 
payments.  Even when a jobless army descended upon the state capital, the Senate 
refused to compromise.  To capitalise on the Republicans’ intransigence, Earle 
whipped up popular discontent by embarking on a speaking tour of the opposing 
senators’ constituencies.   Building upon the wave of local discontent, the NUSJ 
backed candidates running in the Democratic primary who aligned themselves with 
Earle’s reform campaign.  In Pennsylvania, like Ohio, with the jobless radicalised and 
alienated by the shortcomings of locally elected officials, it was no surprise that 
candidates endorsed by the NUSJ were able to build support.   It was easy for both 
Coughlin and Townsend to endorse and back local candidates whom they considered 
sympathetic to their overall objectives.  It was questionable, however, how much 
influence the OARP or NUSJ had in these candidates’ eventual victories or, indeed, 
how indebted these successful candidates felt to the individual radical reformist 
movements.  In this circumstance, their hold over individual representatives in 
Congress was severely limited.   
The second challenge that Coughlin and Townsend faced was that working 
outside of the political mainstream, their personal inexperience was compounded by an 
absence from their organisations of a network of high quality political strategists 
required to drive forward the development a national political movement.  When placed 
onto the defensive by the administration, Townsend and Coughlin responded to 
political pressure (either externally imposed or internally generated) not by deploying a 
carefully calculated counter-move, but in knee-jerk appeals to their core supporters in 
violent, incendiary language.  By contrast, the Roosevelt administration used their 
political influence and knowledge of the system to their distinct advantage, isolating 
and attempting to eliminate the support of their opponents both by absorbing key 
opposition demands into their own political plans (thus rendering opposition somewhat 
irrelevant) and by exploiting the personal weaknesses of the temperaments of the 
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leaders of the radical reform movements, in turn presenting the president as the 
people’s champion fighting to defend the nation from poverty and the excesses of his 
opponents.    
In his January 1936 State of the Union address, Roosevelt sought to challenge 
the dire warnings issued by his conservative opponents and the coalition of radical 
reformists for his direct electoral advantage.  Carefully avoiding Hugh Johnson’s 
mistake in 1935, the president did not name any names in his speech, but instead 
established the enemy of the New Deal as a dark and sinister scapegoat – an all-
purpose threat to economic recovery – against which he provided the sole defence.  
Battling on behalf of the electorate, he warned, ‘we have earned the hatred of 
entrenched greed.’  The nature of the problem that faced America ‘made it necessary 
to drive some people from power and strictly to regulate others,’ he continued, ‘but with 
recovery, these same men sought ‘the restoration of their selfish power.’  Roosevelt 
presented the electorate with a choice between backing him, the New Deal and 
governance in the interest of the people, or opposing him and passing power to the 
sinister opposition.  ‘Give them their way,’ he concluded, ‘and they will take the course 
of every autocracy of the past – power for themselves, enslavement for the public.’137  
In the days prior to the passage of the Second New Deal, Coughlin and Townsend had 
been safe in the knowledge that in the absence of action from the administration, their 
calls for reform connected with the desires of a significant part of the electorate.  
Following the passage of the Second New Deal, however, it was not clear that the 
NUSJ and OARP could sustain such mass appeal.  Townsend’s and Coughlin’s 
increasingly violent outbursts only served to weaken their charm. 
Townsend’s appointment of Smith – a fellow ‘rabble-rouser’ – as his personal 
political advisor was indicative of his political naivety.  Townsend was significantly 
influenced by Smith’s connection to the enigmatic Long, and by the promises of the 
younger man’s abilities, rather than a true understanding of the nature of political 
assistance the OARP required.  ‘At that particular moment,’ Smith later explained, ‘I 
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had more influence on the decisions of Dr. Townsend than any other man in 
America.’138  Encouraged by Smith, Townsend would seek to counter the 
administration’s attacks not by calm political action, but by increasing the volume and 
intensity of the OARP’s public challenge to the president.   
 Following his installation as Political Director of the OARP, Smith attempted to 
enhance the success of Townsend’s campaign against the re-election of the president 
by building alliances between the pension movement and NUSJ.  Here Smith held a 
particular advantage for, in his role as Long’s political lieutenant, he had been 
responsible for maintaining formal links between the Louisiana senator and Coughlin in 
the discussions following the World Court debate.  ‘It must be remembered that 
Coughlin and Huey Long had colluded with each other prior to the Senator’s 
assassination,’ Smith later recalled.  ‘My contact with Father Coughlin was a natural 
follow-up.’  When Coughlin’s campaign for the passage of Lemke’s Farm Mortgage 
Refinance Bill was defeated, Smith moved immediately to establish a partnership with 
the priest.139  In late May 1936, Coughlin sent his emissary, Robert Harriss (an 
influential member of the New York Cotton Exchange and owner of vast tracts of 
southern farmland), to meet with Smith in New York.  A few days later, Smith sealed 
arrangements in a personal visit with the priest in his church at Royal Oak, Michigan.  
‘Coughlin wanted me to be in on all the strategy with him and Lemke,’ Smith later 
explained, ‘because they felt I was the only one that could persuade Dr. Townsend to 
join with them.’140  On June 1, Smith revealed to the New York Times that an 
agreement had been reached for representatives of the OARP, NUSJ and SoW 
movements to meet together at the pension movement’s convention in Cleveland in 
July 1936.  Poorly advised, politically outmanoeuvred and easily manipulated, 
Roosevelt’s individual radical reformist opponents came together to defend their 
interests in a loose collaborative arrangement of mutual convenience.141   
On June 1, 1936, Roosevelt’s diverse radical reforming opponents reached the 
point of convergence.  In the early summer of 1936, crushed by their treatment at the 
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hands of Congress and the Democratic administration, Townsend and Coughlin found 
themselves cornered.  Unused to, and uncomfortable with, being placed on the 
defensive, both men were increasingly forced to justify the continued relevance of their 
reform campaigns.  Having failed to achieve passage of the OARP pension plan and 
the Lemke Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill, both movements and their leaders looked 
vulnerable.  Despite their strong words in defeat, both movements lacked a clearly 
articulated political strategy and the highly-skilled political advisors necessary to 
mobilise their supporters into coordinated, sustained, successful action to achieve the 
passage of their individual reform plans.  A new direction was needed if they were to 
regain the initiative against the president.  Here the ambitious, well-connected Smith 
seemed to provide the boost that both Townsend and Coughlin thought they needed.  
The primary purpose of the joint OARP, SoW and NUSJ convention that was the 
outcome of Smith’s negotiations was not, the preacher was clear, to promote a joint 
reform agenda, but to achieve a single negative outcome.  The slogan of the joint 
convention, Smith announced, would be: ‘Anybody but Roosevelt.’142    
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Let us not continue to chase rainbows, but if we must start a 
new party, or take over one of the old, and I do not mean join 
the old, but take it over, let us get a candidate for president 
whom we know will go through with a program for the people. 
William Lemke, February 1, 1935.1 
 
 
The actions taken by the Democratic administration between January 1935 and June 
1936 to strengthen its support amongst the electorate had a dramatic effect upon the 
most prominent of its diverse collective of radical reform-minded opponents: Charles 
Coughlin, Francis Townsend, William Lemke and Gerald Smith.  The passage of the 
legislation that made up the Second New Deal robbed the leaders of the radical reform 
movements of their individual political agendas, allowing President Roosevelt to seize 
the centre-left ground of popular opinion in which his opponents had thrived.  
Increasingly forced out of the mainstream political debate, the loose collective of radical 
reformers converged around the single theme that they shared, a common hatred of 
the president.  It was questionable, however, whether such a negative principle was 
enough to form a solid platform for positive political action.  Indeed, despite Smith’s 
announcement on June 1, 1936, that the SoW, OARP and NUSJ would meet at a joint 
convention planned for July 1936, it remained unclear how the future backers of the 
Union Party intended to bring about Roosevelt’s defeat.2   
As late as June 1, 1936, three strategic options remained open to Townsend, 
Coughlin, Lemke and Smith in relation to the presidential election: to displace 
Roosevelt as the Democratic presidential nominee, to seek the confirmation of an 
acceptable candidate for the Republican nomination, or to launch a third party to fight 
against Roosevelt in the election.  However, evidence such as the Gallup ‘Presidential 
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Trial Heat’ published on June 7, 1936, which found only 2.5 per cent support for a 
potential (unnamed) third-party candidate, suggests that such an option would be very 
much a last resort.3  In this circumstance, with the major party presidential nomination 
conventions not scheduled to take place until mid-July, Lemke, Smith, Coughlin and 
Townsend remained hopeful that they could endorse a candidate from one of major 
political parties.  Furthermore, a preference for finding a Democrat or Republican they 
could support was entirely compatible with the radical reform movement leaders’ 
individual tactics in the Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania primaries where, rather than 
field their own candidates, their organisations had simply endorsed existing candidates 
they considered sympathetic to the overall objectives of their movements.  The use of 
such tactics enabled them to reap maximum public benefit from their election 
campaigns, whilst at the same time minimising the direct costs borne by their 
movements.  With their organisational strength largely untested, the successes of the 
OARP and the NUSJ in Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania revealed little about the 
individual radical reform movements’ ability to mobilise their supporters to directly 
influence the outcome of an election in their favour.4  The reality of the weak 
organisation of the OARP and the NUSJ was exposed as Coughlin, Townsend, Smith 
and Lemke attempted to influence the outcome of the Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominations.  It was only then, their tactics having failed and with no other 
alternative, a union was agreed and the Union Party established. 
Coughlin and Lemke had supported the Democratic presidential candidate in 
1932, but they were not natural ideological allies of the party.  Indeed, their individual 
beliefs in American independence, isolation and economic self-determination (as 
evidenced by their reform plans and subsequent campaigns against the president from 
1932-1936) placed them closer to the insurgent wing of the Republican Party.  
Nevertheless, given their outright opposition to the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936, it 
was natural that they would seek to displace him from the Democratic nomination.  In 
the absence of a significant challenger, however, this proved an impossible task. 
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 The most likely source of radical reformist opposition within the Democratic 
Party was Huey Long.  In recognition of this, in the months immediately following the 
success of Coughlin and Long’s combined campaign to defeat the World Court 
resolution in January 1935, the leaders of the divergent radical reform movements held 
private discussions regarding Long’s potential bid for the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 1936.  Townsend met with Coughlin in Washington in late January.  This 
was followed by further contact between representatives of the NUSJ and the OARP in 
early April 1935.5  Concurrently, Coughlin engaged in detailed negotiations with Long 
regarding his intentions in the 1936 campaign.   
In public, Long denied that he and the priest had a formal alliance, but admitted 
they were fighting for the ‘same general objectives.’6  In private, however, their 
relationship was significantly more developed.  In an interview with historian T. Harry 
Williams, James P. O’Connor, Louisiana Public Service Commissioner, recalled one 
important meeting between Coughlin and Long, which took place in early 1935.  
O’Connor explained that he had been staying with Long at the luxurious Broadmoor 
Hotel in Washington, D.C., when Coughlin and Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler of 
Montana came into Long’s room discussing options for the 1936 presidential campaign.  
As O’Connor explained, ‘They stayed there discussing until the early morning hours 
and I remember Coughlin said to Huey – after he capitulated to Huey’s ideas – “Maybe 
you are the best man to carry them out.”’7   
To prepare the SoW organisation for his campaign for the 1936 presidential 
nomination, Long developed a network of financial supporters.  Associates of the 
senator revealed to T. Harry Williams that by the time of his death, Long had built up a 
campaign chest with pledges nearing $10 million.  Willing to take funding to achieve his 
ambitions whatever the source, Long accepted donations from, among others, Henry 
Ford and John D. Rockefeller.  These prominent Republican Party backers wanted 
Roovevelt out of the White House and did not care whom they had to support to 
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achieve it.  Although they told Long, ‘We’re not for you.’  Long responded, ‘Just give me 
the money.’8  
On May 27, 1935, having established both political and financial support for his 
presidential campaign, Long issued a letter of command to all SoW members to 
prepare the organisation for the next phase of action.  The time had come, he 
instructed, for the movement to take on a more active form.  ‘I want you to take on new 
work,’ Long wrote, ‘and to renew your own Society’s efforts in our Share-our-Weath 
cause.’  The letter set out three immediate actions.  Firstly, Long asked that all officers 
and members of societies begin preparation for the national elections in 1936.  ‘We 
must be ready,’ he explained, ‘to do and act in whatever manner may be necessary’ to 
guarantee that SOW’s plans be enacted.  Secondly, he instructed each society to send 
out scouts across the country to organise new societies where there were none.  
Finally, he requested that all members subscribe to his newspaper American Progress, 
which he announced would shortly increase its publication from once to twice a month.9  
In July 1935, Townsend followed Long’s move to place the SoW on a pre-election 
footing by issuing similar instructions to the OARP to reorganise in preparation for the 
1936 election.  ‘For a while we thought we could support President Roosevelt,’ 
Townsend told the New York Times, ‘but we have given up hope in him.’10  Finally, on 
August 13, 1935, the New York Times reported that Long had told his senatorial 
colleagues he intended to run for the presidency in 1936 – even if it meant he had to 
destroy the Democratic Party to do it.  On August 15, he made a public statement of his 
intent to oppose Roosevelt for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination.  
Furthermore, in a ploy to ensure that Democratic Party leaders considered the 
seriousness of his opposition, he threatened to walk out of the convention and split the 
party.  If the candidates of the major parties were President Roosevelt and Herbert 
Hoover, and the people of the country wanted him, ‘his sense of duty would leave him 
no choice but to offer himself as a third party candidate.’  He told the assembled press, 
‘All you would get for voting for Roosevelt or Hoover, would be a ticket to Hell.’11  With 
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the leaders of the individual radical reform movements and their potentially powerful 
organisations united behind him, Long represented a significant threat to Roosevelt’s 
re-nomination.  This threat was never to be tested, however, as the challenge to 
Roosevelt from the radical wing of the Democratic Party was removed by Long’s 
assassination in September 1935.   
 Long’s death ended Townsend and Coughlin’s influence within the Democratic 
Party and thus reduced the likelihood that the party would endorse a radical reformist 
candidate in 1936. Yet, powerful dissident conservative forces within the party that had 
coalesced around the Liberty League since its foundation in the autumn of 1934 
represented a threat to the president’s re-nomination.  With Coughlin, Townsend and 
Smith’s single stated political aim being to oppose Roosevelt’s re-election, his 
displacement by a conservative candidate would still represent a victory.  Ultimately, 
however, Roosevelt’s grip over the party proved too strong.  
 By the summer of 1936, membership of the Liberty League had grown to 
125,000, drawn from every state of the Union, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Alaska, 
the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico.  Membership of the League proved attractive 
to those wealthy traditional Democratic Party contributors who felt Roosevelt’s 
leadership had isolated them from the party.  The strength of this support is 
demonstrated by the fact that in 1935, the League raised nearly as much money as 
each of the national parties.  30 per cent of the League’s funding was from the DuPont 
family alone.  In 1936, two-thirds of the funding for the organisation was derived from 
30 men donating $5,000 each.12  
The gap between rich and poor, old and new inherent in the organisation was 
demonstrated at the Liberty League dinner held at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, 
D.C., on January 25, 1936.  Here 2,000 guests, including 12 members of the DuPont 
family, attended to hear the former Democratic presidential nominee and prominent 
progressive mayor of New York, Al Smith, respond to Roosevelt’s State of the Union 
address issued two weeks earlier.  Rather than rising above the president’s comments 
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about the dark, sinister forces that sought to undermine the New Deal, an angry Smith 
delivered a frenzied speech that served to sustain, not deflate, Roosevelt’s argument.  
‘It is all right with me if they want to disguise themselves as Karl Marx or Lenin or any 
of the rest of that bunch,’ Smith said, sharing the anti-communist rhetoric now regularly 
used by the president’s opponents to reflect his allegedly authoritarian, centralised 
control of government and consequent reduction of the rights of individuals, ‘but I won’t 
stand for their allowing them to march under the banner of Jackson or Cleveland.’13  
The time had come, he said, for loyal Democrats to make a choice.  ‘We can either 
take on the mantle of hypocrisy or we can take a walk,’ he concluded, ‘and we will 
probably do the latter.’14   
The challenge set down by Al Smith effectively marked the end of the League 
as a force within the Democratic Party.  In the four years between Roosevelt’s 
nomination in 1932 and the 1936 convention, changes had taken place within the 
Democratic Party which had enhanced the president’s hold.  Party Chairman Jim 
Farley had proved an exceptional political operator, and through his ruthless leadership 
and generous patronage, he had reshaped the Democratic Party in Roosevelt’s image.  
The effectiveness of Farley’s control was demonstrated by presidential trial polls 
conducted by the Gallup Organisation between October 27, 1935, and the eve of the 
Democratic Party Convention in 1936, which showed Roosevelt with opinion ratings 
never lower than 50.3 per cent when compared to any Republican or third-party 
challenger.  In these circumstances, the Gallup Organisation considered it so unlikely 
that Roosevelt would not be re-nominated that not a single polling question was asked 
in which another candidate for the Democratic nomination was suggested for possible 
consideration.  The final pre-convention poll, published on June 7, indicated that 
Roosevelt had the support of 53.5 per cent of the electorate.15   
By the time delegates convened in Philadelphia on June 23, 1936, both the 
Liberty League and Roosevelt’s radical reformist opponents had given up hope of 
preventing the president’s re-nomination.  In one final, symbolic challenge to the party 
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they had once led, the League sent party chairman Jim Farley an open telegram 
addressed to the delegates of the convention, challenging the Democratic Party to 
return to the principles personified by Thomas Jefferson and Grover Cleveland and to 
nominate a ‘genuine Democrat.’  ‘These are hard tasks.  They would necessarily 
involve the putting aside of Franklin D. Roosevelt,’ it concluded.  ‘But if you do not act, 
you should put aside the name of the party.’16  Although the telegram provided the 
delegates with the liveliest topic of conversation, it had little impact.  Secure in the 
support of his delegates, Roosevelt received every vote cast in the first ballot.  The 
rejection of the Liberty League signified the end of any influence that the old party 
leaders including former presidential candidates John Davis and Al Smith, as well as 
former executives of the Democratic National Committee John Raskob and Jouett 
Shouse had over the Democratic Party.  The failure of the Liberty League removed any 
hopes that Townsend, Smith, Lemke or Coughlin might have had that the Democrats 
would oppose Roosevelt’s re-nomination.  In a statement issued to the press on June 
13 by Gerald Smith, Townsend dismissed the importance of the Democratic 
nomination.  Townsend was, Smith said, ‘more concerned with who goes out than with 
who goes in’ at the November presidential election.17  Following the convention, the 
American Liberty League formally severed its connections with the Democratic Party 
and aligned with the Republican opposition.18   
Having failed to present their own candidate to the convention and aware that 
Roosevelt was unlikely to be displaced as the Democratic Party candidate from the 
Gallup opinion polls, the leaders of the radical reform movements had already shifted 
their attention to the Republican Party and William Borah’s campaign for the 
presidential nomination.  Roosevelt’s re-nomination had revealed a fundamental 
ideological split between his New Deal and the former leadership of the Democratic 
Party now aligned with the Liberty League.  Similarly, the campaign for the Republican 
nomination exposed ideological splits within the Grand Old Party.  From the most 
conservative backers of the party emerged support for the re-nomination of former 
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President Herbert Hoover.  On the other extreme, from the insurgent wing, Borah 
presented himself for consideration.  Given their many long-standing connections with 
insurgent senator, Coughlin, Townsend and Lemke placed their backing squarely 
behind Borah’s campaign. 
Townsend, Coughlin, Smith and Lemke had reached the point of convergence 
on June 1, 1936 with the announcement they would mount a joint convention of their 
movements that July to oppose the continuation of Roosevelt’s presidency, but their 
reformist partner in the Senate, Borah, thus far remained outside the loose coalition.  
Yet he was the key figure in determining the future shape of their union.  In May 1936, 
despite Roosevelt’s extensive appeal, 42 per cent of the electorate expressed support 
for the election of a Republican as the next president.19  It was the Republican Party, a 
well-financed machine, with its extensive national network of supporters and array of 
experienced political advisors, that Townsend, Lemke, Smith and Coughlin believed 
was their best option to defeat the president.  Despite these hopes, Borah proved a 
weak candidate and incapable of delivery on the expectations of the leaders of the 
radical reform movements.  The Republican senator’s failure to win his party’s 
presidential nomination was the final step required to force the formation of the Union 
Party.   
Throughout Roosevelt’s first administration, the president’s opponents found 
greatest support for their anti-New-Deal reform movements from across the western 
region.  Townsend, as evidenced by membership of the OARP, had developed 
particular strength in California, but also in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
North and South Dakota, Washington, Wyoming.  Likewise, Coughlin’s NUSJ had 
powerful footholds in Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa and Missouri.20  Seeking to 
reconcile his reform agenda with the support expressed for the radical reform 
movements, Roosevelt had incorporated some their reform proposals into his Second 
New Deal in 1935.  The launch of the Second New Deal had a significant impact upon 
both the insurgent Republicans and the conservative leadership of the RNC.  It was the 
125 
 
combined effect of this response that persuaded Borah to launch his campaign for the 
Republican presidential nomination.   
Firstly, the launch of the Second New Deal significantly hardened the RNC 
against both the New Deal and the grassroots campaign launched by Borah following 
the 1934 mid-term defeat to reform the Republican Party along more liberal lines.  The 
Second New Deal perceivably improved the economic outlook of the nation, but the 
passage of legislation designed to more actively regulate business, most notably the 
National Labor Relations Act and the wealth taxes, severely strained the link between 
Roosevelt and his business supporters.  Responding to what they perceived to be a 
direct attack on Democratic values, the conservative Liberty League had broken with 
the administration.  Despite the defeat of their conservative platform in the 1934 mid-
terms, the RNC viewed this groundswell of conservative opposition as justification for 
the continuation of their anti-New-Deal stance. 
The extent to which the RNC was able to rally the Republican Party in 
opposition to the Second New Deal is evident in congressional voting figures.  The old 
guard’s wavering support for the New Deal in the 73rd Congress evaporated in the 74th: 
only 6 per cent of old-guard Republicans in the House voted for New Deal legislation 
(down from 35 per cent in the 73rd Congress), and only 10 per cent of old-guard 
senators (down from 25 per cent).21  Spurred on, the RNC set about re-establishing its 
control over the party.  In May 1935, RNC representatives from New England gathered 
in Boston and reconfirmed their support for a national platform along conservative 
lines.22  In June, the RNC organised a conference in Springfield, Illinois, attended by 
13,000 delegates and observers.23  Despite an attempt to reach out to reformers 
through support for farming interests, most of the conference speakers took a strongly 
anti-New Deal, anti-liberal position.  The ‘Declaration of Principles’ adopted by the 
conference was highly critical of the administration attacking the New Deal as 
‘unsound, un-American,’ ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘prompted by demagogic methods.’24  
Unsurprisingly, the insurgents were unimpressed.  ‘I am fairly well satisfied that the 
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attempt to liberalize the Republican Party is going to be rather a sad bit of ersatz,’ 
commented prominent insurgent newspaper editor William Allen White from Kansas.25  
It is ‘useless,’ observed Borah, ‘to go into the campaign with the old organization 
dominating the situation.  The people simply will not follow them even at a distance.  I 
agree with the people, there is no reason why they should follow them.’26  Despite 
these protestations, the Republican Party’s increased cohesion along conservative 
lines apparently broadened its appeal amongst the electorate, as reflected in state and 
local elections.  Having lost an overall majority in the New York State Assembly in 
1934, by-election victories enabled the old guard to regain control in 1935.  In addition, 
campaigning on a conservative platform, the party secured substantial election wins in 
municipal elections in Massachusetts and Ohio, as well as the re-election of the RNC-
backed Republican mayor of Philadelphia.27 
Secondly, the passage of the Second New Deal increased the isolation of the 
insurgents from the Republican Party.  Unwilling to oppose legislation presented by the 
Democratic administration that was intended to improve the overall economic and 
social condition of the nation, the insurgent bloc voted in favour of Second New Deal 
legislation.  With the RNC strongly asserting its dominance, however, other western 
representatives and senators started to drift more into support for the RNC.  In the 74th 
Congress, 54 per cent of western senators voted for New Deal legislation (down from 
66 per cent in the 73rd Congress) and 27 per cent of western House members (down 
from 59 per cent).28  The increased conservatism of the western bloc can be attributed 
partly to the withdrawal from the party of Senator Robert La Follette and the insurgent 
representatives from Wisconsin in 1934 to form the Progressive Party, as well as the 
death of Senator Bronson Cutting in May 1935, but nevertheless, the voting pattern 
exposed the increased segregation of the core insurgent bloc.  Conversely, the 
insurgents’ shift towards the New Deal weakened both their positions of independence 
and opposition in the eyes of the public.  Receiving letters from angry supporters, 
Borah was forced to defend his support for Second New Deal legislation.  ‘I have no 
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apology to offer whatever,’ he informed one correspondent.29  However, such letters 
intensified Borah’s concern that the increased polarisation of the political parties 
brought about by the Second New Deal risked making the insurgents entirely irrelevant.  
The New York Times speculated whether Borah, as the leading insurgent, would 
attempt to reassert the power of the bloc by seeking the party’s presidential 
nomination.30  Yet Borah believed he lacked the financial support necessary to mount a 
campaign.  ‘I haven’t the money to make any fight for the presidency,’ he explained to 
his friend Lucius G. McGuire in April 1935, ‘and I haven’t any means of honorably 
securing the money.’31  In this circumstance, his final decision to seek the nomination 
was heavily influenced by the personal encouragement he received from the leaders of 
the radical reform movements. 
Borah’s loose coalition with Coughlin and Long over the senatorial debate on 
adherence to the World Court resolution in January 1935 established a working 
relationship between the three men.  Following the defeat of the resolution, Borah 
expressed gratitude to the priest for his support, and thereafter the two men 
corresponded frequently.32  Borah’s private alignment with Coughlin was matched by 
his public friendship with Long.  The two men frequently spoke alongside each other in 
the Senate in opposition to the administration.  As a consequence, despite Long’s own 
presidential ambitions in 1936, the senator endorsed a potential Borah campaign for 
the Republican Party nomination in April 1935: ‘Borah, I think, is the strongest man in 
the country today,’ he told the New York Times.  ‘With him on the Republican ticket, 
gathering the votes of the Progressives and the old-line Republicans, he would sweep 
the country.  He would even carry a number of Southern states.’33  The prospect of a 
Borah candidacy unifying reform-minded voters over traditional party boundaries 
highlighted the attraction and potential impact of his campaign.  On August 15, 1935, 
two days after announcing his own campaign for the Democratic nomination, Long 
once again reasserted his belief in the potential power of Borah’s candidacy.  ‘If the 
Republicans nominated Borah,’ Long told the New York Times, ‘they could carry each 
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of the forty-eight states.’34  Despite Long’s supportive words, it is possible that the 
notion of two friendly candidates competing for the reformist vote across party lines 
contributed to Borah’s uncertainty regarding the Republican nomination.  Long’s death 
in September 1935 thus opened up an opportunity to rally the support expressed for 
the radical reform movements behind Borah’s potential candidacy.  The drive towards 
Borah’s campaign was evidenced by a series of positive public and private 
endorsements from prominent reform leaders.  It was this which broke his initial 
reticence and cemented his decision to seek the presidential nomination.  
The broad appeal that Long had suggested might exist for Borah’s candidacy 
was confirmed on August 19, 1935, when the New York Times published an 
independent poll of county Republican chairmen revealing that the insurgent senator 
led the list of possible candidates by over 100 votes.35  Borah’s poll lead encouraged 
the leaders of the radical reform movements and, in late August 1935, Coughlin wrote 
to him seeking a meeting in Washington, D.C.  In reply, Borah confirmed he wished to 
meet the priest.  On September 18, days after Long’s death, Coughlin replied via his 
Washington representative, Louis Ward, confirming a meeting with Borah, as early as 
the following week in Michigan if possible, or in October (‘when it is convenient for you’) 
in Detroit or New York.36   
Coughlin’s interest in the senator’s activities was matched by support from 
William Lemke.  Prompted by the publication of the New York Times poll of local 
Republican chairmen, Lemke wrote to Borah in early October 1935 to express ‘delight’ 
that the insurgent senator was emerging as the leading candidate for the Republican 
nomination.  Further, Lemke informed Borah of his analysis, based on his knowledge of 
contacts within various local and national farm organisations and the NUSJ, that Borah 
had wide support amongst delegates at the Republican Party national convention.  
With a simple majority needed for victory, Lemke believed the senator was on course 
for the nomination.  Borah had, according to Lemke’s analysis, already gained the 
support of 327 of the 1003 delegates and looked likely to gain ‘an even break of the 
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rest.’37  When Borah replied seeking a meeting to discuss the results of his survey, 
Lemke set out his explicit and full support for the senator’s candidacy.  ‘I feel that the 
Republican Party can be rejuvenated and put in the hands of people who represent the 
spirit and the ideals of this nation,’ Lemke wrote on November 6, 1935.  ‘We are fast 
making a nation of tramps and beggars out of a once proud people.’38  On November 
22, Lemke announced to the press that should the senator declare, he would support 
Borah’s campaign for the presidential nomination.  Borah was, he explained, ‘the only 
candidate so far prominently mentioned who could get the support of the farmers of the 
west for the Republican nomination.’39   
 Alongside supportive statements received from Long and Lemke, Borah’s 
decision to seek the Republican nomination was finally confirmed by support from 
Francis Townsend.  On August 15, 1935, on the eve of the publication of the New York 
Times preferential poll for the Republican nomination, Townsend wrote to Borah 
expressing support for his potential run.  ‘The people are convinced that you are going 
to come out for us,’ the doctor concluded, ‘and when you do your campaign will be won 
before it starts.’40  On September 18, Townsend once again wrote to Borah to make his 
intentions transparent: ‘If you want the presidency we will give it to you.’41  On  
October 20, Townsend demonstrated the potential voting power of his organisation by 
introducing Borah to a mass rally of more than 10,000 supporters in Boise, Idaho.42  
Following the rally, seeking to push the senator into declaring his intentions, the OARP 
released a series of bumper stickers promoting the senator’s potential presidential 
nomination campaign, proclaiming ‘Get the Townsend Plan with Borah,’ ‘Save the 
Constitution with Borah,’ ‘16 to 1 with Borah,’ ‘Back to America with Borah,’ and ‘Back 
to Prosperity with Borah.’43   
The groundswell in public opinion behind Borah’s undeclared candidacy 
reached its peak in December 1935, when a poll undertaken by the New York Times of 
the insurgent senator’s support amongst Republican National Convention delegates 
found that he could already claim 203 votes, mainly from the west, but including states 
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as diverse as Maine and North Carolina.44  The poll confirmed the widespread support 
that Long had foreseen back in the summer, and that Lemke and Townsend had 
confirmed to him in October.  The following month Borah authorised Hamilton Fish, 
Republican congressman for Roosevelt’s Hyde Park district of New York state, to open 
the drive for the official Borah for President National Committee, and appointed Carl 
Bachmann, a former Republican House Whip, to serve as his national campaign 
manager.  Bachmann rented a suite in Washington, D.C.’s Willard Hotel and began the 
task of generating funds, spending the first few weeks of January 1936 writing to local 
Republican Party figures nationwide seeking funds to support the senator’s 
campaign.45  Despite Borah’s reported strength, he was acutely aware of the potential 
limitations of his campaign.  ‘While I am proud to say I have very much greater support 
than I had any idea of among the people, he wrote pessimistically in November 1935, 
‘that support is largely among those who are not in conventions.’46  In this 
circumstance, Borah’s campaign strategy rested entirely on his ability to mobilise his 
fellow insurgent senators and his anti-Roosevelt colleagues formally behind his 
candidacy in the primary election campaign.  If he arrived at the convention with a 
substantial minority of delegates pledged for him, he believed it would be possible to 
overcome the power of the RNC and, as he wrote to one correspondent, ‘direct it along 
liberal and progressive lines.’47  To win a substantial number of delegates during the 
primary election campaign required Borah to run a well-organised, well-financed 
campaign that maximised his support from reform-minded voters.  However, Borah 
failed on both counts.  Ultimately undermined by both his poorly-executed campaign 
strategy and the RNC, Borah could not turn his early poll lead to his advantage.   
 Borah’s ability to mount a successful campaign was severely hampered by his 
lack of funds and organisational infrastructure. The support that Borah might have 
expected to receive from his insurgent colleagues within the Republican Party failed to 
materialise.  The harsh treatment handed out by both the administration and the RNC 
to Bronson Cutting had highlighted the vulnerability of the independent insurgent 
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senators when they were unprotected by the leadership of either political party.  
Seeking to minimise their exposure, however, the insurgents’ subsequent support for 
the Second New Deal had served to undermine their freedom.  Unwilling to risk their 
positions of seniority within the Republican Party or the new-found favour of the 
Roosevelt administration, the majority of his colleagues refused to back Borah’s 
independent campaign with only insurgent senators Gerald Nye of North Dakota and 
Peter Norbeck of South Dakota willing to formally endorse him.  Most damagingly, 
Borah’s longtime senatorial companion Hiram Johnson of California expressed an 
opinion that in seeking the nomination the Idaho senator was primarily seeking 
publicity, and that he was certain his ‘vacillations, and apparent streak of laziness’ 
would prevent him from gaining the nomination.48    
Borah’s distance from both the RNC and his insurgent colleagues limited his 
appeal to the corporate backers and individual private contributors he needed to 
finance his campaign.  Borah’s lack of financial support forced him to make decisions 
that removed his control necessary to deliver his campaign strategy.  In December 
1935, Borah explained the difficulty of his financial situation.  ‘I haven’t the means 
financially to go into this fight,’ he explained to one Idaho supporter.  ‘I am simply, 
therefore, availing myself of what developments permit.’   It quickly became apparent, 
however, that the other options available to Borah were extremely limited.  The harsh 
reality was that Borah’s natural supporters, the young, reform-minded Republicans and 
poor, unemployed, former middle-class voters discontented with the progress of the 
Democratic economic reform plans, had little money to donate his campaign.  Despite 
Bachmann’s best efforts, by March 1936, Borah had raised only $3,000.49  With such 
meagre resources, the senator was forced to seek the endorsement of the NUSJ and 
the OARP to sustain his campaign.  Yet, despite their personal friendship, Townsend 
and Coughlin ultimately were unable to mobilise their supporters.  Borah’s naivety was 
largely to blame.    
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The truth behind Hiram Johnson’s comments regarding Borah’s unsuitability as 
a presidential candidate became apparent as soon as the insurgent senator hit the 
campaign trail.  With so much of the campaign dependent on developing support 
amongst OARP and NUSJ supporters, it was essential it be launched in the correct 
tone with a message that would bring dissatisfied reform-minded voters to his side.  In 
this respect, his campaign launch could not have been more disastrous.  Borah 
formally announced his candidacy on January 28, 1936, in a national radio broadcast 
from the Kismet Temple in Brooklyn, New York.  The New York Times reported on the 
buzz of expectation that the event had generated; however, the effects of Borah’s 
limited organisational capacity were revealed when, instead of the anticipated crowd of 
5,000, only 2,000 people attended.50  In his address, Borah outlined his planned policy 
objectives in the driest of terms, setting out his opposition to the proposed anti-lynching 
bill, which he felt was unconstitutional, speaking for neutrality, attacking monopolies, 
and declaring his support for the Supreme Court’s actions against the excesses of the 
New Deal.  The main focus of his speech, however, was directed not at the president, 
but at the leadership of the Republican Party.  The presidential nominee must not be 
determined, the senator declared, in secret with ‘selfish and sordid interests pulling the 
strings.’  This year, the public must refuse to accept uninstructed delegates at the 
convention susceptible to control by the party hierarchy, and extend their democratic 
right through the primary elections to choose their presidential candidate.  He 
concluded by sending out a clear warning to the Republican Party: ‘We cannot go 
back.  We cannot compromise.  We must move forward, and the political party which 
does not accept responsibility will drop out and some other party will take its place.’51 
It was not the content of Borah’s speech that attracted the attention of the 
press.  The Boston Globe, for example, commented that it ‘lacked fire.’52   The most 
significant part of the event came when Borah was questioned from the floor on his 
support for Townsend’s pension plan.  Rather than issue a bland response, Borah took 
the opportunity to articulate his support for the introduction of a substantial pension 
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provision.  ‘I believe in it,’ he said, ‘as a matter of social justice and a matter of 
economic sanity.’  Labelling the $30 pension provision entitlement under the ‘so-called’ 
Social Security bill ‘a slow death,’ he went on to advocate the adoption of an enhanced 
pension amount sufficient to protect the elderly.  This was all relatively uncontroversial; 
it was his comment that he did ‘not think that [it] is practicable’ to force pensioners to 
spend their pension in one month that placed him in apparent outright opposition to 
Townsend’s plan.53  Borah did not intend his questioning of one of the central features 
of the plan to be taken as a signal of his opposition, but merely an indication of his 
belief that further work was required to make the proposal workable.  Whatever his 
intentions, Borah’s comments sparked a campaign amongst Townsend’s supporters 
against his nomination.     
Townsend himself was aware of the senator’s concerns.  Following much 
careful reflection, Borah had written to Townsend on October 1, 1935, expressing a 
fundamental concern over the constitutionality of the tax-raising element of the plan.  
‘Can the Federal government levy a tax for A,’ he questioned, ‘for the specific purpose 
of giving it to B, when A and B occupy the same position in the social structure, except 
as to the question of age?’  Borah assured Townsend, however, that this concern did 
not amount to rejection.  The senator retained ‘a great desire to find a favorable 
solution,’ but he would not express support ‘purely as a matter of political 
expediency.’54  On October 4, Townsend replied rapidly to Borah’s concerns, assuring 
the senator of his belief in the constitutionality of the plan.  Borah’s attendance 
alongside Townsend at the OARP rally on October 20, 1935, and the subsequent 
launch of the pension plan’s public campaign in support of the senator’s nomination, 
suggests some form of compromise had been agreed in private between the two men.  
Indeed, further to these displays of public support, Townsend wrote to Borah on 
November 14 with a blank invitation to redraft the pension plan as required ‘at once’ to 
remove ‘all objectionable features.’55  It is unclear, beyond the doctor himself, how 
aware the leaders of the OARP were of Borah’s exact position.  Townsend was willing 
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to conduct negotiations around the details of his plan in private, but he was careful that 
questions regarding practicability did not surface in public.  To Townsend’s most 
fanatical supporters, willing to follow him, as Borah commented to the doctor in private, 
without any well-defined ideas as to how ‘problems which are inherent in the proposal 
are to be solved,’ anyone questioning any detail of the plan was marked out as an 
opponent.56  Whatever the wishes of the OARP leadership, by expressing his private 
views on the detailed workability of the pension plan in public, Borah undermined his 
presidential aspirations.   
Victory in the California primary, the home state of the OARP and of Hoover, 
was central to Borah’s strategy to win over the support of convention delegates for his 
nomination.  Borah’s victory in the key battleground state would demonstrate the 
strength of support for a reform-minded candidate and strike a blow against the RNC, 
which retained close links with the former president.  Borah was dependent on 
Townsend’s supporters to deliver him the primary victory.  ‘I do not believe that any 
candidate could be successful without their support,’ wrote one local organiser to Carl 
Bachmann.  Prior to his January statement on the Townsend plan, Borah was informed 
that he was the clearly favoured candidate of the Californian OARP.  The senator’s 
perceived opposition to the Townsend plan, however, shifted them against his 
candidacy.  He had, Borah was informed, ‘lost [the] entire strength’ of the 
organisation.57 
 Borah’s controversial comments on the Townsend plan also hit the senator 
closer to home.  Borah had decided that he would campaign for re-election to his 
senate seat should he lose his bid for the party nomination.  This ambition took a blow 
when, in response to his supposedly anti-Townsend comments, the OARP in Idaho 
placed their own candidate into the Republican senatorial primary.  This local move 
against Borah hurt him deeply. ‘I doubt very much,’ he wrote to one friend, ‘if anyone 
can be elected who is not in favor of the proposition.’58  He concluded in a letter to 
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another Idaho correspondent, ‘I realise fully that the situation in Idaho might be such as 
to cause the Republican Party to wish to select some other candidate.’59   
 Borah attempted to retrieve his position in California and Idaho by re-engaging 
in discussions with the national OARP leadership.  Townsend’s subsequent attempt to 
assert his authority over his movement ended in failure.  The spring of 1936 was 
difficult, as Townsend endured the congressional investigation into his activity (‘I think 
the investigation has gone far beyond reason and justice,’ commented Borah in 
private).60  One of the immediate consequences of this investigation was a weakening 
of Townsend’s central control of the OARP.  The committee had revealed Townsend’s 
leadership to be fallible.  The campaigns waged by the California and Idaho groups 
against Borah were local decisions in which Townsend had played no part.  In a direct 
attempt to reassert his leadership over the movement, in March 1936, Townsend 
announced his support for Borah’s nomination.  ‘Senator Borah has not come right out 
for our plan,’ the doctor explained in his statement, ‘but he has moved a great deal 
further towards our ideals than any other candidate in sight in either party.’61  
Townsend’s formal endorsement of Borah’s candidacy, however, angered the OARP’s 
Board of Directors – constitutionally the President of the OARP was unable to endorse 
candidates for election without the Board’s prior authority.  With Borah refusing to 
express unqualified support for the Townsend plan, the OARP Board refused to back 
his candidacy.  From Townsend headquarters in California came a warning from 
Edward J. Margett, state manager, that Townsendites should ‘hold steady against 
unofficial onslaughts on the Townsend votes by those who by doing so use it for some 
goal other than enactment of the plan.’  Reminded of his constitutional limitations by his 
Board, Townsend was forced to present a revised statement to the press explaining 
that ‘he had not pledged his organisation to support Senator Borah for the nomination.’  
Anything he did in the campaign, he clarified, would ‘be merely an expression of his 
personal attitude.’62  Although he tried to make light of it, there was no doubt that 
Townsend had suffered public humiliation at the hands of his organisation.  Despite his 
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continued personal preference for Borah, there was now nothing that Townsend could 
do to mobilise the OARP behind the senator.  Borah’s political naivety had cost him 
dearly.  On March 26, 1936, with the national OARP unwilling to support him and the 
movement’s state organisation campaigning against him, the senator’s name was 
withdrawn from the California primary.63   
Townsend’s experience reduced the appeal of Borah’s candidacy to Coughlin.  
In April 1936, Carl Bachmann expressed a personal view that ‘many followers’ of 
Father Coughlin would get behind Borah’s nomination.64  Yet, despite Coughlin’s 
longstanding relationship with the senator, the formal endorsement of the NUSJ was 
not assured.  From Detroit, Coughlin watched the development of Borah’s nomination 
campaign closely, in particular, Townsend’s difficulty when he unilaterally awarded the 
OARP’s endorsement to the senator.  Despite his more autocratic control, Coughlin too 
was bound by an agreement that the NUSJ would not back a presidential candidate.  
Not wishing to suffer a similar public humiliation, Coughlin attempted a more subtle 
approach to demonstrating his support for Borah.  He would get the insurgent senator 
to endorse the NUSJ.  Coughlin’s supporters would then be able to make their own 
decision where to place their vote in the primary elections.  In mid-April 1936, Borah 
was made aware of Coughlin’s strategy in a letter from a mutual friend, Farmers’ Union 
president Edward Kennedy.  Informing Borah that Coughlin was ‘in a very friendly 
attitude’ to his campaign, Kennedy revealed that Borah would shortly receive a letter 
from the priest seeking confirmation that the senator would support the NUSJ’s plan to 
re-monetise silver.65  Borah’s subsequent response, published on the front page of 
Social Justice in early May, confirmed that he was indeed in sympathy with the NUSJ’s 
monetary plan.  In an accompanying article, Coughlin offered support for Borah’s 
campaign.  ‘Members of the National Union must obviously vote for somebody for 
president,’ the priest wrote.  For the NUSJ, the central issue by which all candidates 
must be judged was ‘the ‘money question’ and both of the parties are dodging it as if by 
common consent.’  In this circumstance, Coughlin concluded, the only candidate ‘who 
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has approached the ticklish question is the leonine battler Borah.’66  Although this 
compromise delivered Coughlin’s indirect endorsement, it did not mobilise the 
necessary resources of the NUSJ to address his campaign’s fundamental weakness.   
With the Republican insurgents largely indifferent to his campaign, with limited 
support from the NUSJ, and with the OARP against him at state level, Borah’s slim 
chances of victory were entirely dependent on whom the RNC chose as their 
candidate.  Should the RNC candidate prove unacceptable to the insurgent wing of the 
party, Borah might still provide an acceptable alternative despite the weakness of his 
campaign.  However, by endorsing the candidacy of Governor Alf Landon of Kansas, 
the RNC effectively neutralised Borah’s appeal.  
The RNC decision to endorse Landon’s candidacy was the result of a simplistic 
assessment of the party’s electoral appeal.  The Republican Party’s affirmation of its 
support in the northeastern states in regional elections during 1935, and the additional 
political and financial backing to the party obtained from the northeastern-dominated 
Liberty League following their break with the Democratic Party in January 1936, made 
the RNC assume that the region would be assured in the presidential election.  Victory, 
it was thus assumed was dependent on winning back the western states, which they 
had largely dominated since the end of the Civil War.  This, the RNC determined, could 
be achieved by selecting a western candidate acceptable to the northeastern party 
leadership.  Borah was not this candidate.  His long history of party insurrection, his 
outright opposition to the Hoover presidency, and his moves in late 1934 to undermine 
the power of the RNC through a revolt of Young Republicans, all rendered him 
unacceptable to the party leadership.67  Alf Landon, however, the only Republican 
governor to hold on to his state in the Democratic landslide of 1934, had great appeal.  
Landon had left the party to support Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party campaign 
in 1912, but had since supported the RNC.  He thus had the real benefit of not falling 
directly into either the conservative RNC or insurgent camps.68  With Borah’s campaign 
having faltered, the RNC’s backing for Landon’s candidacy effectively assured him the 
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nomination.  As Landon’s great political friend and supporter William Allen White, 
Kansas newspaper editor, explained bluntly to the Governor, ‘New England will let us 
write the platform and let you have the nomination.’69  
Landon launched his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination on 
January 29, 1936, the day after Borah and four days after Al Smith’s address to the 
Liberty League dinner.  In a speech designed to demonstrate both his reformist 
credentials and his appeal to more conservative-minded voters, he pronounced himself 
willing to consider reform where it was demonstrably necessary, but condemned the 
New Deal in forceful terms: ‘We need desperately a cheaper, simpler, and more 
responsible administration throughout the nation.’  Comparing Landon’s and Borah’s 
performances, the press generally favoured the former.  His speech was ‘better 
balanced, more comprehensive, closer to the ground and generally more impressive,’ 
concluded the Boston Herald.  The Literary Digest observed that in many editorials, 
Landon emerged clearly as the ‘common-sense’ candidate.70   
The main source of information on the comparative strength of the Republican 
candidates is the Gallup opinion polls.  The first poll to question Republican voters on 
their preference for the 1936 nomination, published on December 1, 1935, 
demonstrated that there were only two real candidates.  Borah (at 26 per cent) and 
Landon (leading with 33 per cent) each had received more than double the support of 
their nearest opponent, Hoover, who stood only on 12 per cent.  Borah and Landon at 
this stage each had every reason to believe that they had a chance of securing the 
nomination.  Following the formal launch of the Republican presidential nomination 
campaign, however, Borah’s reduction in electoral appeal was evident in the April 5 poll 
(with interviews undertaken in late February 1936).  The poll found that whilst Borah 
retained second place at 20 per cent, he had experienced a rapid drop in support.  
Conversely, Hoover had slightly increased his poll rating to 14 per cent, but Landon, on 
56 per cent, had moved decisively ahead by taking support from Borah and the other 
conservative candidates.  Furthermore, an analysis of the data broken down on a 
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regional basis revealed that Landon had a decisive lead (ranging from 43 per cent in 
the Pacific region to 8 per cent in the Mountain states) in every region of the country.   
Landon’s moderate conservatism had appeal across the spectrum of Republican voters 
and had overtaken Borah’s insurgent campaign.71   
 With Landon established as the front-runner, the RNC systematically set about 
removing the potential for Borah to cause an upset at the nominating convention by 
undermining his primary election campaign.  Primary elections were not the ubiquitous 
events they are today.  Instead, as Borah had highlighted in his January address, state 
leaders preferred to choose their own ‘uninstructed’ delegates to send to the 
convention.  The state leadership was then able to gain power within the national party 
by offering these blocs of votes to candidates who offered them the greatest rewards.  
Exploiting this system, the RNC encouraged state leaders not to conduct competitive 
primaries.  As a result, in 1936 only 12 of the 48 states staged primaries, the vast 
majority in the western states.  In a second move, the RNC met in New York in January 
1936 to agree a list of ‘favorite son’ candidates to compete against Borah in the 
primaries that did go ahead.72  Favorite sons were popular local political figures who 
were likely to achieve victory.  Those delegates pledged to the favorite sons were 
bound to vote for them in the first round of voting at convention, but were then free to 
act as uninstructed delegates able, in return for a reward, to back the RNC’s preferred 
candidate.  To ensure victory, the RNC directed substantial funds behind its anti-Borah 
primary election candidates.73  Finally, the RNC minimised Landon’s exposure to the 
electorate and engagement in direct debate.  In February 1936, William Allen White 
informed Borah that the RNC had agreed Landon should only enter the Massachusetts 
and New Jersey primaries, both northeastern states where support from the 
Republican leadership assured him of victory.74   
The RNC strategy severely weakened Borah’s chances of victory.  With the 
votes of the delegates loyal to the RNC assured, Landon remained aloof, whilst Borah 
was forced with extremely limited resources to campaign nationally against an array of 
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well-funded candidates.  Borah reacted bitterly in private to news of the strategy that 
was being used to defeat him.  The RNC, he wrote to one correspondent, felt that they 
could ‘elect any man they nominate upon any platform which they choose to write.’75  
Borah fumed to another correspondent, ‘I have never known a more determined effort 
to control a convention through the sheer use of money than is now being revealed.’76  
As the primary results began to come in, the weakness of Borah’s campaign was clear 
– he was able to win only those primaries in Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Oregon 
where he ran unopposed and in Wisconsin where he ran only against a slate of 
‘uninstructed delegates’ and West Virginia where he was opposed by a minor politician 
from Milwaukee running without RNC support.  He was heavily defeated by Landon in 
Massachusetts and New Jersey and by RNC-backed favorite son candidates in the 
remaining three states in which he entered.77 
 Following his failure in the primary elections, the press wrote off Borah’s 
campaign.  His candidacy, the Dayton Herald concluded in May, had ‘lost whatever 
significance it may once have possessed.’78  Despite this, Landon’s campaign team 
understood the difficulty that any show of support for Borah at the convention might 
cause for their candidate’s nomination.  Landon therefore set about making a deal with 
the senator.  The principal link between the two candidates was their mutual friend 
William Allen White.  In repeated meetings throughout the months of April and May, 
White and fellow Landon supporters placed sustained pressure upon Borah to 
withdraw from the campaign and endorse the governor, emphasising that a convention-
floor battle between the two might result in the selection of a conservative candidate.79  
‘For some weird reason Borah has got Alf classified as a reactionary,’ concluded White.  
‘I suppose he is hard to move once his opinion is set.’  Unwilling to accept Landon’s 
liberal credentials, Borah, thus, refused to budge.80   
 Borah, though, had good reason not to withdraw from the nominating campaign.  
As late as May 21, his campaign team remained convinced that the senator retained 
the support of at least 200 delegates.  Despite the weakness of his campaign, this core 
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support, Carl Bachmann commented, ‘surprise[d]’ the senator.81   Aware of the 
continued support for Borah’s candidacy, the RNC had no desire to weaken Landon’s 
appeal to reform-minded voters with an insurgent walkout from the convention.  They 
thus informed Borah they were willing to consider the incorporation of the senator’s 
views into the Republican platform.  As William Allen White articulated in a letter to 
Landon written before the convention: ‘Even the threat of Borah’s walkout will construct 
for us a platform that you could run on faster and further than you could run if Borah did 
not help us liberate the platform.’82  Borah did not trust the RNC; he feared that ending 
his campaign in advance of the convention might enhance rather than reduce the 
likelihood that a candidate more conservative than Landon might receive the 
nomination.  With the support of his bloc of loyal delegates behind him, however, Borah 
retained a significant bargaining chip that might affect the outcome of the nomination 
process.  ‘I do not propose to be satisfied with the platform,’ he wrote to one Landon 
campaign advisor in April 1936.  ‘Platforms are not worth a dahm if you do not know 
who is going to stand upon them.’83  Maximising his opportunity to shape the eventual 
outcome, Borah arrived in Cleveland on June 7, two days before the opening of the 
convention.  Working from the Idaho delegate room, he engaged in a period of intense 
negotiation which assured him that, even if backing for a conservative candidate 
emerged on the convention floor, the RNC would ensure Landon’s nomination on the 
first roll call vote.  On the evening of June 8, Borah announced to the delegates from 
Idaho that Landon’s victory was inevitable and formally withdrew from the race.84  On 
June 11, the RNC called upon their favorite son candidates to withdraw, and Landon 
won the nomination on the first roll-call, receiving 934 votes to Borah’s 19 (1 from West 
Virginia − Carl Bachmann − and 18 from Wisconsin).85    
Although Borah refused to serve formally on the Committee on Resolutions, he 
offered suggestions on the wording of the party platform.  However, the nomination of a 
moderate presidential candidate masked strong conservative voices within the RNC 
and the delegates at large.  Hoover in particular had previously chosen to remain 
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largely aloof from the nomination process, but with the RNC having asserted control of 
the party he stepped once more to the fore.  Hoover’s reassertion of his authority 
undermined Landon’s candidacy and placed immediate questions over his ability to run 
a moderate campaign.  In a blistering address, the former president described the New 
Deal as ‘a muddle,’ a ‘reckless adventure’ and overall a calamitous and expensive 
failure.  ‘After three years,’ he pointed out, ‘we still have the same number of 
unemployed that we had at the election of November 1932.’   The time had come, he 
said, for the nation to repudiate the New Deal and to restore sacred ‘human freedom.’  
‘Today,’ he concluded, ‘the stern task is before the Republican Party to restore the Ark 
of that Covenant to the temple in Washington.’86  The speech, which was interrupted 
repeatedly by prolonged applause, ended with a mass demonstration of support by 
delegates holding up their banners and marching around the convention floor, calling 
his name.  Hoover’s speech radicalised the convention and altered the final party 
platform.87  Much of Borah’s wording was ignored.  Although the final version 
incorporated support for social security and unemployment relief administered at state 
rather than federal level, its overall tone was resolutely opposed to a drive towards 
reform.  ‘We were lucky to get what we did,’ commented William Allen White later.  The 
RNC had secured a moderate western candidate, but burdened him with a largely 
conservative platform.88  The position of the RNC was set out in the preamble in the 
starkest terms: ‘for three long years the New Deal administration has dishonored 
American traditions for partisan political purposes.’89  Borah’s private concerns 
regarding Landon’s ability to overcome the determination of the RNC to reassert 
conservative values were thus ultimately proven true.   
Reflecting later in life upon his campaign for the Republican nomination, Borah 
expressed no regrets.  ‘I suppose some thought I was really seeking to gratify a great 
ambition,’ the senator explained to his friend Frank Brice, Jr. ‘But I was seeking to be of 
some service to what I consider a real crisis in this country.’90  Borah’s campaign had 
ended in failure, but a number of lessons should have been learned from the 
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experience.  Although he had made efforts to establish a grassroots movement to 
reform the Republican Party, without resources, he had been unable to galvanise 
enough support behind his campaign to bring state leaders over to his cause.  The 
RNC’s endorsement of a western candidate, coupled with the power they wielded 
through their overwhelming financial support for the national party, easily suppressed 
Borah’s ineffectual and amateurish campaign.  Borah might have been able to 
overcome the power and reach of the RNC if he had been able to successfully tap into 
alternative quasi-political networks operated by sympathetic organisations such as the 
OARP and NUSJ.  Borah recognised the potential power such networks might have 
afforded his campaign (he wrote to Townsend in early October 1935, ‘I realize fully the 
strength of your movement and the great support it has’), but although Townsend and 
Coughlin expressed public support for the senator, they were unable to mobilise their 
movements behind his campaign.91  More problematically, in the case of the OARP, 
Borah’s perceived negative comments about Townsend’s plan led directly to damaging 
local campaigns against his presidential nomination in California and his re-nomination 
for his senate seat in Idaho.  This was entirely counter to the radical reform leaders’ 
individual intentions.  They had turned to the Republican Party seeking to endorse a 
candidate sympathetic to their reform agenda.  Borah’s failure thus represented 
another setback in their campaign against the re-election of the president.  Whatever 
his good intentions, poorly financed and politically naïve, faced with certain defeat, 
Borah had found himself outmaneuvered by the powerful RNC.  In contrast, Landon’s 
nomination represented a victory for the conservative party leadership (and President 
Hoover) over the threat from their insurgent wing.   
For Coughlin, Townsend, Lemke and Smith, the nomination process for the 
major parties’ presidential candidates had proved deeply unsatisfactory.  There was no 
natural place for them to vent their frustration within the Democratic Party, where, 
following the assassination of Huey Long, opposition to Roosevelt had unsuccessfully 
solidified around the conservative Liberty League.  Borah’s failure to win the 
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Republican nomination placed the leaders of the radical reform movements in an 
impossible position.  With the 1936 presidential election now very clearly on the 
horizon, what should have been their moment of triumph as they campaigned against 
Roosevelt’s re-election appeared to have been snatched away from them.  Coughlin, in 
a statement published in Social Justice on June 22, summed up his opinion of the 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in damning terms: ‘To ask the 
National Union of Social Justice to support either Roosevelt or Landon is to invite this 
organization to choose between carbolic acid and rat poison.’93  Having failed to exert 
their influence over the major parties, the leaders of the radical reform movements 
could have chosen to remain silent, but they believed that a section of the American 
electorate stood ready to be mobilised behind a pro-reform, anti-Roosevelt crusade.  
Without a presidential candidate, however, this campaign lacked focus and political 
expediency.  With no other choice open to them, the time had come for the 
independent leaders of the diverse radical reform movements to enter into a formal 
union to back a candidate to defeat the president.  Gerald Smith had acted as the 
bridge between the NUSJ and the OARP.  His personal ambition for power had been 
the final driving force behind the convergence of the diverse group of independent 
radical reformers.  It was only right then that the nature of their new agreement was 
revealed by Smith himself in a press conference held in Chicago on June 15.  There 
the preacher announced that a formal ‘united front’ had now been established between 
the NUSJ, OARP, SoW and supporters of Congressman William Lemke.  The basis of 
this unification was a common belief that basic American rights and freedoms had been 
seriously undermined by the strict state control and central planning advocated by the 
administration.  By working together, Smith announced, the leaders of the diverse 
radical reform movements would successfully oppose ‘the communistic philosophy of 
Frankfurter, Ickes, Hopkins and Wallace.’92  In their editorial columns published in 
Social Justice on June 12 and the National Townsend Weekly on June 15, immediately 
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following Landon’s victory at the Republican National Convention, Coughlin and 
Townsend set out the next stage in their campaign against the president.    
 Coughlin began his editorial, titled ‘Stand By!,’ by reminding his members that 
the NUSJ had been established not only to teach the principles of social justice, but to 
ensure these principles were put in place.  Members were, Coughlin reminded them, 
‘expected to be doers of and not only listeners to the gospel of social justice.’  With the 
presidential candidates of the two major parties confirmed, the priest set out his plan 
for action.93  Ordering his members to ‘rally to your principles and your leaders,’ 
Coughlin announced that the activities of the NUSJ would ‘increase tremendously’ 
immediately following June 16 or 17.  He would, he said, at this time ‘lay down a plan 
for action which will thrill you and inspire you beyond anything that I have ever said or 
accomplished in the past.’  Coughlin concluded his piece by presenting a clear case for 
the entry of the NUSJ directly into this new political arena.  In the past, he explained, 
he had promised his members that ‘as long as I remained your legal president it would 
be impossible for the National Union to become a political party.’  Priests might be 
interested in politics, but they ‘may not head a political party which has a candidate for 
president or for Congress.’  In this circumstance, he had therefore focused the activities 
of the movement on the endorsement of ‘good’ Democrats and Republicans who would 
‘fight’ the ‘partisan machine’ in Washington.  Yet in the current political situation, he 
continued, he could not, in good faith, endorse either the ‘promise-breaking’ 
Democratic president in the White House nor the Republican nominee ‘dominated not 
by the progressive Republicans west of Wall Street, but by the bankers themselves.’  
The lack of an acceptable presidential candidate presented the NUSJ with a significant 
challenge.  Coughlin had conceived the NUSJ as a ‘real union of farmer and laborer, of 
merchant and industrialist, of professional man and housewife, independent of party, 
creed or race,’ because ‘every one of us had been victimized by the errors which crept 
into our modern capitalism.’  In these impossible circumstances, it was right that the 
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NUSJ step forward to defend the nation against the excesses and failings of the old 
‘moribund parties’ who continued to ‘play the bankers’ game.’94  
Coughlin’s mobilisation of the NUSJ represented a real threat to the balance of 
power within Congress and the outcome of the presidential election.  This new action, 
however, exposed the priest as never before.  Whatever news emerged over the next 
week, Coughlin concluded, he ‘pledge[d]’ and ‘promise[d]’ that ‘I still remain your 
leader!’95  Coughlin’s pre-announcement of the date he would reveal his presidential 
candidate was intended to generate press, public and political interest, but also to allow 
a period of time to assess the reactions of his membership.  With a week to confirm the 
final details, the priest allowed himself some flexibility to construct his final plan.   
 The nature of the third-party movement sketched out by Coughlin was further 
elaborated in Townsend’s editorial of June 15.  Townsend, having learned his lesson 
from his embarrassment at the hands of his board when he had unilaterally announced 
his support for Borah’s presidential nomination campaign, also explicitly warned his 
members in advance of his intention to mobilise them behind a new third-party 
movement.  The doctor’s leadership of the OARP had been thrown into question by the 
evidence presented during the congressional hearings into the movement.  It had been 
challenged further when the doctor had been blocked from endorsing Borah’s 
campaign for the Republican nomination.  His editorial of 15 June was intended to rally 
his supporters but also to explain his actions in the clearest of terms, set out the need 
for change of focus for the movement, and to end any potential challenge to his 
leadership.  Like Coughlin, Townsend was clear that any future concerted political 
action by the OARP did not require a change in the organisation itself.  ‘I am asked 
many times a day,’ he began, ‘if there is to be a merger of the OARP with [the NUSJ] 
and similar movements.’  ‘My answer has always been “No merger of any kind is 
proposed.”’  But in the present political and economic circumstances, doing nothing 
was not an option.  ‘Do not mistake this!’ warned Townsend, ‘We are proposing to go 
places!’  With the single aim of seeing the enactment of his pension plan, Townsend 
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set out ambitious plans for the OARP to be the driving force behind the formation of a 
new political party.  This new party, he foresaw, would replace ‘both of the gang-ridden 
political parties’ with a ‘new shining model.’  However, this ‘new alignment’ was not 
something that the Townsend movement would take on alone.  Instead, he announced 
his intention to form a ‘new league of Farm and Labor’ groups to ‘blast Farleyism out of 
high places and again take possession of our rightful heritage.’  To achieve this new 
plan, the OARP needed not to embark upon a ‘bloody revolution’ but to ‘get together all 
we who are against the hidden forces which now plainly control our political destinies.’  
Thus, where he found ‘Father Coughlin, or Gerald L.K. Smith, or a Lemcke [sic] who 
[were] in the spirit of fiery revolt against the present encroachments on our rights and 
liberties, then know that I will strike hands and will speak at mass meetings and will join 
or lead processions.’  But ‘once and for all,’ Townsend assured his members, the 
launch of the new party would not affect the independence of the OARP: ‘I am not 
adopting the platforms or teachings of other groups or parties.’96     
Both Townsend and Coughlin went to great lengths to assure their members of 
the independence of the new movement from their own organisations.  There would be 
a new third party with its own platform, both men agreed, behind which both men would 
throw their backing, but the NUSJ and OARP would remain separate from it.  By taking 
this dual approach, they believed they could mobilise the third party to defeat the 
president, but, at the same time, by maintaining their independence, protect their 
individual positions of power.  Townsend wrote that he had ‘no desire to gain political 
leadership of any new party.’  ‘Titles mean nothing,’ Coughlin commented.  ‘Sometimes 
they are only embarrassing to him who holds them; sometimes they only obstruct 
activity.’97  The publication of their two powerful editorials constituted a significant 
enhancement of the loose coalition of anti-Roosevelt groups announced on June 1, 
1936.  Having now made their plan public, criticism arising from amongst their 
membership would have represented a considerable embarrassment.  The point of 
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union had now formally been reached.  Significant challenges remained, however, in 
turning the new union into an active political movement. 
As befits a political party born of negotiation between several headstrong 
leaders accused of dictatorial tendencies, the detailed circumstances surrounding the 
birth of the new party were not particularly democratic.  From the point of the 
announcement of the union on June 15 and the formal launch of the Union Party on 
June 19, much detailed work remained to be undertaken.  A flurry of private telephone 
conversations was held, and telegrams passed, between Lemke, Coughlin, Townsend 
and Smith to put in place arrangements for the new party.98  In line with the position 
presented in Coughlin’s and Townsend’s editorials, rather than seeking to transform 
one of the existing movements, the men backed the creation of a new political party.  In 
the last week of May, as it became apparent that Borah’s candidacy for the Republican 
nomination was likely to fail, Townsend had visited the senator in Washington, D.C., 
along with a delegation of what the New York Times described as ‘representatives of 
other dissident groups,’ and had offered him the nomination of the new party.  Borah 
thanked Townsend for his support, but offered no further encouragement.  In this 
circumstance, William Lemke, the only established politician amongst them, agreed to 
take the presidential nomination.99  It is possible to determine from a June 16 letter 
written by Lemke to Thomas O’Brien (a Massachusetts labour lawyer and NUSJ 
activist), thanking him for ‘consenting at my request, to seek the office of Vice-
President on The Union Party ballot,’ that both the new party’s name and Lemke’s 
acceptance of the nomination had occurred prior to that date.  Indeed, this would be 
consistent with Smith’s confident announcement to the press on the previous day of the 
establishment of the new ‘united front.’100  Further evidence that Coughlin was working 
together with Townsend and Smith on the details surrounding the establishment of the 
new party can be derived from a comment provided to the press by Eastern Regional 
Director of the OARP, Dr. Clinton Wunder.  ‘Dr. Townsend and Father Coughlin,’ 
Wunder announced on June 18, ‘were keeping in touch by long distance telephone.’  
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Furthermore, a telegram received by Lemke from Smith on June 17, invited the new 
presidential nominee to speak alongside Townsend before a crowd of 20,000 OARP 
supporters meeting in Syracuse, New York, the following Saturday, June 20.101    
Despite progress made in the week following Landon’s nomination, the truth 
was that by the date of Coughlin’s scheduled radio address on June 19, considerable 
work remained to be done to confirm the details of the radical reform leaders’ support 
for Lemke’s campaign.  With the Democratic National Convention due to open on 23 
June, Coughlin’s timing was likely influenced by a desire for his announcement to 
dominate the news agenda and potentially mobilise opposition to Roosevelt’s re-
nomination.  It is also possible that he was trying, by naming a specific date, to force 
Townsend to make a decision more quickly than the doctor might have found 
comfortable.  The doctor had only been willing in his editorial to commit to the third-
party launch taking place ‘this summer or autumn.’102  Townsend’s relative reluctance 
to name a specific date likely sprang from the recent challenges made against his 
leadership of the OARP, particularly given damaging evidence revealed by the 
congressional investigation.  Thus, despite additional pressure from Smith that he 
should move quickly to formalise the third-party arrangement (as evidenced by the 
preacher’s announcement in the press of the formation of the new ‘united front’ and the 
private invitation to Lemke to speak before at the mass OARP meeting on 20 June), 
Townsend retained a strong preference for delaying the formal announcement.  ‘We 
can’t say what our strategy will be until after our convention in Cleveland, July 15-19,’ 
Townsend announced to the press on June 18.  ‘If Father Coughlin wants to support 
us, all well and good.  We’re not endorsing anybody at this time.  Why should we?  We 
have the strength and it’s growing everyday.’  Coughlin, however, having made a 
commitment to his members and having raised the expectations of the press, set aside 
the concerns of his partner and on June 19 proceeded with his scheduled 
announcement.  The conflict between Coughlin and Smith’s desire to move quickly and 
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Townsend’s preference to delay threatened to derail the new party before its campaign 
had even begun.103 
As Coughlin had promised, his June 19 address redefined the purpose of the 
NUSJ and permanently shifted his position as leader of the movement.  The radio 
priest began his presentation by announcing to his massed listeners the surprising 
news that he had received notification from Washington, D.C., that afternoon of the 
establishment of a new ‘Union Party,’ with Lemke as its presidential nominee.  In 
accordance with his statements in opposition to the nominations of Roosevelt and 
Landon, and in support of the Union Party’s radical reform platform, Coughlin 
announced that he considered Lemke ‘eligible for endorsement’ by the NUSJ as its 
favoured presidential candidate.  He likewise invited similar expressions of support 
from the members of the Townsend movement, farmers, workers and all other radical 
reform minded groups.104  Coughlin went on to devote little of his speech to comments 
on Landon’s nomination for the Republican Party, beyond stating that the nation ‘had 
turned its back’ upon the ‘ragged individualism’ that he said they represented.  Instead, 
the priest focused the majority of his time criticising Roosevelt for the failures of his first 
administration.  He attacked the AAA’s destruction of farm produce as ‘immoral’ and 
expressed strong support for Lemke’s Farm Mortgage Refinance Plan.  He ended the 
speech with an outright attack upon the honesty of the president.  Roosevelt had 
promised upon his inauguration, Coughlin said, to ‘drive the money changers out of the 
temple,’ yet in the course of his first administration, the president had repeatedly failed 
to live up to his vow.  As a consequence, there existed only one political party in the 
nation today, ‘the bankers’ party.’  Neither ‘old dealer nor new dealer, it appears,’ he 
challenged, ‘has the courage to assail the international bankers, the Federal Bankers.’  
In 1936, Coughlin concluded, ‘our disillusionment is complete.’   
Concurrent with Coughlin’s radio address, Lemke issued a statement to the 
national press confirming that he would ‘run for President of the United States on the 
Union Party Platform.’105  One reporter, commenting on the nature of the 
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announcement, acutely observed that the presidential convention must have been held 
in a telephone booth.106  Although Lemke provided no further details at this stage on 
the origins, leadership or structure of the new Union Party, alongside his statement, he 
issued a fifteen-point platform of liberal reform policies (described by the New York 
Times as ‘radical in nature’ and ‘remarkable for its brevity’) which he claimed would 
counter Roosevelt’s dictatorial tendencies and thus ‘save democracy and put an end to 
the so-called Depression.’107  Observers interested in the balance of power within the 
new ‘Union’ commented that Lemke’s proposals read like a ‘re-hash’ of the platform of 
Coughlin’s National Union of Social Justice and observed, wryly, that Townsend’s old-
age pension proposal and the key elements of the Share-our-Wealth plan were 
missing.108 
If Coughlin and Lemke had hoped that an immediate statement backing 
Lemke’s candidacy would be forthcoming from the OARP, they were proved wrong.  A 
final agreement had not been achieved between the different parties, and Townsend 
refused to be pushed.  Lemke had telegrammed Smith in the hours before Coughlin’s 
announcement seeking an urgent telephone call.  In a reply received by Lemke at 
11.38 a.m. on June 19, Smith apologised that his ‘train schedule and confusion in time 
made my call impossible.’109  In the absence of this call, no formal backing for Lemke’s 
announcement was possible.  In its place, later that day, a rather embarrassed Smith 
was forced to announce to the press that Townsend and he had agreed to meet Lemke 
early the following week.  Any formal announcement of their support would be withheld 
until that meeting had taken place.  The likely outcome, at least from Smith’s 
perspective, was clear.  ‘We believe,’ he concluded his statement, ‘that the combined 
strength of [the NUSJ, OARP and SoW] can elect the next President of the United 
States.’110  The inability of the union to agree such basic details as the timetable for the 
announcement of the new party and Coughlin’s decision to proceed with the launch in 
its absence, did not bode well for the success of Lemke’s candidacy.  It appeared that 
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the lessons of Borah’s uncoordinated, naïve nomination campaign had not been 
learned.   
Despite the failure of his partners to co-ordinate their endorsement of his new 
party and candidacy, Lemke remained positive as to his chances.  Speaking to 
reporters from the Associated Press on the day of Coughlin’s announcement, Lemke 
identified Illinois as a state likely to fall to the Union Party.  Roosevelt had achieved an 
18 per cent swing to seize the state for the Democrats in 1932, but, Lemke explained, 
with blocks of businesses and residential property in receivership, dissatisfaction rife in 
the mining and agricultural sectors, and both traditional parties torn apart by infighting, 
‘the situation in the state is ideal for the success of our party.’111  The situation 
described in Illinois was not unique.  Thus, although the press hesitated to declare 
Lemke a significant contender for the presidency in November, there was a common 
belief that, if he was able to harness the popular discontent of the section of the 
electorate dissatisfied with the pace of reform under the New Deal, Lemke’s candidacy 
might cut seriously into Roosevelt’s share of the popular vote.  Democratic 
Representative Martin Sweeney of Ohio expressed a widely reported view that Lemke 
would ‘garner 20,000,000 popular votes and possibly put the election of the president 
to the House of Representatives.’112  
The formation of the Union Party generated considerable interest in the press 
and the general public. Front pages across the nation from Oregon to New York to 
Iowa to Missouri ran with Lemke’s surprising news.  An editorial published in the 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette on June 22 declared the news ‘a much more important 
development than in any other campaign in which third parties have appeared.’113  
Such excitement seems vastly disproportionate, however, to the facts surrounding the 
establishment and launch of the Union Party.  Forced into a corner by continued 
outright opposition to the re-election of Roosevelt, the leaders of the radical reform 
movements, Townsend, Smith, Lemke and Coughlin, had been unsuccessful in 
displacing the president from the 1936 Democratic presidential nomination and unable 
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to secure the nomination of an insurgent candidate for the Republican nomination.  On 
June 15, 1936, with few other alternatives, the diverse collective of radical reformers 
reached the final point of union.  Yet, with one week between Landon’s nomination as 
Republican presidential candidate and the opening of the Democratic National 
Convention to turn their union into an effective political force, time pressures and 
Townsend’s reluctance to be rushed meant that launch day was amateurish and 
muddled.  The circumstances of its chaotic launch would ultimately define the public’s 
attitude towards Lemke and the Union Party.  Despite Townsend and Coughlin’s 
attempts to establish distance between the new party and their movements, the 
strange circumstances of its birth and Lemke’s nomination generated immediate and 
sustained speculation that Coughlin was the power behind the throne.  Wishing to 
suppress these suggestions, the priest went to extreme lengths to preserve the 
pretence of the new party’s independence.  When asked during a press conference 
held at the close of his June 19 radio broadcast when he had received a copy of 
Lemke’s new party platform, Coughlin abruptly ended questioning and stormed out of 
the room.  In the priest’s wake, a scuffle broke out between a number of Coughlin’s 
aides and the journalist, J. A. Reichman of The United Press.  When Reichman refused 
to provide his newspaper identification card, he was seized and his arm twisted behind 
his back.114  Whatever the eventual significance of Lemke’s presidential candidacy, the 
Union Party campaign was clearly not going to be without incident.  
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The Union Party as a Fiction 
  
When the third party did come up, it was merely a protest. 
Charles Coughlin, interview with Sheldon Marcus.1 
 
 
In June of 1936, a new political party was formed to fight for the presidential election: 
the Union Party.  Born of protest at the perceived failures of the New Deal and the 
Democratic president, Franklin Roosevelt, it was backed by a union of the leaders of 
the Depression era’s most successful mass movements: Charles Coughlin, Francis 
Townsend and Gerald Smith.  Together, Smith estimated that together their groups 
would control ‘more than 20,000,000 votes’ in the November election.2  The basis of 
this union was not stable, however.  Its backers and its presidential candidate had 
limited practical experience of what was required to establish or run a national political 
party.  They also had different ambitions for the long-term future of the party from their 
presidential candidate, William Lemke.  It became apparent that the rivalry that had led 
to breakdown in their individual relations with the administration would also tinge their 
relationships with their colleagues within the new union.  Still, the emergence of a third 
party candidate concerned the Democratic Party leadership. 
The Democratic National Committee (DNC) was well aware of the potential for 
a third party to disrupt the result of a presidential election.  Only twenty-four years 
previously, a split within the Republican Party had led to Theodore Roosevelt 
campaigning under the third-party banner of the Progressive Party.  His campaign 
divided the Republican vote and delivered Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic Party 
candidate, the victory.  Likewise, a secret poll undertaken by the Emil Hurja, Deputy 
Chairman of the DNC in 1935 revealed that, should Huey Long split the Democratic 
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Party in 1936, he would take about six million votes from the president.3  With Long 
dead, these fears persisted amongst the Democratic leadership and morphed into a 
concern that the Union Party might mobilise the senator’s supporters, along with those 
of Coughlin and Townsend, to disrupt the 1936 election.  Indeed, further polling 
undertaken by Hurja in the run up to the presidential election suggested that Lemke’s 
forecast vote, drawn overwhelmingly from the president, might affect the election 
outcome.  This perceived threat of the Union Party, which could be sustained by 
historic voter trends, was accepted by the DNC and the president himself.  
American history is littered with third parties, but the peculiarities of the U.S. 
governmental system ensure that they play only a specialised and limited role.  
American third parties have taken on one of two distinctive forms: the doctrinal party 
and the transient party.  The doctrinal parties (for example, the Socialists or 
Libertarians) are typified by both their long life and their focus on a clear ideological 
standpoint missing from the traditional party platforms.  Their failure to elect candidates 
to office does not mean that they have failed.  Their existence offers a section of the 
electorate sympathetic with their views a means to express their political preference.  In 
comparison, a transient party (for example the Progressive Party in 1912) usually 
originates either as a movement of economic protest or as a direct splinter from one of 
the major parties.  These parties act as pressure valves, giving a section of the party 
membership the opportunity to express support for views outside of the political 
mainstream.  Once the pressure has been released, these splinters tend to be 
reabsorbed by one of the established parties.  Transient parties tend to burn fast, 
brightly and intensely, whilst the doctrinal parties offer a slow burn.  The common 
thread between the doctrinal party and the transient party is that in each case their 
formation has been an act of choice against the major parties.  In this context, there are 
questions as to whether the founders of the Union Party considered it to be a transient 
or doctrinal party.4   
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Lemke’s private correspondence with his friend, socialist organiser and poet 
Covington Hall, provides evidence of the representative’s evolving views and ultimate 
determination of the need to establish a doctrinal political party along radical reforming 
lines.  Hall was born in Mississippi in 1871, but was brought up in rural Louisiana.  
Moving to New Orleans in the mid-1890s, Hall became a leading member of the state’s 
Socialist Party.  He was not dogmatic, however, and became disillusioned by what he 
saw as the party’s prioritisation of its electoral success over the needs of its voters.  
Leaving the party, he embarked upon a series of endeavours to bring small farmers 
and rural labourers together into their own radical union.  This shared passion to 
improve the lives of farmers brought Hall and Lemke together, their friendship dating 
over twenty years.5  A reading of the extensive correspondence between the two men 
establishes their close personal relationship: on one occasion, Lemke enclosed a 
cheque for $5 in his letter for Hall to purchase cigarettes; on another, the 
representative agreed to facilitate a $500 loan for his friend’s sister.6  Within the 
boundaries of this close friendship, the two men exchanged their detailed views on the 
current financial crisis and the need for, as Lemke wrote in February 1934, a ‘new 
alignment’ in American politics.  His initial view had been that Roosevelt might himself 
bring about the political change that he and Hall agreed necessary.  ‘I am inclined to 
believe,’ Lemke informed his friend, ‘he is far more progressive than the reactionary 
Democratic machine.’7  By February 1935, however, the president’s personal 
opposition to the representative’s agricultural reform proposals ended Lemke’s 
relationship with the Democratic Party.  He remained unconvinced at this stage, 
however, of the need to establish a new political party.  ‘I feel,’ he concluded, ‘we 
should take some good progressive Republican and take the Republican Party over.’8  
Lemke would thereafter back William Borah’s campaign for the Republican nomination.  
However, Borah’s difficulty in overcoming the stranglehold the conservative Republican 
National Committee held over the party, prompted Lemke gradually to reappraise the 
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need for a new political party.  Hall was likely a strong influence on shifting Lemke’s 
opinion.   
In an intense period of correspondence between May and August 1935, Hall 
challenged Lemke to take action to form a new political party ahead of the 1936 
elections.  Gradually the representative was persuaded of his friend’s argument.  On 
May 19, 1935, Hall wrote to Lemke to inform him of his latest round of meetings on 
behalf of the Socialist Party.  He concluded the letter by setting out his vision for 
overcoming the failings of the Democrats and Republicans by establishing a new ‘Party 
of the Undermen.’9  Hall elaborated upon his proposal in his subsequent letter of June 
2, suggesting that Lemke force a coming together of the Socialist, Progressive and 
Farmer-Union movements (Hall’s so-called ‘chickenfeed parties’) to form the new party.  
Everywhere he had been throughout the country, he explained, his proposal had 
‘brought cheers from the crowd and has done more than aught else to pep up our 
people.’  He concluded, ‘Why not us try it?  What have WE to lose?’10  Mindful of the 
difficulty of bringing together competing leadership of these small parties into a single 
agreement, Hall suggested that Lemke should move quickly to establish a new party, 
and let the momentum this would generate bring the various elements together.  ‘Once 
that party is there, it will get leaders whom we can build up and make known to the 
people, for its very formation will do more than all else to solidify the Rebels and they 
will rapidly do the rest.’11  Hall’s words had a considerable impact on his friend.  On 
June 8, Lemke replied to Hall affirming his desire to take action.  ‘When this session of 
Congress closes,’ the representative confirmed, ‘I shall devote my energies to an 
attempt to get together and organize such a movement as will bring the people of this 
nation together.’12   
There was one significant point of difference between Hall and Lemke in their 
planning for the establishment of their new doctrinal party: the role of Coughlin and 
Long.  ‘As for the Longs and Coughlins,’ Hall wrote in June 1935, ‘they ARE potential 
Fascists.’  ‘The only possible economic base for a new party,’ Hall concluded, ‘is one 
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based four-square on the declaration that Capitalism has failed and then demanding its 
replacement by a system based on production for USE and not for private profit.’13  
Lemke, however, rejected Hall’s advice and tapped Long’s and Coughlin’s political 
influence to pressure for passage of his agricultural reform proposals.  To Hall, 
Lemke’s move towards Long and Coughlin was a serious misjudgement.  I ‘saw by the 
papers that you seemed to be flirting with “Father” Coughlin,’ Hall wrote in warning on 
July 16, 1935.  ‘DONT [sic] DO IT, mix up with him I mean.  I have a strong hunch that 
you’ll regret to your dying day if you do, and with Long as well.’14  In retrospect, Hall’s 
words seem prescient, but in his reply, Lemke strongly defended his actions.  ‘The fact 
that I may speak at Coughlin’s or Long’s meetings does not mean that I accept all of 
their ideas or ideals.  But you know me well enough to know that I am not afraid to 
speak with the devil, if necessary.’15  In reply, Hall set out an explanation for his 
opposition to Long and Coughlin.  Apologising for the strong language contained in his 
previous letter, Hall explained, ‘I have seen something of Louisiana under Long’s 
“dictatorship” and, while I have still less use for his enemies than for him, I do not like it 
at all.’  Most importantly, his direct experience of life in Louisiana had provided him with 
an insight into the realities behind Long’s record of reform likely lost upon those that 
only heard the senator speak in the Senate or on the radio.  ‘The state,’ Hall concluded, 
‘is one vast poorhouse, regardless of the senator’s ballyhoo.’16  Despite Hall’s 
explanation, Lemke remained unmoved and responded robustly.  ‘I do not know 
anything about the senator excepting as I have seen him in action in the U.S. Senate,’ 
he wrote. ‘There he has always been a hundred per cent for the people, and a 
thousand per cent against Wall Street.’17  Lemke had benefited from Long’s support in 
the passage of his Farm Bankruptcy Bill and believed that alignment with the senator 
would benefit his campaign for passage of Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill.  Most 
significantly, Lemke believed that a link with Long and Coughlin, with their powerful, 
national organisations behind them, would provide momentum for his plan to establish 
his new political party.  Thus, having rejected Hall’s comments, Lemke presented his 
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friend with a direct challenge in return.  ‘I think the time has arrived,’ Lemke concluded, 
‘when we must get away from mere words that are meaningless, and get down to brass 
tacks, and let the public know just what we intend to do, and how it is to be done.’18  On 
June 10, 1936, Lemke wrote to Hall to confirm his plan of action had finally reached 
fruition.  He was, he concluded, ‘satisfied that there will be a new alignment of the 
liberal groups and that the American people will have an opportunity to vote on a real 
platform and real candidates.’19   
Despite the influence of his powerful backers, from the moment of its 
conception, William Lemke maintained independent control over the Union Party.  An 
experienced political organiser, in his early career he had with little resource been 
responsible for the establishment of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League (NPL), 
which through its exploitation of the primary system had swept aside traditional 
conservative Republican candidates and seized control of the state’s political 
establishment.  In power, the NPL had delivered a package of substantial, lasting social 
reforms to its supporters.  The political model that Lemke had pioneered in North 
Dakota spread through the western farm states and, in the form of the Farmer-Labor 
Party, remained during the 1930s the major political force in Minnesota.20  Lemke had 
not accepted Coughlin, Smith and Townsend’s plan as a fool’s errand, but because he 
genuinely believed that the New Deal was failing to offer solutions to the problems of 
the Depression and that, as in North Dakota, a new political movement was needed to 
force change.  Once established, Lemke believed the electorate would, as with the 
NPL, flock to the Union Party.   
The NPL, the New York Times concluded, had ‘colored the Lemke political 
philosophy far more than any of the other movements with which he has been 
associated.’21  The NPL and the Union Party shared a central belief, reflected in their 
core values and articulated in their platforms, that the power of the federal government 
should be utilised to support the interests of the common people, the farmer, the 
worker, the shopkeeper, by establishing a framework in which freedom of competition 
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could be sustained and honest endeavour rewarded.  Like his fellow insurgent 
Republicans and his backers from the independent radical reform movements, the 
Times argued, Lemke believed that ‘governmental policies are in fact responsible for 
the economic well-being of the individual American.’  Ultimately, this required the 
government to control ‘the people’s money’ to remove private business from banking 
and natural resources.  Government control, Lemke believed, was ‘necessary to spare 
competitive business the ruinous effects of an endless series of inflations and 
deflations contrived in the interests of gamblers in specious values.’22   
The Union Party platform demonstrated the attempts by Lemke to unify the 
independent social agendas of his backers in a single, shared ideology, but also 
provides evidence of his ambition to establish it as a formal political party.  The Kansas 
City Star dismissed Lemke’s platform as ‘a combination of New Deal, Father Coughlin 
and the late Huey Long,’ but it is misleading to view the Union Party platform as simply 
an amalgam of his backers’ plans.23  Lemke himself countered such suggestions in a 
discussion with reporters on June 27. ‘We don’t accept each other’s ideas in their 
entirety,’ he concluded.  ‘That’s why we call it the “Union” party.’  His organisation, he 
explained, ‘did not represent a merger of dissatisfied groups’; rather, it was a 
‘combination of distinct lines of endeavor.’24  To Lemke the union within the new party’s 
title was symbolic not only of the bringing together of his backers, but was also 
reflective of the three broad sections of the electorate he intended to form the party’s 
core support.  The Union Party’s emblem was a triangle within a circle.  ‘The base for 
the triangle will represent agriculture,’ Lemke said.  ‘With labor on one side and 
industry on the other, united by the encircling ring.’25  The American nation had been 
built upon the efforts of these individuals.  ‘I appeal to you,’ Lemke commented upon 
foundation of the new party, ‘because this nation belongs to you and you are 
responsible for its destiny.’26  The Democrats and Republicans, Lemke alleged, existing 
only to support the dominance of the wealthy, exploited their control of the federal 
government to suppress the individual freedom of the common man.  ‘Democracy, 
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when it works, places a premium on self-reliance,’ explained an editorial published in 
Social Justice.  It fosters and nourishes a sense of responsibility in the individual, in 
economic and political groups.’  However, ‘under the New Deal, the self-reliance of all – 
save the small banker and monopolist wealthy classifications – has suffered severe 
and continuing onslaughts.’  In particular, the New Deal’s establishment of a 
‘paternalistic’ federal government had restricted the freedom of the people and 
‘undermined’ self-reliance.  ‘When responsibility is removed from free citizens that is 
when their liberties are in grave jeopardy,’ commented Social Justice.27  ‘Every policy 
of the administration,’ Lemke explained, ‘is leading us to greater and greater 
regimentation which means further loss of freedom on the part of our people.’28  ‘The 
truth is,’ he concluded, ‘that we have made beggars out of a once proud people.’29  In 
comparison, the Union Party intended to re-energise American self-reliance and bring 
about a genuine economic recovery.  ‘Our  people,’ commented Union Party Chairman 
John Nystul, ‘demand the right to be free in body, spirit and religion, with no man a 
“dictator” and no man a “subject.”  They demand the plain right to govern themselves 
without coercion or intimidation.’30   
In its language, message and tone, the Union Party platform repudiated the 
New Deal’s attempts to rehabilitate the capitalist economic system.  ‘To correct the 
errors and abuses caused by avarice and greed,’ explained Social Justice, ‘and provide 
faith and inspiration for greater prosperity, greater security and greater 
accomplishments.’31  These aspirations were reflected in the key proposals set out in 
the platform.  The first point of the platform established the thread of isolation and 
independence inherent throughout the remaining fourteen points: ‘America shall be 
self-contained and self-sustained: no foreign entanglements, be they political, 
economic, financial or military.’  The economic independence of the nation was re-
emphasised in point seven: ‘Congress shall legislate that American agricultural, 
industrial, and commercial markets will be protected from manipulation of foreign 
moneys,’ and military independence in point eight.  The nation’s armed forces, it 
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proclaimed, should be utilised only to defend the nation from aggression but ‘must not 
be used under any consideration in foreign fields or in foreign waters either alone or in 
conjunction with any foreign power.’32   
In addition to establishing the nation’s economic and military independence, the 
Union Party platform proposed a series of measures intended to rebalance the 
interests of the nation back in the favour of the average American.  It proposed to 
reduce the influence of international bankers (point two: ‘Congress and Congress alone 
shall coin, issue and regulate all the money and credit in the United States through a 
central bank of issue’), big business (point twelve: ‘Congress shall protect small 
industry and private enterprise by controlling and decentralizing the economic 
domination of monopolies’), corrupt political parties (point nine: ‘Congress shall so 
legislate that all federal offices and positions of every nature shall be distributed 
through civil service qualifications and not through a system of party spoils and corrupt 
patronage’; point ten called for restoration of power to the  people through ‘the ruthless 
eradication of bureaucracies’) and, the wealthy (point fourteen: ‘Congress shall set a 
limitation upon the net income of any individual in any one year and a limitation on the 
amount that such an individual may receive as a gift or as an inheritance’).33  
Finally, the Union Party proposed a series of social, economic and industrial 
reforms intended to utilise the power of the federal government to enhance the position 
of the common man.  To improve the lives of the majority of average Americans, point 
three of the Union Party platform proposed that Congress would ‘refinance all the 
present agricultural mortgage indebtedness for the farmer and all the home mortgage 
indebtedness for the city owner.’  In addition, Congress would directly intervene in the 
operation of the economy to protect the interests of the common man, (point eleven) by 
establishing ‘federal works for the conservation of public lands, waters and forests.’  
Furthermore, for the young, point fifteen assured that Congress would ‘re-establish 
conditions so that the youths of the nation as they emerge from schools and colleges 
may have the opportunity to earn a decent living.’  For workers, their industrial policy 
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set out in point four assured Congress would legislate to deliver ‘a living annual wage 
for all laborers capable of working and willing to work.’  Their agricultural policy set out 
in point five assured Congress would legislate ‘that there will be assurance of 
production at a profit for the farmer.’  Finally, for the elderly, the Union Party proposed, 
in point six, ‘an assurance of reasonable and decent security for the aged.’34  ‘Our 
platform,’ Lemke concluded, ‘is made for the common people of the country.’  It was 
written, ‘to free the working classes from the slavery of capitalism.’35   
It can be concluded that, based upon the Union Party’s carefully crafted 
platform, Lemke did not establish the party on a whim; it was the culmination of a 
carefully calculated long-term political plan.  He had a genuine belief that a new 
political party was necessary to deliver the reforms required to overcome the 
Depression.  Lemke was not hurried or forced into support for the Union Party by his 
backers.  He had thought out the options and seized what he thought was a real 
opportunity through the launch of the Union Party to offer a legitimate and ideologically 
coherent doctrinal third party.  The Union Party’s radical reform platform failed, 
however, to appeal to Lemke’s press critics.  ‘It is infused with idealistic aims,’ 
concluded the Kansas City Star, ‘but with short cuts to reach them, which have been 
thoroughly considered and discarded because they would be ineffective or actually 
lead away from the purposes Mr. Lemke has in mind.’36   
Despite the long gestation of the Union Party concept in Lemke’s mind, his 
efforts were not accompanied by similar preparations in establishing the organisational 
framework required to operate the party.  ‘It is easier to announce a new national party 
than achieve it,’ commented the New York Times.37  Responsibility for establishing 
party apparatus fell entirely to Lemke, but with only a few months until the election, this 
was a considerable challenge, particularly in the absence of any independent financial 
or organisational support.  ‘My candidacy,’ Lemke explained rather naively to reporters 
on the day of his nomination, ‘represents an honest and sincere desire to emancipate 
our people from economic slavery.  In that case, finances aren’t very important.  If they 
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become necessary the people will know and contribute.’38  No plans were articulated in 
Lemke’s personal correspondence in advance of the launch of the Union Party as to 
how it might operate.39  In the absence of an established party machine, Lemke was 
forced to depend upon favours from close friends and colleagues.  Shortly after its 
launch, Lemke appointed North Dakota congressman Usher L. Burdick to the position 
of National Chairman.  ‘I’ve always wanted to run a presidential campaign,’ Burdick 
naively remarked.40  However, in early July, faced with the pressures of his personal re-
election, Burdick resigned.  In the hiatus between Burdick’s departure and a new 
appointment, pressure fell on William Skeeles, Lemke’s administrative assistant in his 
Washington, D.C., office, to provide support.  ‘I have been investing some personal 
money in postage in order that the mail would not lie here unanswered,’ he wrote to 
Lemke on July 2.  Five days later, he informed Lemke, ‘We still need money for 
postage.  $20 to $25 would bring us out of the present financial slump.’41  Following 
establishment of official Union Party headquarters in Chicago in mid-July, operations 
improved little.  Skeeles informed Lemke’s son, William Jr., in early August that ‘if there 
is anything that we could hand out, we would appreciate having it here.’  ‘Many people 
drop into the office requesting information,’ Skeeles concluded, ‘and finding us with 
nothing places us in a rather negative position.’42  In response, the Union Party office 
provided a handful of campaign buttons – and requested that Skeeles forward them, in 
return, some congressional franked postage cards so that they could save on postal 
expenditure.43   
The situation did not improve with the appointment of another of Lemke’s long-
term associates, former NPL organiser John Nystul, as National Chairman.  Having 
assessed progress made to date, Nystul wrote to Skeeles, ‘we are desperately in need 
of funds.’44  Seeking to address their financial weakness, Nystul issued a public call for 
‘dollars for the poor man’s party.’  One dollar, he explained, would purchase a 
chartered membership to contribute towards an extremely modest campaign fund total 
of $500,000: $100,000 to establish and operate proper offices; $200,000 for newspaper 
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advertising, literature, postage and travelling expenses; and $200,000 for broadcasting 
expenses.45  In total the Union Party raised only $92,033 over the course of the 
election campaign.46  Only 11 individuals contributed $500 or more to the campaign.  In 
comparison, over the same period, Republican Party donations, including substantial 
contributions from the Liberty League, totalled $13.2 million; and the Democrats, their 
business donations replaced by contributions from the Trades’ Unions, $8.9 million.  
Even the Communist Party campaign fund reached $266,000.  With Union Party 
national recorded expenditures exceeding income by $2,800 and with an additional 
loan of $3,500, Lemke was left with a personal debt of $7,000 that took years to 
repay.47  This was simply not enough to provide the Union Party with the capacity 
necessary to run the new organisation as a functional third party.   
Lacking his own resources, supporters and organisational networks, Lemke 
might have been able to deliver his vision if Townsend and Coughlin had been willing 
to merge their successful independent radical reform movements into the Union Party.  
Funded by a steady stream of donations from their followers, both the OARP and the 
NUSJ had established functioning operational structures at local, state and national 
level.  Access to these networks would have provided the Union Party with a 
readymade, relatively mature operational structure.  Townsend and Coughlin, however, 
did not share Lemke’s long-term ambitions for his new political party.  Townsend and 
Coughlin had no desire to hand control of their personal movements over to a new 
party under the leadership of Lemke.  This put even basic organisation of the new party 
in doubt.  In fact, there is no evidence that formally or informally that Coughlin, 
Townsend and Smith donated a penny to the Union Party.  Indeed, years later, 
Coughlin told Sheldon Marcus proudly, ‘I never gave them a nickel.  I never gave them 
a nickel.’48  The reality was that the ‘union’ that had backed Lemke’s creation of the 
Union Party was a fiction even in its making.  There were, however, several factors 
tying the constituent movements together, even if several of the backers expressed 
mixed emotions to a point of disavowal.  Most important was the common opposition to 
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Roosevelt expressed by Coughlin, Smith, Townsend, Long, Borah and Lemke.  There 
was, however, no fundamental meeting of minds or a shared intellectual agenda 
beyond the common radical reforming thread which united them.  The leaders were 
rarely supportive of each other’s programmes and in the past, seeking to boost their 
individual egos, had been publicly critical of the others’ individual shortcomings.  
Coughlin considered the OARP plan to be simplistic and believed that it did not account 
for the changes in the nation’s currency system that he deemed necessary to ensure 
any financial scheme could work.  In return, Townsend was unimpressed with the 
sixteen points of the NUSJ programme, feeling that they were overly complicated and 
unnecessary as Coughlin’s aims were achievable through the implementation of his 
single-point plan.49  Despite their recently formed loose political alliance, the truth 
nevertheless remained that the groups had been forced together by a common desire 
to defeat Roosevelt and not to unify into a new doctrinal political party.  ‘The political 
party,’ Coughlin explained later in his life, ‘was simply a political protest against the 
establishment of the day.  I was never entertaining the hope that it would be 
victorious.’50  For Townsend and Coughlin, seeking to rally opposition to the president 
from amongst a section of the electorate that deemed the pace of social reform under 
the current administration too slow, Lemke provided a legitimate alternative to the 
candidates of the traditional political parties.  As a transient third party, the long-term 
viability of the Union Party was not, therefore, of concern to Townsend, Smith or 
Coughlin.  The Union Party, as Coughlin later explained was, simply ‘one of those 
things of increasing anger rather than prudence and wisdom.’51 
The divergence in ambitions for the Union Party between its presidential 
candidate and its union of backers was illustrated by statements issued by both 
Coughlin and Townsend in the days following its establishment.  Both leaders, wary of 
Lemke’s ambitions to establish the Union Party as a doctrinal third party, moved quickly 
to protect their independent powerbases and position the party as merely a transient 
movement of protest against the re-election of Roosevelt.       
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Coughlin had promised his readers in his June 12 Social Justice editorial that 
his plan of action for the presidential election ‘would thrill you and inspire you beyond 
anything I have ever said or accomplished in the past,’ yet with that plan now revealed 
in his next editorial, published on July 6, Coughlin clearly established distance between 
the Union Party and the NUSJ.52  The opening statement of his editorial – ‘Rumor and 
false report travel speedily from garrulous tongues to credulous ears’ – established the 
priest’s newly defensive tone. Coughlin was not resigning, and would not be forced to 
resign, as president of the NUSJ as he was not ‘organising a new political party.’  The 
priest had not, he claimed, been responsible for the establishment of the Union Party or 
the selection of its candidate.  Rather, in pursuit of its independent mission to see the 
passage of its legislative platform, the priest had been ‘approached by friends of 
William Lemke’ who had convinced him ‘if democracy was to be preserved, that the 
bureaucratic, dictatorial minded Roosevelt must be removed.’  Thus influenced by 
these external forces, Coughlin explained, he had announced his endorsement for 
Lemke and agreed to present him to the NUSJ for the consideration of its individual 
members.  By doing so, Coughlin was not asking for the NUSJ to change its official 
stance as a non-aligned organisation – ‘It has been resolved by the officers of the 
National Union,’ he concluded, that ‘we will not participate in electing William Lemke or 
Thomas Charles O’Brien.’  Instead, Coughlin explained, he was merely suggesting that 
individual members might be ‘interested,’ as he was personally, ‘in helping to file for 
Union Party candidates and assisting to secure their election.’53  Despite Lemke’s 
personal ambitions, Coughlin’s editorial established clearly that he had no goal for the 
Union Party to become a permanent rival to his own organisation.  He had backed the 
formation of the Union Party and Lemke’s candidacy solely as a transient protest 
against the continuation of Roosevelt’s presidency and nothing more. Coughlin’s need 
to establish a distance between the political party that he had created and his own 
movement both undermined the future of the Union Party as a doctrinal party and 
impacted upon Lemke’s credibility as a candidate in the 1936 campaign. 
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The attempts made by Coughlin to establish the Union Party as a transient 
protest movement were replicated by Townsend and Smith.  The pension leader had 
been unable in the few days between Alf Landon’s nomination as the Republican 
candidate and the opening of the Democratic National Convention to agree the detailed 
terms of his formal partnership with Coughlin.  This had meant that he had been unable 
to provide a formal endorsement for Lemke’s candidacy upon the announcement of the 
formation of the Union Party.  Instead, he announced that he would reopen discussions 
with Lemke and Coughlin that had concluded without resolution in the week before the 
Union Party’s formation.  The subsequent discussions did nothing to establish the 
Union Party as a viable third party.  On June 21, Lemke and his vice-presidential 
nominee, Thomas O’Brien, met in New York with Townsend, Smith and representatives 
of the NUSJ to negotiate the doctor’s backing for the new party.  This was followed by 
a further meeting in Washington, D.C., on June 23.  These discussions were not held in 
secret.  Smith, seeking to maximise the benefit of the publicity he had created, 
delighted in holding regular press conferences to update on progress.  Although this 
increased news coverage, it also exposed the vacillations of the various participants to 
constant, detailed public scrutiny, serving only to damage Lemke’s credibility.  ‘Dr. 
Townsend and I hold the balance’ in the presidential election, Smith insisted to 
reporters on June 21.  ‘Anybody who is elected president must have the support of our 
group.’  Yet, when pushed to reveal the specific details of the OARP’s plan for action, 
Smith instead diverted the question by launching into a tirade about the alleged abuses 
of the ‘contemptible and damaging Farley dictatorship.’  By doing so, Smith reinforced 
the view that the Union Party’s sole purpose was to bait the Democrats.  As the New 
York Times concluded, ‘the possibilities [of Lemke’s likely electoral chances], as Mr. 
Smith saw them, were not so glitteringly attractive as the subject of Roosevelt.’54  To 
the press it was apparent that for Smith, at least, the Union Party had only short-term 
goals – to defeat or embarrass the president. 
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When news of Townsend’s final position emerged on June 24, it confirmed the 
earlier impression given by Smith that both men viewed the Union Party solely as a 
transient protest movement.  There was to be no formal union of the OARP with the 
Union Party.  Following a meeting in Lemke’s office to (as they described it) ‘look the 
candidate over,’ Smith announced the congressman had been invited to speak at the 
OARP’s national convention on July 15.  When reporters pushed for a further comment 
on the formal position of the OARP and SoW with regard to Lemke’s candidacy, Smith 
explicitly ruled out the pension movement providing the capacity for the Union Party to 
establish itself as a doctrinal third party.  ‘We may consider,’ he concluded, 
‘cooperation for the time being for a given end.’  Standing meekly in the corridor 
outside his congressional office, the presidential candidate was treated with little of the 
respect normally extended to the leader of a national political party.  Whilst Smith 
spoke, with the occasional interruption from Townsend, Lemke ‘hung his head in 
becoming embarrassment’ while his backers discussed him ‘as if he were not 
present.’55  Lemke’s personal view of the apparent vacillations of his backers is absent 
from his personal correspondence, but with Townsend, Smith and Coughlin having 
made their ambitions for the Union Party clear, whatever the outcome of the OARP and 
NUSJ conventions later that summer, it looked entirely unlikely that their organisational 
machinery or their funds would be diverted to the Union Party.   
With the NUSJ and OARP unwilling to provide the direct financial and 
organisational resources necessary to underpin the long-term viability of the Union 
Party, Lemke might have depended instead upon the coalition of the small, regional 
radical reform parties that had backed La Follette’s campaign in 1924.  However, in 
accordance with the advice received from Hall in June 1935 that rather than seek pre-
agreement with the small radical reforming parties he should simply ‘force the 
organisation’ of the new party, Lemke had not undertaken any negotiations in advance 
of the Union Party’s launch.56  This lack of engagement with the regional radical reform 
groups was apparent in the reception for the Union Party amongst Lemke’s 
175 
 
congressional colleagues.  It was quickly apparent that Lemke had misjudged the 
strength of the potential appeal of his new party.  An assessment of support for 
Lemke’s candidacy included in Jim Farley’s private file notes was not generous:  
‘William Lemke’s appeal to liberals of all parties to support his newly organised Union 
Party,’ Farley reported, ‘has met with scattered support from Progressives and Farmer-
Laborites, but only apathy from Republicans and Democrats.’  Lemke’s ‘most ardent’ 
congressional supporters, Farley noted, were the representative’s close friends and 
fellow North Dakotans Republican Senator Lynn Frazier and Republican 
Representative Usher L. Burdick.  In contrast, Frazier’s senatorial colleague Gerald 
Nye had ‘nothing to say.’  Farley’s conclusion was that Frazier’s response was typical 
of most insurgent congressmen.  Lemke’s failure to mobilise the insurgents behind the 
Union Party was reflected in the most damning of the quotations, from Republican 
representative Vito Marcantonio of New York: ‘I am not interested in the movement 
except in an academic way.’  Although Lemke claimed the Union Party would generate 
the support of ‘labor, farm, independent and progressive groups,’ Marcantonio was less 
sanguine.  ‘A real Farm-Labor-Progressive coalition,’ he concluded, ‘would be a horse 
of a different color.’57   
Lemke’s inability to draw established politicians to the Union Party limited the 
choices available for the vice-presidential candidate.  A significant political figure joining 
his campaign as his running mate would have provided additional evidence of the 
genuine long-term ambitions of the Union Party.  The highest-profile politician 
associated with the Union Party was William Borah.  ‘I have great respect for 
Congressman Lemke,’ Borah commented to Social Justice in late June.  ‘The new 
party will have a decided effect on the coming election.’58  Beyond this statement, 
however, Borah focused on winning his re-election to the Senate and offered Lemke 
only discreet support.59  He provided advice on the establishment of party operations in 
Idaho and the procedure for accessing the ballot.60  Borah provisionally accepted an 
invitation to deliver a keynote address at the NUSJ national convention, but a clash 
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with the Idaho primary forced him to decline.  ‘If I were free and had the time to prepare 
an address worthy of the occasion, I should certainly avail myself of the pleasure and 
the honor of being with you,’ he wrote on August 2, 1936.61  Borah’s most public 
support for Lemke came in late October, when the two men shared a platform in Boise, 
Idaho, where the senator officially accepted the endorsement of the Union Party for his 
candidacy for the Senate.62  Borah’s limited support for Lemke, though useful, did not 
provide the Union Party with the credibility that it lacked in the eyes of the electorate. 
With no significant established political figure willing to associate with his 
campaign, Lemke was forced to look further afield for his vice-presidential candidate.  
Upon Coughlin’s recommendation, he accepted Thomas O’Brien of Boston, 
Massachusetts.  O’Brien was an Irish-Catholic labour lawyer who had during his earlier 
career been both a Democratic and Republican office holder at county and state level.  
Beyond his position within state leadership of the NUSJ, O’Brien had restricted political 
experience and offered Lemke little assistance with either boosting the public profile of 
the Union Party or establishing its long-term viability.63  The first time that Lemke and 
O’Brien met was on June 25, 1936, in a conference with Coughlin.  After that, the two 
men met only sporadically.64  O’Brien barely features in Lemke’s personal 
correspondence, and the four letters or telegrams passed between them between June 
and November 1936 focus more on their inability to find a time to meet, than on any 
constructive discussion of politics or strategy.  ‘I will try to make arrangements so that I 
can meet you soon and discuss the campaign further,’ Lemke wrote rather 
noncommittally on July 22, 1936.  When O’Brien wrote seeking guidance on Lemke’s 
position in support of labour legislation, William Skeeles, without any recognition or 
acknowledgement of his correspondent’s position as Lemke’s running mate, responded 
as he would to any enquiry, simply sending him a copy of two of Lemke’s 
congressional speeches.65  O’Brien provided some support for Lemke on the campaign 
trail, but his platform speeches were mostly intended to provide an introduction for 
Coughlin rather than promote Lemke’s campaign.  Providing, for example, the 
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introduction for Coughlin at a Chicago rally of the NUSJ on September 11, 1936, 
O’Brien ‘drew polite applause and restrained cheering’ when he mentioned Lemke’s 
campaign, but the ‘crowd whooped and howled’ when he turned his speech to the 
subject of the priest.66  Leaving Lemke to shoulder the burden of the national 
campaign, O’Brien focused most of his efforts in the months between June and 
November on a separate campaign to win the Senate seat for the Union Party in 
Massachusetts, eventually winning 7.4 per cent of the vote.67   
O’Brien’s weakness as a running mate demonstrated the validity of 
Representative Marcantonio’s earlier reaction as to the status of the Union Party.  
Despite Nystul’s best efforts, the reality was that the new national party faced 
organisational challenges exceeding those experienced in North Dakota by the NPL, 
which simply could not be overcome without significant financial investment from the 
wealthy backers who bankrolled the major parties.  Moreover, party organisers faced 
an additional difficulty: there was simply not enough time to put in place the structures 
necessary to run an effective campaign.  In this circumstance, Nystul was forced to put 
together a small team to staff national party headquarters drawn entirely from his close 
circle of associates from within the NPL, none of whom had experience of running a 
national political party.  In the absence of any existing regional or local party structures, 
Nystul sought to co-ordinate the disparate attempts of local amateur enthusiasts who 
formed ‘Lemke for President’ clubs.68  Nystul and Lemke realised early in the campaign 
that the new party simply did not have the resources or professional expertise to mount 
a full slate of candidates at local level, and in July they issued an instruction that the 
Union Party would simply endorse candidates for Congress who they determined had 
articulated general support for elements of the party platform.  A small number of local 
candidates would eventually stand in the party’s name, but these were almost 
exclusively amateurs, like O’Brien, or disreputable figures who would not have been 
considered suitable by either of the traditional parties.69  The most significant political 
figure to campaign under the Union Party banner was former mayor of Chicago William 
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‘Big Bill’ Hale Thompson, who sought election as governor of Illinois.  Under 
Thompson, Chicago had become the national capital for organised crime, a status he 
actively encouraged.  A close associate of Al Capone, Thompson’s victory in the 1928 
mayoral primary was attributed directly to financing received from the crime gangs, and 
the direct intimidation of voters at the polling stations.  Despite generating press 
interest for his campaign, Thompson eventually received only 3.2 per cent of the vote 
in November 1936.70  The most telling fact regarding the local weakness of the Union 
Party was that Lemke, lacking a local political network to support his campaign, chose 
to run for re-election for his congressional seat with the willing support of the NPL 
under the Republican banner.  Lemke’s decision only served to underline the 
weakness of the Union Party as a serious political force.71      
With limited organisational capacity and without any demonstrable support for 
the party separate from that of the NUSJ and OARP, there was little that bound the 
party together.  The Union Party was, in reality, two conflicting and contrasting things.  
On the one hand, to Lemke and his small, dedicated band of close friends, it was a 
genuine attempt to form a new doctrinal third party based upon support for radical 
alternatives to the package of reforms presented by the Democratic Party, as 
expressed by the establishment of the SoW, OARP and NUSJ movements.  In 
accepting the leadership of the party, Lemke believed he would bring about real, 
positive change.  The organisational failures of the Union Party should not detract from 
Lemke’s desire to found and operate a doctrinal political party, but without funds, he 
lacked the capacity to develop more than a skeleton structure operating only at national 
level.  In the absence of mature local, state and national organisation to underpin the 
new party’s activities, Lemke was unable to generate the independent support the 
movement needed to be established on a permanent basis.  In contrast, to Coughlin, 
Townsend and Smith, three powerful men who through their act of union had backed 
the creation of the party, it was a transient protest movement with a narrowly defined 
political aim to defeat and embarrass the incumbent president and advance their own 
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reputations.  It was simply impossible, as much as Lemke tried, to balance these 
different aspirations.  Beyond its platform and weak party organisation, the reality was 
that Lemke’s claims the Union Party was a genuine political party were little more than 
fiction, a visionary concept formed in the minds of Lemke and Hall in its earliest guise 
that the representative struggled to turn into reality.   
The conflicting vision for the long-term future of the Union Party of its backers 
and its candidate meant that the new party was unlikely to survive beyond the 1936 
presidential election.  Yet, as a protest movement, it still had the potential to disrupt the 
outcome of the election.  In particular, the potential threat from the Union Party meant 
that the DNC needed to take the third-party challenge seriously.  They were aware that 
similar protest candidates had disrupted three of the previous eleven presidential 
elections.  In addition to the thirteen Electoral College votes and 16.6 per cent of the 
popular vote achieved by La Follette in 1924, in 1892, James Weaver, the candidate of 
the People’s Party, had received 8.5 per cent of the popular vote and twenty-two votes 
in the Electoral College.  Most significantly, in 1912, Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign 
for the Progressive Party had split the Republican Party.  Roosevelt’s 27.4 per cent of 
the popular vote and eighty-eight votes in the Electoral College were directly 
responsible for delivering Democrat Woodrow Wilson the presidency.72  It was 
therefore natural in this circumstance for the DNC to take steps to determine the level 
of threat posed to Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 election by a significant third-party 
candidate.  For this advice they turned to Emil Hurja, Deputy Chairman of the DNC. 
Emil Hurja is widely considered to be the father of modern polling techniques.  
Until the early 1930s, opinion polling was limited to unscientific, non-representative 
‘straw’ or ‘street corner’ polls.  With an employment background in data analysis and 
public opinion gathering, in the late 1920s Hurja developed a new scientific method for 
opinion polling based on representative sampling of the population.  ‘In politics you take 
sections of voters,’ Hurja explained, ‘check new trends against past performances, 
establish the percentage shift among different voting strata, supplement this 
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information from competent observers in the field, and you can accurately predict an 
election result.’73  Ensuring that his samples included all forty-eight states, this 
combination of ‘quota’ sampling (an assessment of trends amongst class, gender, 
ethnic and racial groups) and ‘area’ sampling (an assessment of differences in trends 
between urban and rural voters) proved a powerful forecasting mechanism.74 
Although Hurja’s approaches to the DNC were rejected in 1928, the intervention 
of a party benefactor in 1932 saw him appointed to Jim Farley’s office as part of the 
Democratic strategy team.  Farley was initially sceptical of Hurja’s scientific technique, 
preferring to rely on his own national network of party workers to report to him on voter 
opinion.  Hurja drip-fed Farley evidence to demonstrate the validity of his new polling 
technique, and eventually he convinced his superior of its merits.  By November 1932, 
the DNC was entirely reliant upon Hurja’s polling predictions.  In the final count, Hurja’s 
technique proved accurate, providing an inaccurate forecast in only three states. His 
position in the Democratic hierarchy secured, in the 1934 mid-terms, Hurja forecast the 
vote with even more accuracy.75  Considering Hurja’s forecasts the ‘most remarkable 
thing,’ Roosevelt became a strong personal supporter of his work, and between 1935 
and 1936 increasingly sought out his advice on the allocation of political resources and 
party patronage.76  In 1935, under pressure by the press to reveal the source of his 
accurate polling forecasts, Farley unveiled Hurja, the ‘crystal gazer from Crystal 
Falls.’77  Hurja embraced the public celebrity his work brought him and in March 1936 
was featured on the front page of Time Magazine.78   
In April 1935, in the course of his on-going work to identify voting trends, the 
DNC commissioned Hurja to undertake a project to determine the potential impact of a 
third-party campaign in the 1936 presidential election.  Farley instructed Hurja to focus 
his polling upon the potential effects on Roosevelt’s re-election chances of a split in the 
Democratic Party led by Huey Long.  The results of the poll revealed Roosevelt to be 
favoured by 49 per cent of voters, an unnamed Republican candidate by 43 per cent, 
and Long by 8 per cent.  With 1 per cent, Coughlin was the strongest write-in 
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candidate.  On this basis, Hurja forecast that Roosevelt would win 33 states and 305 
Electoral College votes in 1936, with his Republican opponent winning in 15 states and 
226 College votes.79   
Hurja’s poll appeared to be good news for the administration, but a deeper 
analysis presented a different view.  Hurja extrapolated from the data that Long might 
receive as many as 6 million votes.  As Figure 1 illustrates, votes drawn from Roosevelt 
to Long were forecast to deliver the Republican candidate victory in 5 states, including 
the president’s home state of New York.  Long would draw 122 Electoral College votes 
away from Roosevelt’s total.  In addition, there were 6 further states where Long was 
forecast to secure significant numbers of votes from the president.  If this trend 
continued, Long would deliver a further 60 Electoral College votes to the Republicans.  
Should the momentum away from Roosevelt continue in just 3 of these states, 
Michigan, Iowa and Minnesota, Long would hand the election to the Republicans.80  ‘It 
was easy to conceive a situation,’ Hurja later wrote, ‘whereby Long might have the 
balance of power in the 1936 election.’81   
Figure 1: Extract from the results of the DNC poll carried out by Emil Hurja in April 
1935.  
 
Long had performed best in Louisiana and the southern states (where he polled 
15 per cent), but the poll revealed that his support extended across large parts of the 
nation: he polled 14 per cent in the northwest, 12 per cent on the Pacific coast and 13 
Region
Ohio W 986,672 1,177,930 244,464 26
Illinois W 1,426,172 1,572,641 220,574 29
New York N 1,938,631 2,073,947 209,609 47
Indiana W 686,207 700,273 86,568 14
Colorado W 185,257 189,436 51,969 6
Iowa W 445,676 410,279 116,156 11
Michigan W 723,166 711,921 115,899 19
Minnesota W 437,218 377,194 88,499 11
Washington W 248,169 204,055 70,933 8
Maryland N 220,135 193,135 47,978 8














per cent in the Great Lakes.  Only in New England and the mid-Atlantic states was his 
support weaker (8 per cent).  Analysis of the small write-in vote for Coughlin revealed a 
further level of concern.  His numbers were small, but the poll demonstrated that 
Coughlin held the greatest strength in those areas where Long was at his weakest.  He 
received over 2 per cent of the votes in New England, over 1 per cent in the Great 
Lakes, and over 1 per cent in the mid-Atlantic states.  It was possible to conclude from 
the poll that combined, the two men were tapping into support from voters across the 
entire nation, each compensating for his weakness in some regions with strength in 
others.82  When Secretary for the Interior Harold Ickes saw Hurja’s poll, he recorded in 
his diary that the ‘results were alarming.’83  
The passage of the Second New Deal in the spring of 1935 was intended to 
turn opinion back towards the president.  Equally, Long’s death in September 1935 
reduced the likelihood that those proposing radical reform from within the Democratic 
Party would split in 1936.  Despite this, the DNC remained concerned as to the 
potential impact of a third-party candidate in the forthcoming presidential election.  
These concerns were reinforced in February 1936, when a ‘Presidential Trial Heat’ 
undertaken by Hurja’s friend George Gallup (whose American Institute of Public 
Opinion had been established in 1935 utilising a polling methodology similar to that 
established by Hurja), revealed that, since 1935, Roosevelt had climbed only 1 per cent 
to 50, whilst the appeal of an unnamed third-party candidate stood at 5 per cent.84  
When Long’s protégé Gerald Smith brought Coughlin and Townsend together to form 
the Union Party, the fears of the DNC morphed naturally into concerns regarding 
Lemke’s potential impact upon the presidential election.   
Publicly, Democratic Chairman James Farley was dismissive of the Union Party 
threat.  Asked whether the Lemke candidacy had caused any changes in Democratic 
Party plans, he simply inquired, ‘Why should it?’85  The initial assessment from The 
New York Times of the impact of the Union Party on the 1936 presidential campaign, 
however, was significantly less sanguine.  ‘It goes without saying that Lemke will poll a 
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large vote,’ they commented.  Despite the progress made under the Second New Deal 
to resolve the nation’s economic problems, much remained to be done to bring the 
American economy back to pre-Depression levels of prosperity.  In this continued 
economic crisis, the promises presented by the Union Party platform and its candidate 
potentially held great popular appeal amongst diverse groups in opposition to the 
president, including poor agricultural and industrial workers and those unemployed 
former middle-class voters most affected by the continued economic depression.  ‘An 
unknown who promises everything without being able to accomplish anything,’ 
commented the Times, ‘is a very dangerous factor in a period of economic and political 
flux such as this.’  The paper presented a sombre warning to Chairman Farley: ‘Though 
the Democrats may beat their breasts and proclaim that the election is “in the bag,” 
they know very well that the bulk of Lemke’s storm troops are somewhat more than 
likely to be recruited from disaffected New Dealers.’86   
In early July 1936, Farley, seeking to determine the potential threat posed by 
the Union Party to the president’s re-election, wrote to dozens of local political figures 
across the nation.  Some of the replies made extremely uncomfortable reading.  
J.R. Landy, Collector of Internal Revenue in St Paul, Minnesota, reported that the 
Union Party ‘ticket may poll from 100,000 to 200,000 votes and I believe that fully 90 
per cent of those will be taken from President Roosevelt.’87  From Ohio, Representative 
Frank Kloeb was ‘fearful that the president would lose the state at the present time with 
the Lemke followers drawing the heaviest from him.’88  These responses were 
supported by an assessment of Roosevelt’s electoral chances published by the New 
York Times in July 1936.   ‘Old-time Republican states were swept into the Democratic 
column by only nominal majorities [in 1932],’ the Times commented.  In this 
circumstance, defections from the Democratic Party to the ‘radical group’ and ‘a return 
of some of the Progressive Republican votes to the Republican cause’ would, they 
concluded, ‘greatly weaken the chances of President Roosevelt’s carrying states that 
until recently have been safely classified as holding to their 1932 allegiance.’89  With 
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the Gallup polls showing the average split between Roosevelt and Landon at just 4 per 
cent, Lemke would apparently only need to generate minimal support to potentially 
disrupt the outcome of the election.90   
In addition to his unscientific information-gathering campaign, Farley 
commissioned Hurja to model the likely outcome of the 1936 election.  In a report 
published on September 25, 1936, Hurja concluded that based on an assessment of all 
available polling data, ‘the election would be won by the Republicans by only 6 
Electoral Votes.’  In the report, Hurja set out the 16 states considered to be most at risk 
of defeat (Figure 2) along with his assessment of their relative importance. Hurja 
himself termed these the ‘doubtful’ states.91  The report does not contain any detailed 
 
Figure 2: Assessment of at-risk states in September 25 report to the DNC ranked by 
relative importance. 
 
breakdown of the forecast votes per candidate, but it is noticeable that there is a close 












West Virginia 48-52% 11
Nebraska 48-52% 7
Colorado 48-52% 6

















the September 1936 report and those considered to be vulnerable to defeat in his April 
1935 poll.  Indeed, 9 of the 11 states identified by Hurja in April 1935 poll are also 
highlighted in his 1936 report.  A follow-up report issued by Hurja on October 18, 1936, 
suggested that the earlier trends away from Roosevelt had hardened over the 
preceding weeks and, as a consequence, had increased Landon’s lead to 17 Electoral 
College votes.  Figure 3 sets out those states considered by Emil Hurja to be most 
vulnerable to defeat as of October 18, 1936.  Once again, 9 of those 11 states 
      
Figure 3: States determined to be most vulnerable to defeat, October 18 report to the 
DNC. 
 
identified by Hurja in April 1935 to be susceptible to a third-party campaign appeared 
on the October 18 at-risk list.  Hurja’s polling seemed, therefore, to suggest that the 
efforts made by the administration to consolidate the support of radical reform-minded 
voters behind the president, had not eradicated the appeal of Roosevelt’s opponents.92 
The final pre-election polling report issued to the DNC on October 25, 1936, 
sustained his earlier analysis.  In addition, for the first time, the report set out in detail 
Hurja’s view on the likely impact of the Union Party on the election.  In Hurja’s earlier 
reports he had set his own data alongside that of the other polling organisations to 
produce an overall average poll of polls.  In this final report, however, he based his 
findings on the private Democratic polling alone.  The effect in particular of removing 

















South Dakota 47% 4
New York 47% 47
Illinois 46% 29
New Jersey 46% 16
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but which Hurja reported had in past elections ‘consistently underestimated’ 
Democratic support, produced a dramatic revision to Roosevelt’s overall position.  On 
this more refined basis, Hurja forecast that Roosevelt would win ‘364 electoral votes, or 
winning five states more than required.’  The election remained closer, however, than 
this majority would suggest.  The size of the Lemke vote would potentially determine 
the outcome of the election.93 
The October 25 report includes detailed polling data for 16 states that Hurja 
considered to be of particular importance to determining the outcome of the election.  
This polling data determined the perceived threat of the Union Party on the election 
outcome.  On the basis of his ‘quota’ and ‘area’ trend analysis, Hurja forecast that the 
Union Party candidate would achieve an average of 8 per cent across these important 
states, including a forecast vote in excess of 10 per cent in 5 of them (Figure 4).  Hurja 
considered that most of these votes would likely be drawn from Roosevelt.  
Furthermore, in Indiana, Michigan and Pennsylvania, Hurja forecast that this swing 
away from the president to Lemke would deliver Landon victories in these states.  This 
would account for 69 of Landon’s forecast 167 Electoral College total.  Hurja warned 
that in a number of further states Roosevelt’s forecast margin of victory 
    
Figure 4: Forecast Union Party vote in 1936 Presidential Election, derived from DNC 























(as illustrated in Figure 5) was very small.  A total swing toward Lemke of just 1.8 per 
cent in New York, Ohio, North Dakota, Iowa and Idaho would hand Landon the 
presidential election.94   
   
Figure 5: Extract from the results of the DNC poll, published October 25, 1936.   
 
 
Given the potential significance of Hurja’s forecast to the Democratic Party, it is 
useful to consider what historical evidence there was to back up the statistician’s 
conclusions.  It is possible via a historic-trend analysis of previous presidential election 
results to sustain the trends that Hurja suggested he had identified in 1936.  The 
chances of the Republicans overturning Roosevelt’s 1932 electoral majority would 
likely be assisted by the contribution of a significant third party drawing votes away 
from the president.  Figure 6 ranks each state according to the average percentage of 
the vote received by significant third-party candidates in presidential elections between 
1892 and 1924 (James Weaver, People’s Party, 1892; Theodore Roosevelt, 
Progressive Party, 1912; Robert La Follette, Progressive Party, 1924).  To model the 
potential impact of Lemke’s campaign on Roosevelt’s re-election chances, the average 
percentage vote for the average significant third-party candidate has been subtracted 
from the margin of victory achieved by the Democrats in 1932.  On this basis, should 
Lemke achieve the average level of support received by past significant third-party 
candidates in that state, and should this support be taken only from Roosevelt, the 








New York 50.1 47
Ohio 50.2 26





Figure 6: Average vote for significant third-party candidates, 1892-1924 compared to 
Democrats margin of victory in 1932. 
 
in support towards the Union Party would reduce Roosevelt’s Electoral College tally in 
1936 to 213 – 53 votes short of victory.95   
The conclusions drawn from this historic-trend analysis thus sustain the 
forecasts reached by Hurja in his polling analysis.  There is a correlation between those 
states identified by Hurja as vulnerable for Roosevelt in the 1936 election (as detailed 
in figures 1, 2, 3 and 5) and those considered to be vulnerable for Roosevelt based on 










Nevada 39 44 -5
South Dakota 29 42 -13
North Dakota 42 41 1
Idaho 20 38 -18
Colorado 13 35 -22
Alabama 71 35 36
Wyoming 15 33 -18
Kansas 9 33 -24
Nebraska 28 31 -3
Washington 24 31 -7
Minnesota 24 30 -6
Oregon 21 29 -8
California 21 28 -7
Montana 23 28 -5
Arizona 37 26 11
Wisconsin 32 24 8
Iowa 18 22 -4
Utah 15 21 -6
Illinois 13 18 -5
Michigan 8 18 -10
Pennsylvania - 17 -
North Carolina 41 15 26
Maine - 15 -
Georgia 84 15 69
New Jersey 2 15 -13
Massachusetts 4 14 -10
Ohio 3 14 -11
Vermont - 14 -
New York 13 13 0
Texas 77 13 64
Maryland 25 13 12
West Virginia 10 13 -3
New Mexico 27 13 14
Delaware - 12 -
Arkansas 73 12 61
Indiana 12 11 1
Kentucky 19 11 8
Tennessee 34 11 23
Missouri 29 11 18
Florida 50 10 40
Connecticut - 10 -
Mississippi 92 9 83
New Hampshire - 9 -
Rhode Island 12 9 3
Virginia 38 8 30
Oklahoma 47 4 43
Louisiana 86 4 82
South Carolina 96 1 95
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tables on 4 or more occasions (Ohio, Illinois, New York, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Wyoming, West Virginia and Nebraska).  Ohio and New York feature on 
every occasion.  Success for the Union Party in these 10 most vulnerable states would 
reduce Roosevelt Electoral College total by 167 votes and deliver Landon the election 
by a single vote.  The overall consistency between historic voting trends, Farley’s 
traditional methods of information-gathering, and Hurja’s forecasts suggests that the 
DNC and, indeed, the president himself, were not unreasonable in accepting the 
perceived threat of the Union Party established by the statistician.96  However, given 
the significant gap between the final results achieved by Lemke in the November 
election and Hurja’s forecast, there is an immediate question about how accurate the 
statistician’s forecast of the perceived threat actually was.     
Hurja constructed his forecast vote for the Union Party based on past voter 
trends combined with an estimate of Lemke’s appeal to radical reform-minded voters 
who had voted for Roosevelt in 1932.  In reaching this conclusion, Hurja had taken 
account of other countertrends he had identified that seemed to suggest that urban 
voters were switching towards Roosevelt, as were voters across a wide range of his 
racial, class and gender ‘quota’ groups.  However, such were the entrenched patterns 
of previous voter behaviour – African-American voters and urban voters, for example, 
had overwhelmingly supported Hoover in 1932 – that he was cautious as to what 
extent he applied these emerging trends.  This caution eventually proved unwarranted, 
however.  The Union Party despite its polling data was a chimera.  Its polls did not 
translate into actual votes.  In the November election the Union Party secured no 
Electoral College votes in comparison to Roosevelt’s 523.97   
Looking back on his electoral forecasts after the presidential election, Hurja 
observed that ‘the character of Roosevelt’s victory in 1936 was entirely different from 
his earlier victory in 1932.’  In particular, the final election results demonstrated that 
Roosevelt had gained in his voting strength in 143 of the nation’s 157 largest urban 
centres (those with a population in excess of 50,000).  This was a reversal of an 
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electoral trend evident throughout the 1920s, where the Republicans’ had carried the 
urban vote by a large margin.  Roosevelt had been elected in 1932 not by overturning 
the Republicans’ urban base, but by carrying overwhelming numbers of rural voters.  
Hurja described this shift as ‘emphatic.’98  This reversal in urban and rural support 
could be explained by changes in the Democratic electoral support.  The emergence of 
the New Deal coalition brought together industrial workers living mainly in the large 
urban centres, supportive of New Deal labour legislation, with those millions of formerly 
Republican-voting, poor African-Americans who had fled the rural south during the 
Depression years in search of employment in the cities and had benefited from the 
safety net provided by the Second New Deal.  Roosevelt won 76 per cent of African-
American votes in the 1936 election.  This was a complete reversal of the 1932 
election.  In hindsight, Hurja accepted that such was the transformation of the 
composition of the Democrats electoral coalition in 1936 that he had underestimated 
the effects of the trends he had identified in both his ‘area’ and ‘quota’ voters.99   
Evidence derived from Farley’s correspondence with local Democratic officials 
was combined with Hurja’s polling forecasts to establish the level of the threat to 
Roosevelt’s re-election from the Union Party, which was perceived to be genuine by 
both Roosevelt and the DNC.  However, in constructing his polling results, Hurja had 
underestimated the effects of exceptional shifts in voter behaviour towards rather than 
away from Roosevelt that occurred between the 1932 and 1936 elections.  Hurja’s 
conservatism distorted his electoral forecast and thus projected the election to be 
closer than it really was.100  In this circumstance, it is questionable how much the 
perceived threat constructed by Hurja was, like the party itself, anything more than 
fiction.  The DNC, and the president, did not benefit from this hindsight when 
constructing their response to the Union Party in the autumn of 1936.  In his final 
meeting with the Cabinet prior to the election, Roosevelt confirmed he believed he 
would win, but only according to the margin forecast by his chief pollster.101  
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The Union Party in Reality 
 
Things are progressing in a most satisfactory manner except we 
are desperately in need of funds. 
John Nystul to William Skeeles, July 13, 1936.1 
 
 
Private opinion polling undertaken by Emil Hurja, Deputy Chairman of the DNC 
forecast that the 1936 presidential election would be close and that the newly formed 
Union Party would play a part in determining the outcome.  The perceived threat of the 
Union Party was accepted by the DNC, and indeed the president himself.  In reality, 
this threat proved unfounded.  Exposed to the full force of the Democrats’ professional 
campaign, it was revealed that the Union Party had been constructed on sand – its 
leader and his union of backers with quite different visions for its future.  When the 
Union Party was exposed to the reality of the campaign trail, the union and the party 
simply fell apart.   
The actions taken by the Democratic administration since January 1935 to 
reform the New Deal had encouraged the radicalisation and polarisation of its 
opponents in the November presidential election.  For the Republican Party, the 
administration’s shift away from the business-friendly approach that typified the First 
New Deal established distance between its core conservative support and the 
Democratic Party.  Seeking to exploit Roosevelt’s supposed anti-business orientation, 
the conservative RNC had nominated Alf Landon, a relatively weak candidate with 
supposed appeal in the western states, on a platform that, although it contained certain 
concessions to reform-minded voters, was stringently anti-New-Deal in its tone and 
rhetoric.  Likewise for the leaders of the diverse radical reform movements, the Second 
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New Deal’s embrace of elements of their social reform agendas forced them to 
demonstrate their distance from the president by moving progressively towards the 
fringes of the political spectrum.  It was from this position, and on this unstable basis, 
that the Union Party had been formed.  The Democrats, in contrast, placed their 
centralist position at the heart of their campaign. 
Roosevelt set the tone for his presidential campaign at the Democratic National 
Convention held in Chicago, Illinois between June 27 and July 2, 1936.  The 
president’s grip over the Democratic Party was evidenced by his re-nomination by 
general acclaim on the first ballot and the agreement of a party platform that was 
strongly supportive of the New Deal.  In his State of the Union Address in January 
1936, Roosevelt had celebrated the success of the Second New Deal in starting to 
ease the worst effects of the Depression and in providing a safety net for those not yet 
touched by the economic recovery.  He also contrasted his strong personal record of 
achievement to the opposition, who he claimed sought to disrupt the progress made 
during his first administration.  This theme was magnified in the speech that marked the 
president’s re-nomination.  Briefing chief speech writer Raymond Moley, Roosevelt 
made his strategy for his nomination speech clear: ‘There’s one issue in this campaign, 
it’s myself, and people must be either for me or against me.’2  Moley did not disappoint.  
When Roosevelt rose in front of an audience of 100,000 supporters to accept the re-
nomination, he reminded his audience of the heavy responsibility which faced them in 
November.  ‘This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny,’ the nominee 
proclaimed.  ‘In America we are waging a great and successful war.  It is not alone a 
war against want and destitution and economic demoralization.  It is more than that; it 
is a war for the survival of democracy.’3  The subsequent applause lasted for over an 
hour.   
Roosevelt was able to take a bold stance in favour of his positive social reforms 
because of the success of the Second New Deal and also because of the continuing 
economic crisis that made it a necessity.  The transformation in the economy brought 
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about by the New Deal had been remarkable.  By June 1936, unemployment had 
dropped by 4 million from its high-point in early 1933, and 6 million new jobs had been 
created.  The volume of industrial production had doubled; business failures were one 
third of what they had been in 1932; and the total cash income of farmers had 
increased by $3 billion.  Despite these impressive improvements, the reality was that 
this economic recovery still rested directly on federal government investment.  In the 
first Roosevelt administration, $5 billion of federal funding was poured into public works 
programmes designed to kick-start economic recovery through mass federal 
employment.  The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, through its direct subsidies, 
was providing a substantial proportion of the increased farm income.  The 
Reconstruction Finance and Home Owner’s Loan corporations had provided millions of 
dollars in federal loans to maintain business activity and assist debt-burdened home 
owners.  In 1936, between 8 and 9 million Americans were still unemployed and 
dependent on direct, federally funded relief.4  Rather than hide these facts, Roosevelt 
claimed his social reforms were necessary to underpin the recovery that was gradually 
being delivered through his new economic policy and placed them at the heart of his 
campaign.  Ignoring the Union and Republican party election platforms and presenting 
the coming election as a ‘war for democracy’, Roosevelt defined the terms of the 
debate fusing the cult of presidential character with vitality of the reform measures and 
exploited his opponents’ weaknesses.  Reject me, reject the New Deal, reject recovery, 
reject the safety net became the central thrust of his campaign message.   
In response to Roosevelt’s campaign strategy, rather than present a positive 
message focused on their own reform plans, both the Republican and Union party 
candidates launched explicitly negative campaigns.  Landon, happy in having a fellow 
ally in his campaign against the New Deal, had publicly welcomed the Union Party to 
‘the great debate.’  With Lemke widely considered to be drawing his voter base mainly 
from the president, there is little evidence that the Republicans regarded Lemke as a 
barrier to Landon’s campaign.  Indeed, John D.M. Hamilton, RNC National Chairman, 
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claimed that Lemke would help the Republicans ‘materially’ in the Mississippi valley 
where they believed that Lemke would take up to six Roosevelt votes for every one he 
took from Landon. In this circumstance, there was no explicit campaign to minimise the 
Union Party threat.5  Implicitly, however, Lemke and his radical backers became part of 
a wider threat posed by the turn towards reform evident in the first Roosevelt 
administration.  Rather than accept their rejection at the polls in 1932 and 1934, the 
Republicans rejected the need for social and economic reform, attempted to justify the 
actions of the Hoover administration and warned that a continued rejection of their core 
conservative values would lead the nation only towards its ruin.6  Kicking off a national 
tour in New York in July, Hamilton informed his audience that ‘the electorate has not 
yet been told the evils of the New Deal policies or what its continuation will mean to 
American institutions.’7  Hamilton’s ominous warning was reinforced by vice-
presidential candidate Frank Knox, who declared in Chicago that the very ‘preservation 
of free enterprise was the issue of the campaign.’  ‘The New Deal candidate’, he 
proclaimed, ‘has been leading us towards Moscow.’8  When Landon hit the campaign 
trail in August, he promised a return to ‘the American way of life,’ which offered security 
and abundance ‘without sacrifice of the freedom of the individual citizen.’9   
Whereas the Republicans were explicit in their rejection of the New Deal, the 
Union Party presented a more complex challenge.  They were supportive of much of 
the social reform that lay at the heart of the Second New Deal; indeed, much of it had 
its origins in their own independent radical reform proposals.  Roosevelt claimed that 
the Democrats were the only party promoting a platform of positive social reforms in 
the presidential election, but a direct comparison between the nineteen pledges that 
made up the Democratic Party platform of 1936 and that of the Union Party shows 
many links.  Of the fifteen planks of Union Party platform, twelve shared significant 
similarities with those of the Democratic Party.  These ranged from measures to 
refinance agricultural property, to civil service reform, the need to break up industrial 
monopolies, measures to enhance youth employment, protection of American markets 
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from international interference, and taxation for the wealthy.  What is telling is that 
where the two parties shared views, the difference was in tone more than in the 
intended outcome of policy implementation.  Often, the proposals of the Union Party 
were more forthright, short and definite (Union Party planks start with the phrase 
‘Congress shall’ in thirteen of their fifteen statements).  In comparison, the Democrats 
generally favoured longer statements pledging action by ‘government’ (Congress is not 
mentioned once in the Democratic platform).  Thus, for example, where the Union 
Party proposed simply that ‘Congress shall set a limitation upon the net income of any 
individual in one year and a limitation on the amount that such an individual may 
receive as a gift or as an inheritance, which limitation shall be executed through 
taxation,’ the Democratic platform proposed that ‘as the requirements of relief decline 
and national income advances, an increasing percentage of Federal expenditures can 
and will be met from current revenues, secured from taxes levied in accordance with 
ability to pay.’  The decisive, assertive tone of the Union Party platform reflected the 
rhetoric of its leaders.  Compared to the generally more balanced tone of the 
Democratic platform, the forced negativity and confrontation of Union Party rhetoric had 
the effect of making their often similar policy intentions appear more radical to the 
electorate, thus naturally limiting their appeal to moderate voters.10   
The oppositional tone evident in the platform of the Union Party was echoed in 
the party’s campaign tactics.  The conventions of the OARP and the NUSJ provided 
Lemke and his backers with considerable public exposure.  The conventions would 
enable Lemke to both boost his personal profile and his ambition to establish the Union 
Party as a legitimate third party.  Lemke’s ambitions were not, however, shared by 
Townsend and Coughlin.  They had supported the Union Party campaign as a protest 
against the president and they had no intention of letting the new third party leech on 
their organisations or their funding base.  The stresses of waging this negative and 
oppositional campaign opened up the evident disunity at the heart of the Union Party.  
It also encouraged its backers, in particular Coughlin and Smith, to displays of the 
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worst kind of excess.  These conflicting aims and the inherent weakness of the union 
were exposed to the public during the conventions and ultimately only served to 
reinforce Roosevelt’s message of the stability and dependability of his presidency.   
The second national convention of the OARP which opened on July 15, 1936, 
proved unruly and unreliable.  Townsend had organised the agenda so that on the first 
day Coughlin, Smith and he would present their cases for the endorsement of the 
Union Party’s presidential candidate.  The climax of the convention was planned to 
take place at Cleveland Stadium, where it was intended that before 100,000 supporters 
Lemke’s candidacy would receive the official endorsement of the OARP.  However, 
Townsend had underestimated the continued anger of the 12,000 elderly delegates 
present at the recent congressional investigation’s revelations of corruption at the head 
of the organisation.  In advance of the convention, Townsend had attempted to explain 
that his proposal for the OARP to support the Union Party campaign was not in conflict 
with the organisation’s continued independence, but his elderly members roundly 
rejected his plans.   
During the convention, Townsend gave his members little reason to rally around 
his cause.  He opened the convention with what the New York Times described as a 
‘mild and scholarly philippic against the Roosevelt administration.’  Reading from the 
text of his address, he advocated Lemke’s endorsement and pleaded with his followers 
to ‘unite in an unbreakable phalanx of militant activity that cannot be gainsaid.’  The 
crowd expressed polite appreciation for their leader, but little more.11  Roosevelt had 
accused his opponents of being dangerous radicals but there was little evidence of this 
in Townsend’s lacklustre performance.  Gerald Smith, on the other hand, did not 
disappoint.  
For Smith, the creation of the Union Party was a crowning glory.  He had gone 
in just a few months from the doldrums to the political director of one of the nation’s 
largest mass movements.  As the OARP convention got into full swing, there was no 
doubt that Smith would seek to exploit his position within the leadership of the 
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movement to its maximum.  He roamed the floor of the auditorium, shaking hands with 
the delegates and giving interviews to reporters, full of remarks sure to be printed in the 
next day’s papers.12  When the time came for Smith to deliver his convention address, 
his excessive oratorical display epitomised the tone of the Union Party campaign.  
Clutching his Bible, he delivered a performance that had the elderly audience cheering 
in appreciation.  In colourful, often violent language, Smith (‘coatless, dripping with 
perspiration,’) directly challenged Roosevelt’s claims that he alone could save the 
American democratic system.13  ‘Too long,’ he shouted, ‘have the plain people of the 
United States let Wall Street and Tammany rule them.’  It was Roosevelt himself, Smith 
claimed, who had side-lined Congress and governed through unelected agencies that 
by their actions had undermined American individuality and self-determination.  ‘We 
must make our choice in the presence of atheistic-communistic influences,’ he 
challenged.  ‘It is the Russian primer or the Holy Bible!  It is the Red Flag or the Stars 
and Stripes!  It is Lenin or Lincoln!  Stalin or Jefferson!  James A. Farley or Francis E. 
Townsend!’  ‘As far as I am concerned,’ he said, turning at last to the subject of Lemke 
and the Union Party, ‘I don’t see how I can vote for anybody for president, except the 
only man that has come out on the Townsend platform.  Mr William Lemke.’  In a final 
roar he concluded, ‘I can tell you we are going to seize the government of the United 
States!’  At the end of his address, the crowd stood to praise Smith’s dramatic 
performance.14  Yet, as he basked in his success, the ties that loosely bound the Union 
Party’s backers began to unravel. 
Not everyone was as taken about the crowd’s reaction.  As Smith gave his 
rabble-rousing address, Coughlin, scheduled to speak early the next day, sat anxiously 
at the side of the stage.  The priest had not before witnessed the effectiveness of 
Smith’s oratory.  Reflecting later, Coughlin recognised the extent to which Smith’s 
display had usurped Townsend’s authority.  ‘Smith was,’ he later recalled, ‘a viper, a 
leech.’15  From then on, Coughlin would consider Smith a direct rival to his own power.  
Smith’s melodramatic display brought out the worst aspects of Coughlin’s unstable 
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character.  In his convention address he asserted that the third-party movement was 
the only means of saving the country from the ‘gold standard Republicans and the 
double-crossing Democrats.’  Seeking to rally the crowd to the levels achieved by 
Smith the previous day, Coughlin stepped back and in a dramatic gesture threw his 
coat and clerical collar to the ground.  Returning to the microphone, he screamed that 
Roosevelt was both a ‘liar’ and a ‘great betrayer.’  How many Townsendites, he 
demanded, would follow their leader into the third-party movement?  The crowd, 
impressed by the priest’s passion, stood and applauded wildly.  The New York Times 
declared his speech the ‘high point of the whole day.’  He ‘laid them in the aisles,’ they 
reported.16    
Coughlin’s rhetorical display was certainly striking, but his pursuit of the 
theatrical over careful political messaging undermined the effectiveness of the Union 
Party campaign.  His speech was applauded by the New York Times for its drama, but 
in the cold light of day, the Times reflected, it appeared uncontrolled, excessive, and 
ultimately unseemly for a practising Catholic priest.  Attempting to move beyond the 
power and passion of the performance of the ‘rip-roaring clerics,’ the New York Times 
was damning in its criticism of the content of their presentations.  ‘The wild words at 
Cleveland make it obvious that no logical process will impress those who utter or, 
without understanding, cheer them,’ they concluded.  ‘But the reasonable American 
public will not miss the point.’17  For the members of the OARP executive board, 
concerned by the revelations of the Congressional investigation and by Townsend’s 
apparent turn toward extremism with Smith’s appointment as political director, these 
declamatory displays were the final straw and they rallied to establish control over the 
convention.   
Gomer Smith, Democratic senatorial candidate from Oklahoma and member of 
the OARP executive, took to the rostrum to warn against those who preached 
alternative kinds of ‘salvation.’  He denounced Coughlin and ridiculed the idea that 
Gerald Smith could deliver the votes of 6 million SoW members.  He suggested that the 
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place to look for these supposed voters would be in the ‘swamps of Louisiana’ and that 
they ‘would turn out to be bull frogs.’  On this basis, support for the Union Party, he 
concluded, would not assist the OARP to achieve its aims.  ‘Up to now,’ Smith said, 
‘the Townsend movement had been doing very well’ by sticking to their singular aim of 
achieving a $200-per-month pension for everybody over 60.18  He finished his speech 
by hailing Roosevelt as a ‘golden-hearted patriot’ who had saved the nation from 
Communism – and received a rousing cheer from those same delegates who had 
cheered the earlier denunciations of the president.19  These cheers for Gomer Smith 
demonstrated the diversity of opinions within the audience and reflected the gap that 
existed between Townsend’s personal vendetta and the political thrust of the executive 
and the OARP membership.  The tone of the convention having now shifted decisively 
away from Townsend, a chorus of speakers pleaded with delegates not to endorse the 
Union Party: ‘We are not going to lose with Lemke,’ said one.  ‘We are going to triumph 
with Townsend.’  Unable to steer the convention back on their favoured course, 
Townsend and Smith’s proposal that the OARP back Lemke’s candidacy was 
resoundingly defeated when the delegates passed a resolution that the organisation 
should not ‘at any time during the campaign directly or indirectly endorse any 
presidential or vice-presidential candidates.’20   
Rejected by the OARP, Lemke’s planned coronation on July 19 was an 
embarrassment to the candidate and his union of backers.  Speaking before a sparse 
crowd of 5,000 within the cavernous stadium, Lemke attacked Roosevelt’s ‘brainless 
trust’ and declared that he stood ‘four square with Dr. Townsend in his battle for 
common people.’  His greatest praise, however, was for the fallen Huey Long – ‘the 
greatest Democrat that this nation produced in the last one hundred years.’  It was 
ultimately to his ‘immortal’ friend that he dedicated the Union Party.  ‘We intend to 
make this a government for the benefit of the great mass of the people,’ he concluded.  
‘We are going to bring about a condition where every man is a king, and I may add – 
where every woman is a queen.’  The audience, such as it was, ‘gave one last whoop,’ 
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reported the New York Times, ‘and then ran for the exits, grabbed their bags and 
started home.’21  The OARP convention had provided the Union Party with a significant 
public platform, but this exposure had done little to instil confidence in the electorate in 
either the long term viability of the party or the presidential qualities of its candidate.   
The failure of Townsend and Smith to mobilise the OARP behind the Union 
Party significantly dented Lemke’s ambition that it be established as a genuine third 
party.  In addition, it reduced its effectiveness as a protest movement.  The OARP’s 
explicit rejection of Townsend and Smith’s leadership and its show of support for the 
president demonstrated how successful Roosevelt had been in taking the political 
centre-ground from his rivals.  Yet, blinded by his overwhelming anger at the 
administration, Townsend refused to back down.  Unwilling to accept defeat, he 
announced he would defy his members and would personally support Lemke’s 
election, but would not, he admitted to reporters, ‘try and coerce’ his followers to copy 
him.22  The rejection of his support for the Union Party was not, however, the pension 
leader’s final humiliation.  Unruly delegates passed a series resolutions which severely 
curtailed Townsend’s executive authority.  The executive board, until then controlled 
entirely by Townsend, was reappointed for a further year only.  Thereafter, its 
membership would be made up of locally elected representatives.  The reformed 
organisation was renamed ‘The Townsend Recovery Plan, Incorporated’; this symbolic 
promotion, ironically, marked an abrupt end to Townsend’s unchallenged control.23   
The new limits to Townsend’s authority were quickly evident.  Meeting with his 
executive the day after the convention, a furious Townsend demanded Gomer Smith’s 
immediate resignation.  He was for free speech, he said, as long as ‘troublemakers’ did 
not take unfair advantage of it.24  Townsend’s weakness and vulnerability were 
demonstrated when the executive resolutely rejected his proposal and instead 
presented a counter challenge to remove Gerald Smith.  Seeking to reassert his 
leadership, Townsend stormed from the meeting, expecting his board to seek a 
compromise.  Having waited patiently for some time with members of the press 
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stationed outside, when it became obvious that no compromise would be sought, 
Townsend returned to the meeting.  In return for Gerald Smith retaining his 
directorship, he accepted the continuation of Gomer Smith’s membership.25  
Townsend’s decision to align himself with Gerald Smith and his decision to back the 
formation of the Union Party thus proved a costly mistake for the elderly doctor. 
Whereas Townsend and Smith ultimately found themselves constrained by their 
members, Father Coughlin was restrained by the Catholic Church.  Despite his often 
dramatic rhetoric, prior to his appearance at the OARP convention Coughlin had 
always been able to carefully balance the respectability that his position within the 
clergy naturally afforded him with his overtly political radio sermons.  However, the 
challenge set down by Gerald Smith, the receptiveness of the crowd to theatrical 
oratory, and the priest’s tendency towards dramatic gestures all combined to push 
Coughlin beyond the boundaries of popular acceptability.  Letters published in the New 
York Times in the days that followed Coughlin’s address demonstrated how much the 
priest had angered Catholic voters in particular.  Not one letter was published that 
supported the priest.  It ‘goes against the grain for any honest, self-respecting Catholic 
to have respect for any man, priest or layman, who, from a public platform, call the 
Chief Magistrate of our nation a “liar”,’ wrote a ‘Catholic Voter’ on July 17, 1936.  
‘“Upon what meat” does Father Coughlin feed that he can call the President a liar and 
betrayer?’ questioned Ernest Bristol on July 16.  Alongside these criticisms was one 
common proposed solution: ‘A clergyman playing politics is a clerical error,’ suggested 
a ‘Catholic Voter.’  ‘It is time for his church to “spew him out,”’ recommended another.26   
Coughlin could have chosen to ignore public criticism of his speech.  He was, 
after all, seeking to appeal to a section of the electorate that was already alienated 
from the president and was thus more likely to back his stance than those moderate 
voters writing to the New York Times.  He could not, however, afford to offend his 
bishop who ultimately provided him with the personal freedom from his clerical duties to 
continue his political campaign.  Coughlin’s superior, Bishop of Detroit Michael J. 
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Gallagher, was personally sympathetic to the priest’s campaign for social justice and 
had never previously censured him for his political actions, but the display at the OARP 
convention proved too much.   On July 18, Gallagher issued a public statement 
expressing his disapproval: ‘Father Coughlin is entitled to his own opinion, but I do not 
approve of the language he used in expressing himself on the president.’27  Whatever 
the members of the NUSJ might have thought of his speech or his actions, recognising 
that he had breached the limits of acceptability set down by his bishop, on July 23, 
1936, Coughlin was forced to issue an embarrassing open letter of apology. 
Addressing the president as ‘Excellency,’ the priest attempted to draw a 
distinction between Roosevelt’s role as chief executive and as a candidate for political 
office.  ‘When he becomes a candidate he subjects himself to criticism and to the 
campaign speeches of his opponents,’ Coughlin explained.  But by blurring the 
distinction between these two identities in his speech, and in accusing the ‘president’ 
rather than the ‘candidate’ of being a liar and a betrayer, Coughlin confessed that ‘in 
the heat of civic interest and in righteous anger,’ he had overstepped acceptable 
boundaries.  Discussing his apology with the press, Coughlin admitted that his address 
was extemporaneous, and that if he had prepared in it advance he ‘would not have 
used the strong terms in which he referred to the president.’28 The apology and the 
priest’s confession of his moment of excess were principally intended to defuse the 
anger emerging from amongst the church hierarchy.  Instead, like Townsend’s forced 
capitulation to his rebellious executive, they merely illustrated Coughlin’s weaknesses 
and the limitations of his power.   
Coughlin was constrained by his church, but remained the unopposed leader of 
the NUSJ.  Having witnessed firsthand Townsend’s public humiliation and his ultimate 
loss of face and control of the OARP, Coughlin went to great lengths to carefully 
orchestrate the NUSJ convention to ensure that he would both sustain his leadership 
position and additionally mobilise his movement behind the Union Party as an anti-
Roosevelt protest.  Wishing to make it categorically clear that he had no intention 
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personally, or on behalf of his members, that the NUSJ should support the permanent 
establishment of the Union Party, he announced on the eve of the convention that 
while he wanted his organisation to ratify Lemke’s candidacy, he did not want it to 
endorse the new party.29   To supress any opposition to his proposal emerging through 
the course of the convention, early on the first day of business, Coughlin pushed 
delegates to pass a proposal to endorse Lemke’s presidential campaign.  Delegates 
passed the resolution 8,152 votes to 1, but also, unanimously rejected formal 
endorsement of the Union Party.30   
The passage of the NUSJ resolution opposing formal endorsement of the Union 
Party ended Lemke’s hopes that the new party might overcome its deficiencies in 
finance and organisation by effectively merging with Coughlin’s established movement.  
Lemke was now entirely dependent upon his meagre resources and the goodwill of 
others.  The limitations of the NUSJ’s endorsement of his candidacy were quickly 
apparent.  On one relatively short-term level, Coughlin’s members rose to support 
Lemke but by no means would they actively campaign for his election to the 
presidency.  When Lemke delivered his address to the NUSJ delegates, he once again 
failed to rouse a sleepy crowd in a two-thirds-empty Cleveland Stadium.31   
Coughlin had successfully guided the NUSJ to back Lemke’s candidacy as a 
protest against the continuation of the Roosevelt presidency.  He had thus avoided the 
public humiliation endured by Townsend at the OARP convention.  With the resolution 
passed, however, he was forced to contend with another challenge to his authority from 
Gerald Smith.  The press had speculated in advance of the convention whether, 
following his humbling public apology, Coughlin would ensure no repeat performance 
by withdrawing the speaking invitations issued to Townsend and Smith.  Not wishing to 
undermine the already weak union, Coughlin insisted that his fellow leaders retain their 
speaking slots, but he explicitly ruled out an ‘oratorical contest.’32  Smith would be 
allowed to make an address, but only late in the evening, when the business of the 
convention had ended – with the delegates tired from the long days of speeches.  
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However, Coughlin’s attempt to limit the preacher ultimately ended in failure and his 
own personal embarrassment.  When the time came for Smith to speak, he was able to 
quickly rouse the flagging crowd.  ‘Our president is being Kerenskyized in preparation 
for the chaos that is inevitable,’ he shouted.  ‘When he runs out of money, the 
members of his own party will turn upon him.  When this time comes, there will be 
inflation, repudiation, chaos.’  His address was, if anything, more effective than the one 
he had used at the OARP convention. ‘The Rev. Mr. Smith,’ the New York Times 
concluded, ‘was in his best rabble-rousing form.’33  As the crowd rose in support, 
Coughlin realised he had allowed Smith once again to upstage him.  However, 
constrained by his actions at the OARP convention and his subsequent apology, the 
priest was unable to deliver to match the preacher’s display of rhetoric.  Instead, he 
provided a perfect moment of drama.  The following day, rising to officially close the 
convention, halfway through his speech Coughlin stepped back from the microphone 
and collapsed.  With the press and his followers expressing serious concerns for his 
health and his ability to continue his political campaign, Coughlin once again pushed 
Smith from the press headlines.34   
The relative success of the early stages of the presidential campaign can be 
determined by an assessment of Gallup polling data.  With the president having yielded 
the floor to his opponents during the month of August, there were apparent signs that 
their negative campaigns were generating public support.  The first poll following the 
major party nominations was published on August 9, 1936, with research undertaken in 
mid-July.  This suggested that Roosevelt’s popularity had dropped by 4.2 per cent to 
49.3 since the pre-convention poll published on June 7, whilst Landon’s had increased 
by 2.6 to 44.8 per cent.  Lemke, appearing for the first time, received 3.4 per cent of the 
vote.35  The first poll published in the wake of the NUSJ convention on August 30 
revealed a small bounce for Lemke, with his rating increasing to 4.6 per cent (drawing 
support mainly from other minor candidates).  In comparison, however, support for the 
main party candidates had remained static.  The OARP and NUSJ conventions thus 
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appeared to have confirmed Lemke’s status as the most significant of the minor 
candidates.  Beyond that, however, the dramatic oratorical displays against the 
president had failed to draw support away from Roosevelt.  It was questionable, given 
the unstable nature of the union of Union Party backers and the limited support that 
their organisations had afforded Lemke, how sustainable his slender level of support 
would be as he moved away from the natural spotlight of the conventions and onto the 
campaign trail proper.36   
The NUSJ and OARP conventions might have provided a small boost for 
Lemke’s electoral chances, but they ultimately tested the limits of the union beyond its 
maximum capacity.  Coughlin cared little for Lemke or the Union Party.  The NUSJ 
convention, like that of the OARP before it, had confirmed that the Union Party was 
simply not viable as a political party.  Its existence provided Coughlin and his 
supporters with a symbolic protest movement behind which to rally their campaign of 
opposition to the president.  The failure of the OARP to back Lemke’s candidacy, and 
Coughlin’s personal oratorical battle with Smith, limited the continued usefulness of the 
union.  Whatever the wishes of the Union Party or its presidential candidate, the union 
of backers was unravelling swiftly.   
Immediately following their speeches to the OARP convention, flushed with the 
enthusiasm of the crowd, Townsend, Smith and Coughlin posed for the photographers.  
Throwing his arms around his colleagues, Coughlin had announced his intention to 
mount a joint national campaign on behalf of Lemke’s candidacy.  Yet, in the wake of 
Coughlin’s humble apology and his concerns at the personal ambitions of Gerald 
Smith, the priest withdrew from the campaign, announcing in August that despite his 
best intentions, he had discovered that he had no time in his busy schedule.37  The 
reality was that Smith was the thread that had bound the loose union of diverse radical 
reformers together.  With Coughlin unwilling to be usurped by the Baptist preacher, this 
thread quickly unwound.  In the wake of Coughlin’s announcement, an embarrassed 
Smith was forced to explain to reporters that they had decided that: 
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It would be a waste of energy and duplication of effort to 
campaign together.  Instead, we plan to go in two or three 
different directions, cover two or three times as much territory 
as if we travelled together, and, of course, address two or three 
times as many people.38   
 
The weakness of the union that had backed the formation of the new political 
party was now publicly transparent.  With the union dissolved moreover, Lemke lost 
any final control he might have had over his backers.  The Union Party candidate was 
forced to place his fate in the hands of others – an action he lived to regret.  Thereafter, 
entirely without Lemke’s knowledge, influence, guidance or control, the campaign in 
support of his candidacy split into four entirely independent and unrelated crusades.  
Candidate Lemke toured the country attempting to generate momentum behind his 
new party, but the newspapers preferred to report the colourful displays of Coughlin 
and Smith or the difficulties of Townsend.  Unable to control, constrain or distance 
himself from the actions of the individuals who dominated his campaign but did nothing 
to support him, Lemke and the Union Party were drowned. 
The formal Union Party campaign, directly controlled by party chairman John 
Nystul and delivered by candidate Lemke, was fragile and ineffective and generated 
little press coverage or public comment.  Despite his personal vision and commitment 
to the Union Party cause, Lemke proved a weak candidate for the highest office and 
his appeal remained distinctly regional.  Embracing his rural western roots, he 
immersed himself in the life of a farmer: the suits he wore were un-ironed, and his 
speeches – laden with his strong, twangy accent – were often delivered with one or 
more days’ worth of stubble.  This, in combination with his bald head pocked with 
smallpox scars, slightly jaundiced skin and glass eye, made him extremely 
unpresidential in his appearance.39   
Lemke’s lack of broad electoral appeal became apparent when he embarked 
upon the campaign tour that Nystul was able to arrange for him.  The candidate started 
his tour in the Midwest, speaking before 35,000 people in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
drawing large crowds in Colorado, Michigan and Ohio. Lemke was careful throughout 
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his campaign to sustain his support for all the planks of his platform.  His greatest 
passion, however, was reserved for his proposals for agricultural reform.  These 
agricultural crowds warmly received his pleas to fight against the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration and to ‘get off the hearses and get onto the bandwagon.’40  
Appealing directly to his core constituency, his passionate speeches did not go 
unnoticed; William Borah wrote to Lemke in July, ‘I have said two or three times that I 
thought you were making the most effective vote-getting speeches that have yet 
appeared.’41  Lemke’s focus on agricultural voters looked to be generating momentum 
for his campaign.  In mid-August, the Farm Journal reported that a straw poll of farmers 
in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin indicated that the Union Party candidate might 
win 25 per cent of the vote.42  Buoyed by this success, Lemke told a meeting of the 
Farmers’ Union in Iowa, ‘I think I am going to be the next President.’43  Lemke would 
soon discover, however, that outside of the farm states, his rural image and agrarian 
message carried little weight. With the full-scale advent of television a decade away, it 
is true that Lemke was largely spared the type of hype that has become associated 
with image since, but even so, the radio could not hide his poor speaking voice, nor the 
newspapers and newsreels hide his strange appearance.44  Challenged by reporters, 
an angry Lemke dismissed the importance of his image.  ‘I’m not running for 
Hollywood!’ he exclaimed.  ‘This is not a beauty race, but a contest for the presidency 
of the United States.’45   As Lemke moved from the agricultural to the industrial 
heartlands, he found his rural message failed to resonate.  In late August, he failed to 
impress sparse crowds in New England, the west coast and the industrial cities of the 
northeast.  One stunned crowd in Portland, Maine, sat silently as Lemke rallied them 
against the ‘Harvard and Yale boys sent to teach our pigs birth control.’46   
Despite Lemke’s best efforts, in reality the formal Union Party campaign was 
little more than a sideshow to the main events of the election.  Lemke toured the 
country selling his vision, but he found few interested in listening to him.  His former 
union of backers, however, fared little better in their independent campaigns 
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undertaken nominally on his behalf.  With the Democratic campaign machine now in 
full operation, Smith, Townsend and Coughlin found the constraints placed upon them 
too much.  The presidential campaign drained their remaining reserves of power almost 
to exhaustion and they did little to mobilise the public behind Lemke’s candidacy. 
In late August 1936, the full extent of Townsend’s public humiliation at the 
hands of his executive began to become apparent to the elderly doctor.  Complaining 
of nervous exhaustion, he retreated to the central offices of the pension movement in 
Chicago.  From there his ability to mount a personal campaign for Lemke’s candidacy 
was severely limited.  Unable to call upon the OARP’s financial or organisational 
resources, Townsend exploited his last remaining lever of influence – his editorial 
control of the National Townsend Weekly.  In an August 24 editorial, Townsend 
reiterated his personal position in favour of Lemke’s candidacy: ‘I would be a hypocrite 
and disloyal to my followers if I refused to support William Lemke for President of the 
United States.’47  In September, Townsend re-emphasised this message, suggesting 
that loyal Townsendites voting for any other candidate would be ‘very foolish indeed.’48  
In October, his staff writers stated it more bluntly: ‘no Townsendite can be a sincere 
supporter of the Townsend Plan unless he votes for William Lemke for President.’49  In 
a final election-eve radio address, Townsend called again for Lemke’s election, 
instructing that every Townsendite ‘must vote for men who are pledged to the 
Townsend plan.’50  Lemke himself mused privately, ‘I cannot imagine how any person 
who is for the Townsend movement can at the same time be for either Landon or 
Roosevelt.’51  Townsend remained resolutely behind Lemke’s candidacy to the very 
last.  It is questionable however, given the level of opposition to Lemke from amongst 
OARP members, whether the doctor’s continued personal campaign boosted the Union 
Party vote. 
Townsend’s continued loyalty to Lemke’s candidacy was not shared by his 
erstwhile partner Gerald Smith.  Having no movement of his own, the Baptist preacher 
had used his partnership with Townsend to elevate himself to a position of leadership 
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within the OARP.  This had provided him access to national platforms at the OARP and 
NUSJ conventions from which to establish his leadership credentials in the eyes of the 
massed delegates and press.  These highs, however, were followed by a series of 
damaging blows to his personal credibility and broader political ambitions.  The 
decision of the OARP executive board to reject Townsend’s proposal that Gomer Smith 
be removed as a director and to limit Townsend’s authority, damaged the pension 
leader and isolated Gerald Smith.  The preacher, moreover, realised that he had 
misjudged the extent of Townsend’s authority and with the elderly doctor now reduced 
in status his political value to Smith was removed.  Moving swiftly, Smith sought to 
capitalise upon his raised profile and abandoned the doctor.  Smith summed up his 
situation in a 1939 letter: ‘As my man [Huey Long] had been killed and I had no money 
with which to organize independently, I had the choice between dropping back into 
obscurity or pursuing the course I followed.’52   
Lacking even the skeletal organisational structure available to support Lemke’s 
Union Party campaign, the limitations of Smith’s political influence were quickly 
apparent.  Seeking to galvanise support of former SoW followers, Smith embarked 
upon a solo tour of the southern states with a loudspeaker truck.  His campaign 
generated little interest. Like a traveling salesman, he gave no advance warning of his 
speaking engagements; instead, he arrived in a town and walked the streets 
encouraging individuals to come and hear him speak.  If no crowd arrived, he would 
start his performance and hope that his showmanship would draw a crowd of passers-
by.53  Smith’s abandonment of the OARP thus proved a miscalculation.  In early 
October, Townsend, recognising that Smith had effectively resigned his position, 
removed the preacher from the OARP board of directors.  He was once again 
relegated to the status of a leader without a movement.54 
Townsend’s action forced Smith to make an immediate and dramatic response 
which only served to demonstrate the limitations of his political skills and broad public 
appeal.  Huey Long had been successful because he had been able to combine his 
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oratorical skills with an adroit political mind.  He had built his support amongst the poor 
of Louisiana over many years.  As his electoral power grew, he drew together a 
complex political machine dedicated to him and dependent entirely upon him.  By the 
time of his death, Long stood like a general over a vast army of dedicated workers.  
Smith might have shared Long’s sense of dramatic oratory, but with the Long machine 
now behind Roosevelt, and the OARP membership having rejected his advances, the 
preacher’s power was limited to his words alone.  This was not enough to sustain 
Smith in a position of national political leadership.  On October 17, 1936, in one final 
desperate attempt to capitalise upon his recent press exposure, Smith announced the 
formation of ‘The Committee of One Million.’  Its aim, he said, was ‘ultimately to seize 
the government of the United States.’  He claimed he had 400 friends in 22 cities who 
had pledged to him one per cent of their incomes, in order to rescue America.55  
Whatever the truth of these pledges, on October 20, at a rally held at the New York 
Hippodrome intended to launch his new movement, he found embarrassingly little 
support.  The New York Times reported that an audience of fewer than 600 within the 
cavernous hall merely sat and listened politely to Smith’s harangue.56 
Smith’s failed political move ended any notion that he was formally involved in 
supporting Lemke’s election campaign.  Coughlin, Lemke and Townsend each issued 
statements disavowing any connection with Smith’s new group.  Townsend, his fingers 
most burnt by his association, was bluntest in his condemnation.  ‘Gerald Smith,’ he 
wrote, ‘shall henceforth have no connection with our organisation.  This is definite and 
final.’57  Smith’s fall from grace was hard and sharp.  He made only one more 
appearance in the New York Times in 1936.  That was a brief item on November 2, 
announcing he had been arrested and jailed in New Orleans on charges of disturbing 
the peace, reviling an officer and using abusive language.58  Far from leading Lemke to 
victory, Smith spent Election Day in jail.  Smith’s participation in Lemke’s campaign 
encouraged still further the public’s general view that the Union Party was 
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untrustworthy and potentially dangerous and likely did little to mobilise voters behind 
Lemke’s candidacy.   
With Smith and Townsend neutered by the OARP, and with his own campaign 
generating little press or public interest, Lemke was almost entirely reliant upon 
Coughlin.  With a well-financed and properly organised movement working behind him, 
it was Coughlin who presented the greatest opportunity to rally the electorate behind 
the Union Party candidate.  Lemke’s almost total dependence upon Coughlin 
overexposed the Union Party campaign to a significant, uncontrollable risk.  Coughlin’s 
personal instability had already become very apparent by the time the presidential 
campaign moved beyond the convention halls.  The pressure of taking sole 
responsibility for promoting Lemke’s candidacy ultimately proved too much for the 
priest.  As Coughlin failed to gain traction, Lemke’s meagre electoral popularity 
crumbled. 
When Coughlin embarked upon the campaign trail for Lemke, he entirely 
abandoned advocacy of the Union Party platform.  Instead, his speeches focused upon 
the alleged weakness of the Roosevelt administration at the hands of ‘international 
bankers’ and the president’s failure to fulfil promises to deliver social and economic 
reform set out in the 1932 Democratic platform.  Utilising the national and local 
organisational resources of the NUSJ, Coughlin mounted a series of high-profile rallies 
in the large northeastern cities and in the farming centres of the west.  Social Justice 
was used to promote events well in advance.  The events were well-attended – every 
NUSJ member wanted an opportunity to see the great man in person and no expense 
was spared in delivering a good show.  Mindful of his recent humbling by his bishop, 
Coughlin attempted to tread a careful line, ensuring his dramatic illustrations of the 
alleged failings of the federal government were not perceived as personal attacks upon 
the integrity of the president. Roosevelt had placed his personal credibility at the centre 
of his campaign strategy, but Coughlin was unable to challenge him directly on this 
account.  In turn, this confused Coughlin’s simple message of opposition and limited 
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his effectiveness as a rabble-rousing orator. Ultimately, Coughlin was unable to 
balance the pressure of expectation placed upon him to mobilise his supporters behind 
Lemke’s campaign with the constant need to ensure he did not offend his bishop. 
Despite the limitations placed on him, Coughlin nonetheless stumped hard 
using language familiar to his followers.  In North Carolina, Coughlin instructed a crowd 
of stunned farmers that they should be prepared to ‘repudiate your debts and if 
anybody tries to enforce them, repudiate them also.’  In Providence, Rhode Island, he 
hysterically informed a crowd of 25,000 that if the Roosevelt administration continued, 
then there would be ‘more bullet holes in the White House than you could count with 
an adding machine.’59  The grandest display of his campaign came on September 6, 
when a Chicago crowd estimated at between 100,000 and 125,000 paying supporters 
experienced a massed rally that echoed in scale the dictators of the 1930s.  Preceded 
by a motorcycle police escort, Coughlin was ushered into the park past 2,500 guards of 
honour.  He ascended a platform 50 feet high and 50 feet wide.60  The symbolism was 
deliberate and meticulously planned – indeed, the platform was an exact copy of one 
that Coughlin’s campaign organiser Philip Johnson had witnessed when he had 
attended a Nazi rally in 1932.61  Coughlin launched an unparalleled attack on the 
weakness of the Roosevelt administration, blaming ‘international bankers’ who had ‘set 
upon the American people.’  He described the Democratic platform of 1932 ‘like a 
papier mache sieve through which we have fallen deeper into the depression.’  
Screaming himself hoarse, he concluded, ‘We all know for whom we’re voting if we 
vote for Mr. Roosevelt, for the Communists, the Socialists, the Russian lovers, the 
Mexican lovers, the kick-me-downers.’62  On September 19, in response Coughlin’s 
rabble-rousing speech, Republican-backing newspapers owned by William Randolph 
Hearst alleged in a front-page editorial that on orders from Moscow, the Communists 
were working to re-elect Roosevelt.63  Encouraging panic, not promoting policy, thus 
become the central thrust of Coughlin’s negative campaign.  
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The symbolism and the message of the Chicago event reinforced the stark 
choice between safety and chaos that Roosevelt had presented in his acceptance 
speech, and as the campaign moved into the autumn months, the spectacle became 
too much for many of Coughlin’s supporters.  What had been an entertainment had 
taken on dangerously demagogic attributes, and the priest’s speeches, always a 
torrent of emotion, were becoming increasingly erratic and violent.  Coughlin’s 
weakness, said NUSJ campaign organiser Philip Johnson, was that ‘his imagination 
frequently ran away from him.’64 And so too did the crowds.  In September, in New 
York City, an expected crowd of 60,000 turned out to be a disappointing 22,000.  In a 
mildly hysterical tone, Coughlin explained that the election had become a contest 
‘between the basic principles of Christianity and the old doctrines of paganism which 
seem to be rising up to defy God.’65  He informed a crowd in New Haven that they 
should expect the red flag of communism to be raised in the U.S., and followed this 
with a statement to reporters in St Louis that he foresaw the ‘last general election we’ll 
ever have unless the evils of modern capitalism are immediately eliminated.’  Finally, in 
Philadelphia, he announced that the nation had to be ready to resort to bullets to 
preserve American liberties.  A new revolution would be needed to free the people 
from the domination of the federal government.66  The violence and spectacle of 
Coughlin’s campaign reduced appeal for Lemke in the wider electorate.  Between early 
September and mid-October, Lemke’s forecast share of the popular vote fell by 1.4 
points to just 3.6 per cent.67   
In August 1936, in direct contrast to Lemke, Townsend, Smith and Coughlin’s 
negative campaign message, Roosevelt set out on the campaign trail taking every 
advantage available to him from the privilege of his office to demonstrate his central 
campaign message that his New Deal was delivering both economic recovery and a 
safety net for those who had yet to feel the benefits of the gradual return to prosperity.  
By providing clear and continuous evidence to back up his assertions, Roosevelt was 
easily able to counter the increasingly shrill accusations of his opponents.   
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To underline Roosevelt’s central campaign message of the success of his 
administration, he did all he could privately to enhance the effectiveness of the New 
Deal agencies.  When the National Emergency Council provided the president with 
evidence that the recovery had begun in 1932, his personal secretary, Stephen Early, 
was dispatched to inform them that the report would need to be rewritten.  ‘The 
President is insistent,’ he wrote, ‘that the low point in the Depression be fixed as 
March, 1933, or early in the year 1933 – this is for obvious reasons.’68  Roosevelt 
instructed Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace: ‘Henry, through July, August, 
September, October and up to the fifth of November, I want cotton to sell at 12 cents. I 
do not care how you do it.  That is your problem.  It can’t go below 12 cents.  Is that 
clear?’  When the Works Progress Administration planned its annual reduction of relief 
workers during the winter months, when the weather restricted building projects, 
Roosevelt informed Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., ‘You tell 
[Assistant WPA Administrator] Corrington Gill that I don’t give a dahm where he gets 
the money from but not one person is to be laid off on the first of October.’69 
With its agencies working at their maximum capacity, further evidence of the 
effectiveness of the New Deal came in late August, when Roosevelt embarked upon a 
tour of farm states gripped by a drought equal in size to one-third of the nation.  
Determined to demonstrate leadership, the president held five major conferences with 
governors and state officials to agree how the federal government might be able to 
assist.  As a result, the federal administration was mobilised into action to provide 
loans, relief payments and short-term employment to over 400,000 families.70  
Roosevelt’s actions provided ample evidence of the effectiveness of the federal 
government and its New Deal agencies to respond when state resources proved 
inadequate.  His swift response to the crisis placed the president’s opponents on the 
defensive, particularly Landon, who as governor of a drought state was invited to 
attend one of the emergency conferences.  Forced to accept Roosevelt’s lead during 
the proceedings, and unable for the sake of his constituents who genuinely needed 
221 
 
federal support to use the conference as a grandstand for his own anti-New-Deal 
campaign (it was later pointed out on the campaign trail by a Roosevelt official that 
three quarters of the public money spent in 1935 by Landon in Kansas had come via 
New Deal agencies), the Republican candidate could only stand meekly by.  Leaving 
the conference, Landon was asked what he thought of Roosevelt; he humbly replied, 
‘He’s a very fine, charming gentleman.’71  This event was a significant embarrassment 
to Landon’s campaign.  With the economy now burgeoning, Benjamin Anderson of the 
Chase Manhattan Bank and Leonard P. Ayres of the Cleveland Trust Company visited 
Landon to confirm their belief that the recovery was genuine and would continue to 
move upwards.  Landon later recalled, ‘I knew then that I was beaten.’72   
Seeking to disprove Roosevelt’s message that his New Deal reforms were 
gradually bringing about a recovery in the nation’s economic situation, his opponents 
embarked on an increasingly negative campaign.  By late September, it was clear that 
there was a large, immovable block of support in favour of the New Deal which was 
holding firm despite their vigorous attacks.  This was bitterly ironic for Lemke and his 
Union Party colleagues who had found elements of their own independent social and 
economic reforms absorbed into the New Deal and which the president placed centrally 
in his own campaign.  With Roosevelt having integrated large numbers of newly 
unemployed, moderate former middle-class voters who had formed the core support of 
the independent radical reform movements within his emerging electoral coalition, his 
opponents found themselves directing their appeals towards the most extreme and 
discontented fringes of society.  From this position, they found that no matter what 
dramatic display of oratory they might deliver, they were unable to broaden their 
support amongst the electorate.  Thus, when Roosevelt began his official campaign 
tour on September 29 at the New York State Democratic Convention, his opponents’ 
campaigns had largely been derailed.  Under these circumstances, it was opportune for 
Roosevelt to ridicule his opponents for their excess.  So desperate had they become, 
the president suggested, that they were dragging out red herrings ‘to divert attention 
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from the trail of their own weaknesses.’  He directly refuted accusations that he was a 
Communist and seized the political high ground.  ‘I have not sought, I do not seek, I 
repudiate the support of any advocate of Communism or of any other alien “ism”,’ he 
proclaimed, ‘which would by fair means or foul change our American democracy.’  
Returning to his central campaign theme, he warned that it was through not voting for 
him that the nation would risk a turn towards Communism.  His opponents, by 
encouraging economic and social unrest, he explained, would establish the conditions 
in which Communism would thrive.  In sharp contrast, the Democrats, by tackling the 
causes of unrest, struck Communism at its very roots.73  The President’s cool reason 
was in contrast with the intemperance of his opponents.  ‘If it is “Communism” to urge a 
squarer deal for labor and the farmers,’ the New York Daily News commented, ‘then 
there are a lot of “Communists” in this country.’74  Throughout the remainder of 
October, Roosevelt toured the nation delivering a series of carefully planned speeches 
before ever-increasing crowds, drawing the difference in economic and social 
conditions before and after the New Deal.  Voters who had benefited from the New 
Deal’s social and economic reforms cared little for their origins.  The passage of the 
Second New Deal and Roosevelt’s willingness to embrace the success it had given him 
had thus largely rendered the Union Party irrelevant even before its formation.   
The greatest symbol of the success of the Second New Deal and the 
comparative peripheral nature of the Union Party was the implementation of the 
pension element of the Social Security legislation.  In the autumn of 1936, as the 
campaign was moving into its final stage, millions of Americans received in the post a 
document from the newly established Social Security Board.  It explained that from 
January 1, 1937, the payroll tax would take effect and a Social Security account would 
be set up for them ‘which will give about 26 million working people something to live on 
when they are old and have stopped working.’  In sharp contrast to the direct 
accusations issued by Coughlin against the president’s personal integrity at the OARP 
convention, the letter was a vivid illustration that the president could be trusted and was 
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making a real difference to the lives of millions of Americans.  This powerful statement 
was best illustrated by the final sentence of the letter – a solemn promise that from the 
moment of retirement, ‘you will get a government check for the rest of your life.  This 
check will come to you as your right.’75  Through this carefully calculated political 
action, the administration demonstrated that whilst the president’s opponents could 
carp, criticise and speculate from the sidelines, only Roosevelt had the power to 
provide the dollars needed to change real lives.   
With Social Security now a reality, his opponents were forced into a final 
desperate series of appeals that only reinforced their position upon the political fringes.  
For the Republicans, the focus of their campaign was the payroll tax required to fund 
the new Social Security provision.  In an October speaking engagement in Milwaukee, 
Landon proclaimed that Social Security was ‘unjust, unworkable, stupidly drafted and 
wastefully financed.’  Unemployed relief should be a matter for the states, and 
pensions should be funded through a special tax.  The Republican Party, he 
concluded, would have nothing to do with a proposal that involved the federal 
government prying ‘into the personal records of 26 million people.’76  Seeking to scare 
workers, Landon specifically targeted the payroll tax that would fund the scheme. In 
late-October, placards sprang up in factories announcing that all workers would be 
subject to a permanent pay cut from January 1 unless they rejected Roosevelt.  In 
addition, notes included in pay packets informed workers that employers would be 
compelled to make a 1 per cent pay deduction from wages and turn it over to the 
federal government.  ‘You might get this money back,’ the note concluded, but ‘there is 
NO guarantee.’  In his final campaign address, Landon attempted to rally worker 
support.  How, he asked, would the federal administration keep track of these 26 
million Americans?  ‘Are their photographs going to be kept on file in a Washington 
office? Or are they going to have identification tags put around their necks?’  The 
following day the Hearst press ran with the front-page headline: ‘Do You Want A Tag 
And A Number In The Name Of False Security?’77 
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Social Security and the administration’s record of labour relations also become 
the focus of Coughlin’s last weeks on the campaign trail.  On October 26, he accused 
Roosevelt of being a ‘scab president’ and termed the administration ‘the greatest 
employer of scab labor in history.’78  In his final campaign rally on October 29, Coughlin 
concluded his frenzied address by observing that with the New Deal ‘oppressing labor 
and fastening shackles upon the wrist of the people,’ it was no wonder that ‘the 
Comintern in Moscow advises its members here to vote for Roosevelt.’79  The public 
was not interested in listening.  Coughlin became increasingly frustrated, erratic and 
ultimately extreme as his campaign unravelled and his credibility crumbled.  Hounded 
by reporters in Rhode Island, he snatched one man’s glasses from his face and pushed 
him against a wall.  Ultimately restrained and dragged away, Coughlin shouted back, ‘If 
I ever see that fellow again, I’ll tear him to pieces!’80  Three days later, at a rally in 
Detroit, a heckler jumped onto the stage and emptied a feather pillow over Coughlin’s 
head; in a fit of rage, the priest grabbed the man by the throat, pounded him and 
pinned him to the floor.  The press reported that Coughlin was completely ‘losing his 
grip.’81  It was clear now that Coughlin’s shrill appeals were reducing Lemke’s potential 
support even amongst the priest’s most desperate and radicalised followers.  One 
correspondent informed Farley in late October that ‘there is doubt in the minds’ of 
Coughlin’s closest supporters, ‘as to whether he may not be leading them down a 
“blind alley.”’82  Another correspondent observed bluntly that there could be no doubt 
that Coughlin’s statements and attitudes had cost him a tremendous amount of 
influence: ‘Many of his former warmest friends in Philadelphia,’ he wrote, ‘are disgusted 
with him.’83  On October 31, in a final indignity, Coughlin was once again forced at the 
direct instruction of his bishop to issue an apology at the derogatory language he had 
directly towards the president.84   
As Coughlin’s campaign wound to a close he was exhausted, sick and irritable.  
There can be no doubt that he had campaigned hard.  With his sense of occasion and 
personal star quality, he had generated genuine moments of real excitement.  This 
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drive for drama, however, was not enough to turn voters away from an administration 
that was demonstrably delivering on the promises they had made in 1932, whatever 
Coughlin’s and Lemke’s suggestions to the contrary.  Furthermore, the distance 
between the priest and the Union Party candidate grew so wide as the months passed 
that the connection was often forgotten.  Coughlin had made it his mission to warn the 
public of the dangers of re-electing Franklin Roosevelt.  However, he did not present 
Lemke’s positive platform of reforms as a viable alternative.  The campaign had 
succeeded in propelling the priest into the headlines – but ultimately at the cost of 
Lemke’s already undermined campaign.   
The gap between Roosevelt’s centralist positive campaign message and his 
opponents’ negativity is illustrated by opinion polling on public support for the payroll 
tax element of the Social Security legislation.  A Gallup poll taken in November 
revealed that 68 per cent of the population supported the payroll tax, including 82 per 
cent of Democrats, and, crucially, 73 per cent of Unionists and 50 per cent of 
Republicans.  With the majority of the electorate agreeing with the president rather than 
the position advocated by their own parties, it is no surprise that neither the Republican 
nor Union Party candidates were able to generate momentum behind their anti-New-
Deal crusades.  Roosevelt later commented that his opponents’ accusations were ‘so 
obviously untrue and unfair that we were helped.’85 
With unemployment down to 15.3 per cent (the lowest rate since 1931) and the 
Dow Jones hitting 189 points (a 100 per cent increase since the mid-terms in 1934), 
Roosevelt ended his campaign with a final rally at Madison Square Garden on October 
31.  His speech was one of the most powerful of his career and once again presented a 
vivid contrast of his positive message of hope against his opponents’ warnings of 
despair.86  Yet again, without providing names, Roosevelt listed the mysterious forces 
opposed to his re-election: ‘business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless 
banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, and war profiteering.’  He continued, ‘Never 
before, in all our history have these forces been so united as they are today.  They are 
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unanimous in their hate for me and I welcome their hatred.’  He had battled on the 
people’s behalf to save them from the evil intent of his opponents, and, should the 
people will it, he would continue the fight.  With the crowd rising in excitement, he 
concluded: ‘I should like to have it said of my first administration that in it the forces of 
selfishness, of lust for power, met their match.  I should like to have it said of my 
second administration that in it these forces met their master.’87  
Roosevelt’s Madison Square Garden address was an exceptional performance 
and one to which his opponents were in no position to respond in either style or 
content.  At the end of the campaign, the New York Times characterised Landon as 
‘divided between confidence and hope.’  He accepted that his campaign message had 
failed to broaden his appeal amongst the voters and that it was extremely unlikely he 
would secure any support in the western states.  He clung on to the aspiration, 
however, that his conservative message might sustain the party’s support in the 
previously solid northeast.  This, coupled with some Republican gains in Congress, 
would provide a solid basis for the party to build upon for the 1940 elections.88   
Undermined or deserted by their supporters, Coughlin, Smith and Townsend 
were unable to rally the electorate behind the Union Party’s transient protest at the 
continuation of the Roosevelt presidency.  Despite his faltering campaign, Lemke 
remained committed to turning the Union Party into a genuine third party.  There can 
be no doubting his commitment to the Union Party cause or his willingness to innovate 
in the delivery of his campaign message.  In an age when presidential campaigns were 
fought from the back of a train, he became the first candidate to use an aeroplane.  
Funded by Lemke taking out a mortgage on his North Dakota home, in a final 
exhausting haul from October 14 to Election Day, he visited 40 cities across the nation.  
Ultimately, few third-party candidates have made such an effort in their campaigns.  He 
travelled over 30,000 miles, visited 33 states and gave hundreds of speeches.89  Yey, 
despite his effort, the Union Party, forced to the fringes of the political spectrum, offered 
only very limited electoral appeal.  Beyond his traditional farming constituency, Lacking 
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in the basic organisational and financial support he needed, Lemke was unable to 
demonstrate the relevance of his campaign or of his party.   
The final Gallup poll demonstrated the effectiveness of Roosevelt’s campaign.  
Between early October and the beginning of November, Roosevelt had increased his 
popularity by 2.2 points to 52.8 per cent, whilst both Landon and Lemke fell back 
sharply.  Roosevelt’s lead over his Republican opponent now stood at 11 per cent.  
Lemke’s final polling figure of 2.2 per cent was half that he had been forecast to receive 
a month earlier.90  Returning home to North Dakota to cast his ballot, Lemke’s final rally 
before his loyal local supporters once again reflected the suspicion and negativity at 
the heart of the Union Party campaign.  Rather than use his time promoting the central 
proposals of his platform, Lemke bitterly accused Jim Farley of running a dirty 
campaign against him.  Lemke refused to accept responsibility for his failure, preferring 
even to the last to find in the actions of others.  ‘I find,’ he declared, ‘that he has let a 
number of striped cats out of the bag in this State.  These animals have no regard for 
the truth or fact and run true to form in this administration.’  ‘They and the truth,’ he 
concluded, ‘are total strangers.’91  It was too late, however, to shift the view of the vast 
majority of the electorate.  They had rejected Lemke on the campaign trail and they 
would also reject him at the ballot box. 
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Why Did the Union Party Fail? 
 
The campaign was so amateurish and so poorly organized and 
the personality of our candidate was so ineffective that I was 
surprised that we got as many votes as we did.   
Gerald L.K. Smith, February 6, 1970.1  
 
 
Upon the formation of the Union Party, Gerald Smith claimed that 20 million Americans 
under the influence of Father Coughlin and Doctor Townsend would rise in support of 
Lemke’s candidacy.2  As the electorate arrived at the polling booths on  
November 3, 1936, however, such aspirations had long evaporated.  Lemke and his 
backers had simply failed to connect with the electorate, achieving only 891,886 votes 
(1.95 per cent of the popular vote) and no votes in the Electoral College.  He received 
more than 4 per cent of the vote in only 8 states (North Dakota, Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oregon, Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan).  His best 
showing in any state, 13 per cent, was in his home state of North Dakota, where he 
was also successful at regaining his seat in Congress.3  In comparison, Roosevelt’s 
grand centralist coalition delivered him 60.8 per cent of the popular vote and 523 votes 
in the Electoral College.4  In December 1936, addressing what remained of his party, a 
solemn Lemke looked back on the election and could only muse: ‘About two or three 
million people applauded for me just like you did today, but they forgot about me on 
November third.’5   
With the Union Party polarised to the fringes of the political spectrum, crusading 
against the excesses of the New Deal, Lemke lacked broad electoral appeal.  Equally, 
the limited success of the Republicans’ anti-New-Deal strategy was reflected in Alf 
Landon’s poor record.  The Republican candidate secured only 36.5 per cent of the 
233 
 
popular vote and 8 votes in the Electoral College.  He received his strongest support in 
the northeastern states, winning his only victories in Maine and Vermont, but still 
accumulated only 43.4 per cent of the popular vote in the region.  In the west, Landon’s 
conservative appeal fell flat, polling only 34.4 per cent of the vote and failing to win a 
single state.  The party’s traditional strength amongst middle-class voters in urban 
areas evaporated; Landon failed to come close to winning in any of the nation’s largest 
12 cities.6  The election outcome might have been a disappointment for Landon, but for 
Lemke it was devastating.  The gap between expectations in June 1936 upon the 
launch of the Union Party and the dismal showing for its candidate in November is so 
large that it requires a post-mortem.  Why did the Union Party fail? 
In his final electoral forecast, published on October 25, 1936, DNC Deputy 
Chairman Emil Hurja had established the threat that he perceived that the Union Party 
might present in those 13 states he considered most vulnerable to defeat for Roosevelt 
(Figure 1).  Hurja had forecast that in these states Lemke would poll 
     
Figure 1: Forecast Union Party Vote in 1936 Presidential Election, Derived From 
National Inquirer Poll Published October 25, 1936, Compared to Final Election Results. 
 
an average of 7.6 per cent of the vote.  In reality, however, the average vote cast for 
Lemke in these states was only 2.6 per cent.  The perceived threat of the Union Party 
constructed in the minds of the DNC had proved to be a significant overestimation.   











Michigan 13.4% 4.2% -9.2%
Minnesota 11.8% 6.6% -5.2%
Idaho 10.1% 3.8% -6.3%
Maryland 10.0% 0.0% -10.0%
Rhode Island 10.0% 6.3% -3.7%
Ohio 9.5% 4.4% -5.1%
Iowa 9.4% 2.6% -6.8%
Arizona 9.2% 2.7% -6.5%
Wyoming 8.1% 1.6% -6.5%
Colorado 6.7% 2.0% -4.7%
Illinois 6.5% 2.3% -4.2%
Nebraska 6.2% 2.1% -4.1%
Indiana 5.9% 1.2% -4.7%
West Virginia 3.6% 0.0% -3.6%
Pennsylvania 3.1% 1.6% -1.5%
Kansas 3.0% 0.0% -3.0%
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Figure 2: Total Vote for William Lemke, 1936 Presidential Election. 
 
 
The Union Party may have failed to meet the ambitions of either its founder or 
its union of backers to displace the president, but it still galvanised nearly 900,000 
voters to support Lemke.  It is not possible, of course, to identify exactly who voted for 
Lemke in the 1936 election.  It is possible, however, through use of opinion polling data 
gathered by Gallup during the course of the election, supplemented by other available 
data, to identify general trends.  Together the data suggests a particular type of 
individual who might have been more likely to register his vote for Lemke.  
An analysis of Lemke’s performance at regional level suggests that his appeal, 
such as it was, was limited to a small number of western rural states.  Lemke achieved 
5 per cent or more of the vote in 8 states.  Of these 6 were in the west (North Dakota, 
Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan).  These were states, for example 
  WILLIAM LEMKE (Union)  
STATE  Popular vote  
 % of total 
popular vote 
North Dakota        36,708           13.4  
Minnesota        74,296             6.6  
Massachusetts      118,639             6.4  
Rhode Island        19,569             6.3  
Oregon        21,831             5.3  
Wisconsin        60,297             4.8  
Ohio      132,212             4.4  
Michigan        75,795             4.2  
Idaho          7,684             3.8  
South Dakota        10,338             3.5  
Connecticut        21,805             3.2  
Arizona          3,307             2.7  
Iowa        29,687             2.6  
Washington        17,463             2.5  
Maine          7,581             2.5  
Montana          5,549             2.4  
Illinois        89,439             2.3  
New Hampshire          4,819             2.2  
Nebraska        12,847             2.1  
Colorado          9,962             2.0  
Pennsylvania        67,467             1.6  
Wyoming          1,653             1.6  
Kentucky        12,501             1.3  
Indiana        19,407             1.2  
Missouri        14,630             0.8  
New Mexico             924             0.5  
Utah          1,121             0.5  
New Jersey          9,407             0.5  
Texas          3,281             0.4  
Delaware             442             0.3  
Alabama             551             0.2  
Virginia             233             0.1  
Tennessee             296             0.1  
Georgia             141             0.0  
Arkansas                4             0.0  
Total      891,886  2.6           
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Ohio, Minnesota and North Dakota, whose legislators had shown consistent support for 
the passage of Lemke’s agricultural reform proposals in Congress.  As a proportion of 
the popular vote, Lemke achieved an average of 2.9 per cent in the west equating to an 
average of 26,544 votes per state.  The remaining two states where Lemke received 
more than 5 per cent of the vote were in the northeast (Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island).  He received an average of 1.9 per cent of the popular vote in this region 
equating to an average vote of 20,811.  Lemke’s support in the northeast (in those 
states in which he was able to obtain a place on the ballot) is correlated with those 
states where Father Coughlin’s radio audience was at its strongest.  Lemke performed 
extremely poorly in the south where his connection with Coughlin and the Catholic 
Church held little appeal.  He was unable to secure a place on the ballot in 5 southern 
states and he achieved more than 1 per cent only in Kentucky.  Overall he averaged 
0.2 per cent of the popular vote in the region equating to an average of 2,434 votes.  
Lemke’s extremely poor showing across the south suggests that Gerald Smith’s 
contribution to his campaign was negligible.8   
While Lemke might be expected to perform poorly in comparison with his major 
party challengers, a more interesting analysis can be made by comparing his results 
with those of the three significant third-party challenges since the Civil War – those of 
James Weaver (People’s Party) in 1892, Theodore Roosevelt (Progressive Party) in 
1912 and Robert La Follette (Progressive Party) in 1924.  The gap between Lemke’s 
average vote and that received by these candidates at state level is considerable.  In 
total, Lemke received 5 per cent or more of the popular vote in 5 states.  In 
comparison, the average significant third-party candidate received this level of the vote 
in 45 states.  Lemke’s candidacy clearly failed to connect with the electorate to the 
extent of these previous campaigns.9   
Given the gap in the total number of voters registered, it is more interesting to 
consider Lemke’s relative performance against the average third-party candidate as set 
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out in Figure 3.  To judge the relative performance of the candidates, the states have 
 
Figure 3: Analysis of the Relative Performance of the Average Significant Third-Party 
Candidate and the Union Party at State Level. 
 
been divided into quartiles ranked on the average votes received by the significant 
third-party candidate.  This generates a ranking of those states according to likelihood 
of voting for a significant third-party candidate.  Only the states in which the Union 
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taken with the percentage of the vote received by Lemke at state level.  The difference 
between the columns produces a comparison of relative performance.  This analysis 
suggests that there is a close correlation between those states both ‘less’ and ‘unlikely’ 
to vote for the average significant third-party candidate and the Union Party.  That 
Lemke would poll poorly in these states, therefore, is not a surprise.  What is more 
interesting is that Lemke’s performance was below expectations in those states ‘likely’ 
to support significant third-party candidates and, with the exception of North Dakota, 
considerably below expectations in those states where significant third-party 
candidates had previously found the greatest levels of support.10  Together these 
factors suggest that Lemke appealed more to a fringe vote than these previous 
significant third-party candidates. 
Lemke’s marginal appeal is sustained by contemporary analysis.  Immediately 
following Lemke’s defeat, Rodney Dutcher scrutinised the failure of the Union Party in 
the St. Petersburg Evening Independent.  Dutcher reported that ‘cagier veteran 
politicians’ had predicted that support for the new party would decline from the levels 
experienced upon its formation.  These politicians, he wrote, were in agreement that 
the Union Party would not be able to generate popular appeal amongst reform-minded 
voters unless it had a ‘central driving’ theme.  Lemke, as a ‘not so well known 
candidate,’ would struggle, Dutcher’s sources concluded, to achieve the same number 
of votes as Coughlin ‘hammering away for state ownership of banks’ or Townsend 
‘vehemently preaching his old age pension plan.’  In the absence of this clarity of 
purpose, Lemke’s ‘grudge fight’ simply failed to ‘rouse’ reform-minded members of the 
electorate.11   
The nature of the fringe voter attracted to Lemke’s campaign can be determined 
by an analysis of Gallup polling data.  Figure 4 brings together available voting data 
from the Gallup polls that might be used to suggest the likely gender, age and class of 
Union Party supporters.  Based on the four ‘special groups’ of voters that Gallup 
identified, and accepting that as the percentages included are so small it is only 
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possible to draw general conclusions, it can be suggested that Lemke voters were 
more likely to be in receipt of government relief than any of the other categories and to 
identify themselves as farmers.  They were least likely to be young. Indeed a poll 
published by Gallup on September 27, 1936, found that Lemke voters were twice as 
likely to be aged 45-54 or 55 and over as aged 21-24 or 25-34.12   
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Votes for Lemke in Gallup Polls amongst ‘Special Groups’ 
 
Gallup did not include race within its ‘special groups,’ but a poll conducted by 
Gallup in October 1936 found that, nationally, 69 per cent of African-American voters 
supported Roosevelt’s re-election.  Combined with Lemke’s poor electoral performance 
in the south and the large urban cities of the northeast, this suggests that Lemke held 
little appeal to African-American voters.13   
Finally, although Gallup did not break down Lemke’s voters by religion, an 
analysis of the election returns undertaken by Samuel Lubell revealed that outside of 
North Dakota, where Lemke’s support was particularly strong amongst the German 
Protestant population, he received more than 10 per cent of the vote in only thirty-nine 
counties nationally.  Of these, twenty-one were in counties with a majority Catholic 
population.  The only four cities where Lemke got more than 5 per cent of the vote 
were also heavily Catholic.  In Cincinnati, Lemke’s best showing of 12 per cent came 
from the heavily Catholic Price Hill.  To place these results within context, however, 
Gallup polls demonstrated that Roosevelt received the support of 78 per cent of 
Catholics nationally.  Lemke’s candidacy might have proved popular amongst certain 
parts of the Catholic population, but despite Coughlin’s erstwhile popularly, only 
amongst a very small proportion of the Catholic electorate.14   
Gallup 'Special Groups'
% of vote in 
August 16 
poll
% of vote in 
August 30 
poll
% of vote in 
September 
13 poll





Farmer 3.4 5 - 4.5 4.3
Young (21-24) 2.2 2 - 2.3 2.2
Women 2.3 3.4 - 2.9 2.9
Relief 4.2 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.1
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 This analysis suggests that, based on the data drawn from these various 
sources, and accepting that this can create only a very general picture, the ‘typical’ 
Lemke supporter was likely to be either a middle-aged, white, western, Protestant 
farmer or a northeastern, middle-aged, white Catholic in receipt of federal relief.  This 
picture of a ‘typical’ Union Party supporter fits well with the general appeal of Lemke, 
his backers and the central agricultural, pension and broader economic and social 
reforms contained within the Union Party platform.   These would be voters who had 
been hit hard by the effects of the Depression.  As older, white members of the 
electorate, they had possibly lost secure jobs and even their savings.  That they were 
also likely to be continuing to claim federal relief suggests that they had yet to feel the 
benefits of the gradual return to prosperity brought about by the Second New Deal.   
This view of a ‘typical’ Lemke voter is further enhanced and consolidated by an 
additional set of data gathered by Gallup across a broad range of political and social 
questions.  Figure 5 sets out the responses received by Gallup in a number of surveys 
undertaken in 1936 where the respondents were asked to identify their political 
alignment.  The results present a striking picture.  Union Party supporters were more 
  
Figure 5: Comparison of Views of Lemke Voters with Those of the Major Political 
Parties in Political and Social Issues According to Gallup Polls. 
 
likely than those of both either major political parties to support unions and less likely to 
trust politicians in relation to a decision to intervene in foreign wars.  They were also 
overwhelmingly supportive of limiting political inference in running national services like 
Gallup Political and Social Polls












In favour of Labour Unions
85 2 20
In favour of a national referendum before Congress can 
declare war 86 16 18
In favour of the pension element of Social Security
73 -9 23
In favour of the Post Office Department being put 
under the Civil Service 87 3 -1
In favour of 2nd Roosevelt Administration being more 
liberal than the 1st 50 31 46
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the Post Office.  Together these polling results suggest that the ‘typical’ Lemke 
supporter was generally more suspicious of those in positions of power, be they 
politicians or employers, than those of the major parties.  This sense of alienation and 
suspicion reinforces the general picture created by the analysis in Figure 4, and is 
further enhanced by the responses to the final two polling questions.  Lemke 
supporters were overwhelmingly supportive of the steps taken through Social Security 
to provide a pension for elderly Americans, sustaining the view that these were likely 
voters to be sympathetic to the safety net provided by the Second New Deal.  Finally, 
and most tellingly, 50 per cent of Lemke supporters desired the second Roosevelt 
administration to be more liberal than his first.  This was an overwhelming 31 per cent 
higher than supporters of the Democratic Party.15  This again supports the notion than 
Lemke’s supporters were more likely than those of the major parties to be on the 
fringes of the political spectrum.  They were likely those most resentful about the loss 
of status they had suffered due to the worst effects of the Depression, but also those 
who were least likely to have felt the benefit of the return to prosperity.  Equally, they 
were likely those who recognised the benefits of the safety net provided by the federal 
government to support them in these difficult times, but were also likely most 
suspicious of politicians and figures of higher status that they believed had unjustly 
caused their current desperate situation.  As historian James Shenton concluded, the 
Union Party had become the representative of a group of people ‘alienated not only 
from American society, and from the New Deal and its leader, but also from their own 
church and its priesthood.’16  The discontented minority that voted for Lemke did not 
represent the average American in 1936.  Why then did the Union Party lack in appeal 
to the average American voter?  The answer provides the key to understanding the 
Union Party’s failure in the 1936 presidential election. 
The Union Party’s campaign in 1936 was full of drama, incident and 
entertainment, with the press recording all the colourful speeches of Coughlin and his 
erstwhile allies.  These dramatic oratorical displays, however, failed to connect with the 
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electorate.  Roosevelt defined the election as a referendum on the success of the New 
Deal and his opponents, offering only a limited alternative and marred by excessive 
hyperbole, struggled on the campaign trail.  On Election Day, Lemke’s appeal was 
limited to a disgruntled minority.  A number of additional factors, both constitutional and 
political, contributed to the third party’s failure.   
The principal reason for the failure of the Union Party was the success of the 
New Deal.  Fighting from the fringes of the political spectrum, the Union Party and its 
backers naturally limited their appeal amongst the electorate.  In contrast, Roosevelt’s 
positive, centralist campaign consolidated support for the New Deal and drew together 
sections of the electorate unconvinced by his opponents’ negative campaigns.  The 
nature of the mass coalition of voters established in support of the Second New Deal is 
revealed by an analysis of Gallup opinion polls undertaken amongst key voter groups 
between July and October 1936.  In addition to the majority of farmers (51.3 per cent) 
supporting Roosevelt’s re-election, Gallup found majority support for his candidacy 
amongst workers (64.7 per cent), women (51.4 per cent) and young voters (57.4 per 
cent).  Like farmers, these voters had benefited directly from Second New Deal 
legislation providing jobs, union recognition and worker rights; federal relief and 
employment programmes to feed and support families; and federal assistance to stay 
in school or attend college.17  As well as expanding and consolidating Democratic 
support amongst these traditional producer and consumer groups, the success of the 
Second New Deal had helped Roosevelt to extend his support amongst African-
American voters and the new category of ‘Relief’ voters – that mass of unemployed 
voters sustained through sources of federal relief that had put in place by the New Deal 
legislation.   
In 1932, despite the national rejection of Hoover, African-American voters had 
remained loyal to the party of Lincoln.  Indeed, given the southern-dominated 
Democratic Party’s continued antipathy towards the black vote, they expected little 
from Roosevelt.  However, the social legislation passed in the Second New Deal was 
242 
 
colour-blind; as a result, African-Americans, who counted amongst their population 
some of the poorest of the nation’s citizens, received substantial assistance in the form 
of relief payments, federal employment, farm subsidies, unemployment insurance and 
pensions, which transformed both their economic position and their political loyalties.  
As a consequence, Gallup found in October 1936 that 69 per cent of African-American 
voters supported Roosevelt’s re-election.18  This shift of the African-American vote 
alone was enough to alter voting patterns.  However, when combined with the so-called 
‘great migration’ of African-American voters, when millions of poor blacks had left the 
rural south during the Depression to seek opportunities – including unimpeded voting 
rights – in the nation’s largest cities, it had a transformative effect on the electoral 
popularity of the Democratic Party, especially in the urban northeast.19  Gallup reported 
that Roosevelt enjoyed the majority of support in eleven of the nation’s largest cities, 
from San Francisco to Chicago to New York.20  
Finally, and decisively, the success of the Second New Deal had brought a 
new, amorphous mass of voters out in support of the president, drawn from all racial, 
gender and class groups: the ‘Reliefer’ vote.  Gallup found that Roosevelt’s support 
amongst those in receipt of federal relief far outweighed that amongst any other 
category of voter, increasing from an already overwhelming 75.9 per cent at the start of 
the campaign to 78.8 per cent at the close. The introduction of Social Security 
payments from January 1937, announced during the final stages of the presidential 
campaign, was a powerful demonstration of the transformative effect that the New Deal 
had brought to a broad spectrum of the American electorate, from this new mass of 
unemployed members of the former middle classes who had lost everything in the 
Depression to the poorest white and African-American voters who had never had 
anything.  These 8 to 9 million individuals, each with first-hand experience of the New 
Deal safety net, readily heeded the president’s warning that only a vote for Roosevelt 
would protect their already vulnerable position in society, and they flocked to the polls 
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to defend it.  The combined power of this alliance of producers and consumers brought 
together in defence of the New Deal was overwhelming.21   
Such was the size of the shift in the electoral coalition on Election Day 1936 
that, although Emil Hurja had identified the emerging trends in his opinion polling, he 
had misinterpreted the final effects on the election results.  By underestimating how 
resilient Roosevelt’s core 1932 vote had remained in 1936, Hurja had inflated the size 
of the projected Union Party vote.  He had also misjudged the additional swing towards 
Roosevelt from former Republican voters particularly the African-American and labour 
vote.  In combination, these factors had produced the appearance of a close election.  
The reality, however, was significantly different.  At the final count, Roosevelt increased 
his majority over his Republican opponent by 5 million popular votes.22  ‘I am beginning 
to come up for air after the baptism by total submersion on Tuesday night last!’ 
Roosevelt wrote to his friend Josephus Daniels on November 9.  ‘The other fellow was 
the one who nearly drowned!’23  The removal of the overestimated Union Party vote 
alone turned the close election into a landslide.   
The irony for Lemke, Coughlin, Smith and Townsend, should they have been 
able to recognise it, was that the passage of much of the legislation that formed the 
Second New Deal, including the wealth redistribution taxes, labour laws and indeed 
Social Security itself, had threads that led directly back to the diverse plans proposed 
by their individual radical reform movements.  The results of the mid-term elections in 
November 1934, which saw the Democrats return to Congress with overwhelming and 
enhanced majorities in both houses, demonstrated the electorate’s demand for 
continued economic and social reform.  Moreover, an analysis of successful candidates 
shows that the electorate favoured a quickened pace of reform.  Representatives 
favouring the New Deal were more likely to be elected than those opposing it.  Where 
both candidates were in favour of reform, however, it was generally the more radical 
who won victory.  When the new Senate convened in 1935, it is estimated that a third 
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of members favoured the passage of more radical social and economic reform than 
that contained within the president’s existing legislative plans.24   
In the light of this pressure from the electorate, it was not surprising that the 
administration responded by absorbing elements of its opponents’ radical reform 
proposals and transforming them to make them relevant to its agenda of industrial 
recovery.  Roosevelt had thus accommodated demands for liberal social reform within 
the New Deal not by radicalising it, but by strengthening its central mission to restore 
and rehabilitate the economic cycle.  The president’s positive, decisive and swift 
actions rendered his opponents largely impotent.  Long’s agenda had been effectively 
emptied of political material, while Coughlin’s call for worker unionisation and 
Townsend’s pension plans had been co-opted by Roosevelt.  These, and the other 
measures that formed the Second New Deal, had brought about quick, sustained and 
dramatic results: employment levels began to rise and the economy was placed on a 
stronger footing.  By June 1936, as a result of the $5 billion of federal funding allocated 
to support New Deal agencies during the first Roosevelt administration, unemployment 
had dropped by about 4 million from its highpoint in early 1933, and 6 million new jobs 
had been created.25  In this circumstance, it is not surprising that the platforms of both 
the Union and Democratic parties shared many common threads; yet, seeking to 
demonstrate their distance from and opposition to the president, the Union Party 
adopted a decisive, assertive, often negative and confrontational tone that placed itself 
and its reform proposals actively on the fringes of the political spectrum.  This naturally 
limited the appeal of the Union Party to a mass of moderate voters who turned instead 
to the president.26  With its positive agenda of economic and social reform effectively 
absorbed within the Democratic platform, the Union Party was rendered irrelevant as a 
significant political movement even before the moment of its creation.  As the St. 
Petersburg Evening Independent concluded, ‘The only appeal the Union Party 
conceivably could have, was to the discontented, “underprivileged” elements.  
Roosevelt made his appeal to such groups and it was too bad for Lemke.’27   
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The second reason for the failure of the Union Party was its overwhelming 
structural weakness as a political party.  Despite Lemke’s long-term ambitions to found 
a new party, the reality was that little had been done to lay the groundwork for the 
foundation and operation of the Union Party in the weeks ahead of its formation.  
Townsend, Smith and Coughlin had exhausted every possible outlet for their opposition 
to the president before they had finally been forced into the decision that, following 
William Borah’s failed campaign to win the Republican presidential nomination, the only 
remaining option was to back their own presidential candidate.  Reporters were joking 
when they commented that the presidential nominating convention of the Union Party 
must have been held in a phone booth, but the joke reflected a serious observation 
that, up to the moment that Coughlin announced his backing for Lemke’s candidacy, no 
one outside of a very restricted circle had any knowledge of the existence of the Union 
Party.28  This short-term, ad hoc approach did not enable the proper planning to take 
place that was necessary to establish the national apparatus for the party to allow it to 
function as an effective electoral machine.  Indeed, the delays and prevarications that 
pre-dated the formation of the Union Party had already dealt it a significant blow.  
Reflecting upon the launch of the Union Party, the New York Times commented upon 
the difficulties it would have in participating in the 1936 election.  ‘Only nineteen of the 
forty-eight states permit a new party to participate as such in an election immediately 
after organising,’ they wrote, ‘and some of the nineteen have deadlines which have 
now passed.’29  Accordingly, the Union Party did not appear on the presidential ballot in 
Kansas, Oklahoma and West Virginia.  In addition, Lemke was eventually only able to 
find a way onto the Michigan and New Jersey ballots when the Union Party ticket 
received the endorsement of local political organisations that had filed before the 
deadlines.30  ‘It is easier to announce a new national party than achieve it,’ commented 
the New York Times.31 
The problems faced by any new political party in the American electoral system 
were magnified by the major differences in the intentions of Lemke and his political 
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backers.  Lemke had embarked upon his new endeavour based on his fundamental 
belief that the failings of both the Democratic and Republican parties had led to the 
nation’s economic downfall.  He believed America could be restored only under a new 
doctrinal political party intended, Lemke announced, to ‘save democracy and put a 
permanent end to the so-called depression’ – the Union Party.32  In contrast, 
Townsend, Smith and Coughlin had come together in a loose, tentative union to back 
the formation of the Union Party as a protest against the continuation of the Roosevelt 
presidency.  ‘When the third party did come up, it was merely a protest,’ Coughlin later 
informed historian Sheldon Marcus.33   
Coughlin and Townsend had no desire to hand Lemke either control of, or drain 
funding from, their successful independent radical reform movements.  They also 
recognised that it was difficult for them to continue their campaign of protest against the 
president without a legitimate alternative candidate to offer to the electorate.  Lemke’s 
candidacy provided this alternative.  In this circumstance, they had no interest in 
supporting the formal establishment of the Union Party as a legitimate political party.  
Indeed, both Townsend and Coughlin went to great lengths in both public and private 
to distance themselves and their movements formally from the new party.  For 
example, in Coughlin’s July 6, 1936, Social Justice editorial, he reassured his 
supporters that the NUSJ was not dissolving and that none of its fundamental 
principles were being altered or sacrificed as a result of support for Lemke’s candidacy.  
At no time, Coughlin concluded, ‘was it ever contemplated that the National Union 
should become an adjunct to any political party.’34  On this basis, Coughlin was able to 
engineer the NUSJ’s endorsement for Lemke’s candidacy – but explicitly ruled out any 
support (including financial) for the Union Party itself.35  In contrast, internal political 
dissent within the OARP against Townsend’s leadership and his relationship with 
Gerald Smith led to the rejection of the Union Party and its presidential candidate.  
Thereafter, Townsend and Smith vowed personally to support Lemke’s candidacy but, 
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isolated from the OARP, they did not have access to the machinery or funds required 
to back their campaigns.36    
The absence of organisational or financial support for the Union Party from the 
OARP and the NUSJ sharply intensified the challenges faced by Lemke to establish it 
as a fully functioning, independent political party.  Lemke announced the formation of 
the Union Party on June 18, 1936, yet it was not until three weeks later that his close 
friend, John Nystul, as party chairman, formally opened a small party office in Chicago.  
Working alongside a team of three drawn from Lemke’s close circle of friends in North 
Dakota, all lacking experience in running a national political campaign, Nystul sought to 
put in place the organisational structures required of a new political party.37   He was, 
however, severely constrained by the lack of funding.  Nystul had written to William 
Skeeles, Lemke’s private secretary in Washington, D.C., in mid-July 1936 complaining 
that he was ‘desperately in need of funds.’38  Despite his subsequent public call for 
‘dollars for the poor man’s party,’ in total the Union Party raised only $92,033 over the 
course of the election campaign.39  This was simply not enough to fulfil Lemke’s 
ambitions.   
In contrast to the Union Party’s paucity of funding, confidential information 
obtained by Democratic Chairman Jim Farley revealed that money orders to a total 
value of $324,105 had been paid into the accounts of the National Union of Social 
Justice at the post office in Royal Oak, Michigan, between January and June 1936 
alone.40  While Coughlin enjoyed healthy financial support, however, the candidate he 
endorsed had no such luxury.  Accounts submitted by Lemke to Congress reveal the 
pitiful personal contributions he received (and subsequently turned over the Union 
Party) between July and October 1936.   His largest single donation was for $5,000 
from independently wealthy NUSJ organiser Philip Johnson and his companion Alan 
Blackburn.  The second-largest donation amounted to $100.  The remaining 
contributions often amounted to no more than a dollar.41  These contributions were not 
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enough to fund Lemke’s expenses and having mortgaged his house to obtain 
additional funds, he was left with a $7,000 personal debt he struggled to repay.42  
One immediate consequence of the Union Party’s difficult financial situation 
was a decision not to run candidates for the congressional elections.  Instead, Lemke 
announced that the ‘Union Party will be nonpartisan in the coming election.  It would 
support those members of Congress who ‘voted for progressive legislation’ and it 
would do this ‘regardless of party or party affiliations.’43   In the circumstances, this was 
a logical decision, but it had consequences for the establishment of the Union Party as 
an independent political party.  Local and regional operations provide a political party 
with the communication structure to feed information from the centre to local 
operatives, who in turn spread the message out to the electorate.  The election of local 
and regional candidates on a third-party ticket demonstrates that the people believe 
these candidates can achieve something for them at a local level.  By their actions, 
these local and regional party officials increase the legitimacy of the national party.  
Lemke, however, had few local campaign workers whose own political futures were 
tied to the success of the national party.  Where Nystul was able to establish local 
‘Lemke for President’ clubs, they were made up of relatively ineffective political 
amateurs.  Where these local organisations chose independently of the national 
headquarters to run congressional candidates, they were often politically 
inexperienced, (for example, Lemke’s vice-presidential running mate, labour lawyer 
Thomas O’Brien who also ran for the Senate in Massachusetts) or undesirable, 
(notoriously corrupt former Mayor of Chicago William Thompson, who ran for Governor 
of Illinois).  Without a local infrastructure to legitimise its national activity, the Union 
Party appeared transitory and unstable.  This limited its appeal to the electorate.44   
The problems faced by the ineffectual national office in organising the Union 
Party on a national, regional or local basis were exacerbated by the breakdown in the 
loose union of its political backers.  The highly ambitious Gerald Smith had been the 
thread that pulled the leaders of the independent radical reform movements together.  
249 
 
Smith’s grandstanding oratorical displays at the OARP and NUSJ conventions, 
however, concerned both Coughlin and the Executive Board of the OARP.  Concerned 
that Smith was attempting to use the tentative union as a way of usurping the power of 
the established leadership of both movements, steps were taken to eradicate his 
threat.  In July 1936, the Executive Board of the OARP sought to remove Smith from 
his directorship, but found Townsend resistant.  Instead, they isolated the Baptist 
preacher by imposing strict new limits on Townsend’s authority over the movement.45  
The following month, Coughlin, having no formal relationship with Smith, protected his 
interests by terminating the political union between the three men.46  These actions 
removed any hope that Lemke or Nystul might have had about developing a centrally 
coordinated strategy for the Union Party or Lemke’s campaign.  The union having been 
dissolved, any notion that Lemke had central responsibility for his campaign was 
removed.  Coughlin, Townsend, Smith and Lemke embarked on four entirely  
uncoordinated, separate campaigns.  The Union Party central office was able to do 
little more than issue reports on speech-making schedules and distribute a few 
pamphlets describing the party’s platform and candidate.47   
The effects of the weak national, regional and local structures of the Union 
Party were quickly evident.  Lacking a mature network of workers at the grassroots, 
Nystul was forced to depend upon his skeleton network of amateurish Lemke Clubs or 
favours gained from local NUSJ units, whose volunteers themselves tended to lack the 
experience of those working for the traditional political parties.48  This scattered, 
inexperienced, uncoordinated network was not an effective political machine.  This 
weakness manifested itself in two distinct ways: firstly in problems accessing the ballot 
and secondly in generating and retaining support for Lemke’s candidacy.   
By the time that Nystul had established party headquarters in Chicago in mid-
July 1936, the deadlines for accessing the state ballots in Kansas, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, West Virginia and Michigan had already passed.  Nystul’s inability to 
establish a functioning party organisation impaired the party’s ability to gain access to 
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the remaining state ballots.  By mid-August, Nystul had appointed a network of local 
supporters with responsibility for placing the Union Party on the state ballot.   None 
were established political figures, and none had experience of running a state-level 
political campaign.  Often an individual had responsibility for multiple states; for 
example, Luke Lea of Savannah, Georgia, was handed responsibility for all of the 
party’s operations in the south, and George Iverson of Baltimore, Maryland, for much of 
the party’s operations in the northeastern states.  There is no evidence from Lemke’s 
papers that either of these men had the experience required to undertake this essential 
task.  Furthermore, the limited influence of these individuals is reflected in an exchange 
between Herbert Swett, Director of the Union Party in Idaho, and William Skeeles in 
Lemke’s private office.  Swett wrote to Skeeles in late July seeking advice on the 
names of ‘contact men’ for the party across the far western states, only to receive a 
reply from Skeeles in early August that he had ‘no information regarding those who 
have indicated a willingness to assist in this campaign.’49  The lack of basic knowledge 
even at the highest levels of the Union Party that this correspondence reveals is 
evidence of considerable ineffectiveness of the organisation.   
Co-ordination of the nominating petitions required for the Union Party to access 
the ballot in a number of states placed a strain upon Nystul’s local party organisers.  
Despite the best efforts of his inexperienced local workers, in the absence of a strong, 
well-financed, centrally co-ordinated party machine, they found the task an almost 
impossible challenge.  In Townsend’s home state of California, local activists failed to 
gather the signatures of the required 118,040 registered voters in time for the deadline.  
In Ohio, 328,000 signatures – half of which had to be obtained across 44 of the 88 
counties – needed to be gathered by the first week of August if the party wished to be 
registered on the ballot.  In the event, following an exceptional effort, the party gathered 
282,000 signatures.  In September, only after a month of further pressure and expense, 
Lemke was awarded access to the ballot as an independent candidate.50  While New 
York state law required third parties to gather 12,000 signatures, it further stipulated 
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that this had to include a least 50 from each of the 62 counties.  The Union Party filed 
petitions including almost 33,000 signatures by the deadline, but missed the required 
target in 4 upstate counties.  Following an intense and costly legal battle, on October 
23, less than 2 weeks before the election, the Democrat-dominated State Court of 
Appeals formally barred the Union Party from the ballot.  The significance of this New 
York victory to the Roosevelt campaign was demonstrated in Emil Hurja’s final electoral 
forecast released on 25 October (with polling undertaken before Lemke’s withdrawal) 
which showed Roosevelt winning the state and its 47 electoral votes by 0.1 per cent.  
Lenke’s removal from the ballot effectively guaranteed the state for the Democrats.  
The challenge to access the ballot was a major distraction for Lemke and his 
colleagues from the main focus of his campaign.51   
The inexperience and inherent weakness of the Union Party’s organisation was 
easily exploited by Lemke’s opponents.  In mid-July 1936, a conference of Democratic 
Party state chairmen in New York agreed to take advantage of the Union Party’s lack of 
effective state level operations by registering candidates pre-emptively under the new 
party’s name.52  This policy, alongside state laws restricting ballot access, resulted in 
Lemke eventually being listed on the ballot under the titles of ‘Union Progressive Party’ 
in Illinois, ‘Royal Oak Party’ in Pennsylvania, ‘Third Party’ in Michigan, ‘National Union 
for Social Justice’ in New Jersey, and as an ‘Independent’ in Oregon, Ohio and South 
Dakota.  Although there is no direct correlation between Lemke’s relative electoral 
success and the party title he appeared under on the ballot (he achieved 4 per cent or 
more of the vote in Michigan, Ohio and Oregon), the Union Party’s inability to achieve a 
consistent national public profile enhanced the general perception of its ephemeral 
nature and confused voters.53    
As polling day approached and each state’s deadline passed, the news became 
more disheartening.  In all, the Union Party would not be represented on the ballot in 
14 states (Figure 6).  Some were states – including California and Louisiana, with their 
thousands of Townsend and Long supporters – where Lemke might have received 
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substantial popular support.  In 3 of the states where Lemke was unable to secure a 
place on the ballot (Kansas, Maryland and West Virginia), Hurja had estimated in his 
October 25 report that the Union Party would receive between 3 and 10 per cent of the 
votes cast.54  The Union Party managed to appear under its own name in only 28 
states.55  ‘Tricky laws devised by the machinations of political bosses,’ complained 
Social Justice, ‘have sought to make it impossible to place a third political party on the 
ballot.’56  These problems in reaching the ballot considerably reduced Lemke’s chance 
of electoral success, thus reducing further his appeal amongst the electorate. 
 
Figure 6: States where the Union Party Did Not Feature on the Ballot. 
 
 Lemke might have been able to overcome some of the difficulties faced by his 
organisation if he had proven an inspirational politician, able to draw the electorate to 
his cause by his personality and oratorical excellence alone.  Lemke was, however, a 
poor candidate for national office.  His suits un-ironed and his chin unshaved, he 
lacked the expressive, self-assured personality and suave appearance of the 
aristocratic Roosevelt or, indeed, the ordered neatness of Landon.  Attempts by Lemke 
to use his prairie farmer appearance to his advantage – ‘The best president you ever 
had was almost as homely looking as I – Abraham Lincoln,’ he once commented to a 
crowd of supporters – only served to place him in a more unfavourable contrast.  
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Lemke’s poor appearance was not countered by his speaking style.  Flat and 
monotonous, Lemke’s speech before the Townsend convention was described by 
writer H.L. Mencken described as ‘dull from end to end.’57  Lemke was, however, able 
to connect with audiences in the agricultural states, and in mid-August, the Farm 
Journal reported that a straw poll of farmers in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin 
indicated that the Union Party candidate might win 25 per cent of the vote.  Beyond this 
constituency though, the candidate generated little appeal.58   
Neither were Lemke’s personal failings in any way compensated for by a 
charismatic vice-presidential candidate.  Thomas C. O’Brien was a political unknown 
who had effectively been chosen for Lemke by Coughlin in the absence of any 
alternative established political figures willing to join the party.  Lemke had never 
previously met O’Brien and did little to communicate with him following the 
announcement of his candidacy.  On the rare occasions that Lemke and O’Brien 
shared a platform, O’Brien, though always gracious towards his running mate, acted 
more as a spokesperson for Coughlin than an advocate for the Union Party.  This did 
little to help Lemke.  With O’Brien eventually choosing to focus on his campaign for the 
Senate seat in Massachusetts, Lemke was forced to take the full burden of 
responsibility for his campaign and took to the stump alone.59  Reflecting later on the 
failure of the Union Party, Gerald Smith laid the majority of the blame with Lemke: ‘He 
was a complete composite of unattractiveness.’60   
The combination of weak presidential and vice-presidential candidates with a 
barely functional national, regional and local party organisation made it extremely 
difficult for the Union Party to generate and sustain support for Lemke’s candidacy at a 
local level.  Lacking established party loyalty, potential Lemke voters had no formal 
affiliation with the Union Party to bind them to his candidacy and as a consequence 
were vulnerable to approaches from his opponents.  In Ohio, for example, building 
upon the NUSJ and OARP conventions held in Cleveland in July and August 1936, a 
supreme effort co-ordinated by local activists had gathered 282,000 signatures on a 
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petition to establish Lemke’s place on the ballot as an independent candidate in 
November.61  However, the Union Party petition, as a public document, provided a tool 
for Democratic Party workers to bolster support for the president.  A local activist, 
Frank Kloeb, recognised that the petition provided the party with an unparalleled 
source of information on Lemke’s supporters.  Working with support from the DNC, 
using the names and addresses compiled on the petition, Democratic state workers 
targeted individual signatories in an attempt to persuade them to back Roosevelt’s re-
election.62  By mid-September, this direct approach at ground level was bearing fruit, 
and Jim Farley received a report that, following questioning of their intentions, ‘quite a 
number of Democrats [had] signed the Lemke petition under the wrong impression.’  
They now realised that ‘they should not have done so,’ and would not vote for Lemke.63  
A Social Justice editorial expressed the intense frustration felt by Union Party activists 
at the actions taken by the DNC: 
There is a fairly widespread belief among American voters, a 
belief fostered by both major parties, that a third-party 
movement has no place in our political scheme.  Yet the 
founders of our government set no limit upon the number or 
character of political parties.64 
The immature skeleton network of Union Party activists was, however, simply unable to 
counter the Democrats’ effective electoral machine and Lemke’s support slipped away.   
In October, even local Union Party officials were persuaded to sign a letter addressed 
to all petition signers, instructing them not to vote for Lemke.  ‘Don’t throw your vote 
away,’ it concluded.  ‘We urge you to vote for Roosevelt and a continuance of 
progressive government and prosperity.’65  Lemke’s total vote in Ohio in November 
equated to barely half of those who had signed his nominating petition.   
 These local efforts to shore up the vote for Roosevelt were replicated in other 
ways by non-partisan groups outside of the political system who favoured the 
president’s re-election.  The most notable of these was the Catholic Church.  Upon its 
launch, Coughlin’s NUSJ had initially generated support from Catholics across 
America.  Hearing the priest’s warnings that Roosevelt was ‘being driven by sinister 
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influences he does not fully comprehend,’ they rushed to support the priest and other 
large Catholic, anti-Communist organisations, such as the Catholic Daughters of 
America and the Holy Name Society, to denounce the supposed ‘Red Menace.’66  The 
established American Catholic hierarchy, however, was strongly opposed to Coughlin 
and his anti-Roosevelt message.  This was because much New Deal legislation, such 
as the National Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the labour policies, 
were seen to be in accord with papal encyclicals, and because of Roosevelt’s 
particularly liberal attitude towards the Catholic Church.  The president had rewarded 
the support of the Church by appointing many distinguished Catholics, such as Joseph 
Kennedy, inaugural Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Frank 
Murphy, Governor General of the Philippines, as trusted advisors in his first 
administration.67   
Upon the launch of the Union Party, concerned at the potential damage that 
Coughlin’s campaign against the president might have on Roosevelt’s support amongst 
Catholic voters, the American Catholic Church came to the president’s defence.  In July 
1936, Reverend Maurice Sheehy, Assistant to the Rector at Catholic University, 
informed the president’s personal secretary Margaret Lehand:  
At a meeting in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York last night, four 
bishops, three monsignori, another priest and I discussed the 
attack of Father Coughlin on the President.  We decided how 
this matter might be handled most effectively.  We have taken 
action.68 
Following this meeting, Sheehy took responsibility for a campaign to rally ordinary lay 
Catholics in favour of the Democratic campaign.  Sheehy played an important role in 
persuading the Catholic press to come out against Coughlin.  In late September, he 
reported to Roosevelt that ‘on the whole all Catholic publications, except a few 
disreputable and uncontrollable publications, are getting in line.’  Those who stubbornly 
remained in opposition were ‘being subject to the strongest possible influences’ and 
‘they will be curbed.’69  In addition, Sheehy toured the nation to encourage cardinals 
and bishops to denounce Coughlin’s actions publicly.70  Sheehy’s efforts translated into 
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significant actions in the Catholic heartlands where Coughlin found the majority of his 
support.  In Boston, Cardinal O’Connell instructed his clergy not to listen to Coughlin’s 
radio sermons.  In Minnesota, Archbishop John Gregory Murray issued an order that 
there were to be no more NUSJ meetings on church property.71  In Chicago, Cardinal 
Mundelein gathered all of the priests under his jurisdiction and, as Sheehy described it, 
took less than five minutes to ‘destroy’ Coughlin’s reputation.72  By October 1936, the 
effect of Sheehy’s pro-Roosevelt campaign was evident. Following a trip across the 
western states Sheehy wrote once again to Margaret LeHand to confirm ‘President 
Roosevelt is stronger than ever before.’  ‘There is a feeling prevalent among the priests 
that the priesthood through Father Coughlin has betrayed the president,’ he concluded, 
‘and some extraordinary things are being attempted to offset this betrayal.’  Sheehy’s 
actions, like those of Democratic Party workers in Ohio, assisted Roosevelt in 
sustaining his support and reduced Lemke’s electoral appeal.73   
With Lemke’s weak support vulnerable to external influence at the grassroots, 
the Union Party’s campaign was further undermined by the actions of the erstwhile 
union of its high-profile backers.  There is no evidence in Jim Farley’s private file notes 
or in the files of DNC that he was responsible for encouraging OARP executive 
member Gomer Smith to deliver his pro-Roosevelt, anti-Lemke platform speech at the 
organisation’s national convention.  There is evidence, however, that he had watched 
carefully the turn of events and was proactively and personally involved in the further 
actions taken by the disgruntled members of the OARP leadership once the convention 
had ended.  On July 20, the week following the OARP convention, at Farley’s invitation, 
Gomer Smith held a series of secret meetings with the Chairman of the DNC to agree a 
strategy for Townsend’s removal from the leadership of the movement.  Farley 
observed in his private diary that he found Smith ‘a very convincing fellow, extremely 
frank, confident of his ability, and one on whom you could rely.’74  The following week, 
Farley followed up Smith’s visit by meeting with Robert Clements, Townsend’s former 
colleague and co-founder of the OARP, whose evidence against the doctor had been 
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used by the Congressional Committee investigating the movement in May 1936 to 
discredit the pension leader.75  Thereafter, in early August, OARP executive members 
Smith, Clinton Wunder and J.B. Kiefer, and regional directors Nathan Roberts and 
William Parker denounced Townsend’s endorsement of Lemke and his continued 
support for Gerald Smith.  The dissenting directors joined with other disgruntled ex-
Townsendites as plaintiffs in a suit seeking the removal of Townsend as president of 
the organisation.76  The OARP’s National Secretary, Gilmour Young, conceded publicly 
that many club members had protested against Townsend’s leadership and that they 
had written pleas for national headquarters to abstain from continued involvement in 
national politics.77  The challenge climaxed in mid-October when Townsend, sensing 
that he was in danger of completely losing control of the organisation, used 
extraordinary powers vested in him as president to dissolve the OARP board and 
replaced it with an emergency national executive committee consisting of his closest 
and most loyal supporters.  The following week, the National Townsend Weekly called 
for all those who ‘cannot follow Dr. Townsend’s non-partisan leadership’ or ‘who are 
attempting to use the organisation for selfish and partisan purposes’ to be put out.78 
The extent of Townsend’s new lack of control was exemplified in August, when 
the local Townsend organisation in Idaho mounted a campaign against the re-election 
of William Borah that threatened to defeat the doctor’s trusted friend.  Borah’s 
comments regarding the potential weakness of the Townsend plan during his run for 
the Republican presidential nomination had angered the Idaho Townsend movement, 
and its director, Byron Defenbach, had entered the Republican Senatorial primary with 
the intention of defeating the respected insurgent.  Such was the strength of potential 
opposition that Borah considered withdrawing from the race.  ‘If I could have stepped 
out with ease, and dignity, I have preferred to have done so; in fact, I had resolved at 
one time to do so,’ he confided to one correspondent in July 1936.  Having resolved to 
fight on (‘regardless of his personal wishes’), Borah defeated Defenbach in the August 
primary, but the Townsendite determined to stand against him as an independent 
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candidate in the November election.79  Thereafter, it was only after two months of direct 
pressure that Townsend was able to engineer the removal of the OARP candidate from 
the November ballot. ‘As a result of a previous conversation between our mutual friend, 
Carl Bachmann, and myself I have been informed by our organization that Mr. 
Deffenbach is now out of the race,’ confirmed Edward Margett, state manager of the 
California OARP, to Borah in early October.80  Although Townsend had ultimately 
regained control, there can be no doubt that the public battle over leadership, and 
supported in private by the DNC, had affected his respect amongst his members and 
his political influence.  His reputation damaged by the insurrection of his national 
leadership, Townsend had offered little positive momentum to Lemke’s campaign.  
 Townsend’s struggle to re-establish control over the leadership of the OARP 
had one other significant negative effect on Lemke’s campaign.  Gerald Smith, 
recognising that his efforts to usurp Coughlin’s and Townsend’s leadership had failed, 
abandoned the OARP and set out to capitalise upon his oratorical displays at the 
OARP and NUSJ conventions by founding his own political movement.  Without any 
resources or organisational network to depend upon, Smith’s subsequent tour of the 
southern states generated little interest in the press or the wider public.  His October 
announcement of the formation of the quasi-fascist ‘Committee of One Million’ to lead a 
revolution to seize the White House equally failed to take hold of the public’s 
imagination and saw him both formally rejected by Lemke and ejected from the 
OARP.81  The St. Petersburg Evening Independent was blunt in its assessment of 
Smith’s contribution to Lemke’s campaign.  Smith’s ‘efforts to assume the late Huey 
Long’s mantle have been funnier than successful,’ they commented.  Furthermore, his 
‘speeches do not make sense and his call for a Fascist army of a million men to handle 
the ballot boxes has pancaked along with the caller.’82   
 As the pressure of the presidential campaign began to mount, Coughlin began 
to exhibit similarly unpredictable tendencies to his erstwhile colleague.  As the Evening 
Independent concluded, ‘Father Coughlin’s prestige declined perceptibly during the 
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campaign.’  The cause of Coughlin’s decline could be attributed, the paper commented, 
directly to the negative response he had received, particularly from amongst the 
Catholic voters whom he had previously counted amongst his staunchest supporters, 
following his criticism of the president as ‘a liar’ and ‘anti-God’ as well as his 
‘conspicuous smugness’ and ‘arrogance.’83  As well as a cause for embarrassment to 
the American Catholic Church, Coughlin’s comments and high-profile actions in 
opposition to the president raised diplomatic concerns at the highest levels within the 
Vatican.   
The United States had not established formal diplomatic relationships with the 
Vatican upon its establishment as a nation-state in 1929.  However, in 1935, when 
Joseph Kennedy raised the possibility with Roosevelt, he found the president open on 
the question.84  Coughlin later informed Gerald Smith that he had been informed by an 
emissary from the Vatican, Monsignor Joseph P. Hurley, of the conditions for these 
discussions going ahead.  ‘The arm of Jim Farley is long,’ Coughlin said.  ‘Mr. 
Roosevelt has served notice on the Pope that he will not give the Church a fraternal 
delegate in Rome unless Father Coughlin is silenced.’85  In accordance with this 
statement, in late August 1936, Coughlin’s superior, Bishop of Detroit Michael 
Gallagher, was called to Rome to defend the political actions of his priest.  The formal 
action that could be taken, however, was strictly restrained.  Officially the Church could 
do nothing to stop Coughlin doing or saying anything he wanted, as under canon law 
each priest was directly under the control of his bishop.  Fortunately for Coughlin, 
Gallagher was one of his strongest supporters.  Though the Church had no formal 
mechanisms to control Gallagher’s or Coughlin’s actions, they recognised the effect a 
public shaming would have on the two men, and excitement was generated in the 
press around the reason for Gallagher’s visit to Rome.  Speaking to reporters, the 
bishop admitted that he had been informed by Vatican prelates, including the Pope’s 
closest political adviser Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzard, that Coughlin needed to tone 
down his activities for the good of the Church.86  This was followed by a statement 
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published in the Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano, in early September that 
rebuked Coughlin for his violent criticism of the Roosevelt administration.87  When 
Coughlin dismissed the story as ‘one newspaper’s opinion,’ unusually, the Vatican 
issued a release directly to all press organisations, reiterating the criticism of the priest 
and emphasising that the statement represented the official Vatican line on the issue.88  
Returning from Rome, Gallagher remained unmoved.  He believed that Coughlin’s 
actions were legitimate and, as long as the priest continued to respect the limitations 
he had placed upon him, his campaign should continue.  ‘It’s the voice of God that 
comes to you from the great orator of Royal Oak,’ he told a crowd of Coughlin 
supporters waiting at the quayside.  ‘Rally round it!’89 
With the position of the Vatican publicly clear, the administration sought to 
consolidate Roosevelt’s support among Catholic voters and exploit the active dissent 
emerging from within the American Catholic Church to Coughlin’s continued campaign 
against the president by moving to formally discredit and isolate the priest from lay 
Catholic voters.  In mid-September, Dean Al Fange, Chairman of the Democratic 
National Campaign Committee, Foreign Language Citizens’ Department, wrote to Jim 
Farley expressing the view that: 
Those who have the interests of the president, the Church and 
the internal peace of the nation at heart should strive to bring 
about an authoritative declaration from…the Church to the 
effect that [it] is not in politics; that it is not supporting any 
particular candidate; and that Father Coughlin is speaking only 
for himself.90   
Subsequently, on October 8, 1936, in a national radio link-up, Monsignor John A. Ryan 
took to the air on behalf of the DNC with a speech entitled ‘Roosevelt Safeguards 
America.’  In his positions as Rector of Catholic University and Director of the Social 
Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Ryan had become 
one of the best-known Catholic priests in the United States.  In the early years of the 
Roosevelt presidency, Ryan had been an outspoken critic of New Deal legislation, 
suggesting that its reforms were not as radical as those advocated by the papal 
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encyclical Quadragemiso Anno.  His views apparently aligned with those of Coughlin, 
and in December 1933, the New York Times published excerpts of a private letter 
between the two priests in which Ryan described Coughlin as ‘a messenger of God, 
donated to the American people for the purpose of rectifying the outrageous mistakes 
they have made in the past.’  By 1936, however, Coughlin’s turn towards radicalism 
had broken the relationship between the two men, and Ryan’s speech became a public 
retraction of his earlier support.  Ryan believed it essential that the impression that 
Coughlin spoke on behalf of the Catholic Church should be ended.91   
 Ryan began his address by emphatically denying that Roosevelt or any of his 
advisors were under the influence of Communism; it was men like Roosevelt and his 
New Deal agents, he said, who had ‘frustrated the growth of Communism in the United 
States.’  Ryan then moved to challenge Coughlin’s economic theories.  If enacted, he 
said, ‘they would prove disastrous to the American people.’  Despite Coughlin’s claims, 
Ryan insisted that his proposals for radical economic and social reform found ‘no 
support in the encyclicals of either Pope Leo XIII or Pope Pius XI.’92  Indeed, he 
concluded, the encyclicals were designed to prevent exactly the kind of class 
antagonism that Coughlin was attempting to create.93  Ryan closed with an 
impassioned plea for Roosevelt’s re-election, asking his listeners not to vote ‘against 
the man who has shown a deeper and more sympathetic understanding of your needs 
and who has brought about more fundamental legislation for labour and for social 
justice than any other president in American history.’94   
Ryan’s speech completely discredited Coughlin.  Roosevelt wrote to him in 
thanks that it was ’very heartening to know that I have so valiant a vindicator as 
yourself.’95  Farley wrote that he considered it ‘one of the most outstanding talks of the 
campaign,’ then increased the impact of Ryan’s address by distributing thousands of 
copies across the Catholic centres of America.96  Molly Dewson, Chairwoman of the 
Women’s Division of the Democratic National Campaign Committee, wrote to one local 
activist in Ohio, ‘I am sending you some of Monsignor Ryan’s address.  I believe they 
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will be useful to you in holding the Catholic campaign workers to Roosevelt.’97  Finally, 
Maurice Sheehy circulated copies of the speech to members of Congress.98  So highly 
did Roosevelt think of Ryan’s action that, following his November victory, he personally 
invited the priest to give the benediction at his second inauguration.99   
Seeking to capitalise upon the favourable statements published in Osservatore 
Romano and the positive reception of Father Ryan’s address, Roosevelt moved to 
restore formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican, extending a private invitation for 
Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, Papal Secretary of State (and future Pope Pius XII), to visit 
the United States.100  Pacelli’s visit in mid-October proved a significant positive boost to 
Roosevelt’s appeal to Catholic voters.  Although the Vatican was at pains to point out 
that the cardinal’s visit had no connection with Coughlin’s ongoing political activities, 
the press and the public drew a different conclusion.  Pacelli’s refusal to answer 
questions on the topic only served to confirm these suspicions.  Pacelli’s public 
presence in the United States reinforced the Vatican’s statements opposing Coughlin’s 
activities and reinforced the messages publicly issued on behalf of the American 
Catholic Church by Father Ryan.101  Meeting on November 5, 1936, at Roosevelt’s 
personal residence in Hyde Park, New York, the president reached agreement with 
Pacelli to appoint to the Vatican a representative with full diplomatic status.102   
The active support from the Vatican and the American Catholic Church for 
Roosevelt increased the polarisation of Coughlin’s campaign.  Coughlin’s voice 
became shrill, his statements increasingly violent – which served only to reinforce 
Roosevelt’s argument against him and distance him from moderate Catholic voters.  A 
Gallup poll published in early October 1936 found that an overwhelming 78 per cent of 
Catholic voters favoured Roosevelt’s re-election.  The poll illustrates the success of the 
Democrats’ efforts to consolidate the Catholic vote within the New Deal coalition.103  In 
contrast, Coughlin’s waning support damaged not only the reputation of his own NUSJ, 
but also the Union Party with which he was intimately connected.  Like Townsend and 
Smith, Coughlin concluded the presidential campaign radicalised, diminished and 
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isolated from his erstwhile supporters.  ‘All in all,’ concluded the Evening Independent, 
‘it probably isn’t a very rash prediction if one suggests that Coughlin, Townsend and 
Smith have all passed the apex of their political strength.’104   
 The radicalisation and isolation of Lemke’s central supporters was also a 
significant factor in distancing Lemke and the Union Party from the Republican 
insurgents and the representatives of the small western radical reform parties.  In order 
to broaden Roosevelt’s appeal amongst the electorate, the DNC sought to emphasise 
the president’s broad electoral support outside the party by sponsoring the creation of 
three independent, non-partisan networks: the Good Neighbor League, Labor’s Non-
partisan League and the Progressive National Committee for the Re-election of 
Roosevelt.  These networks were not officially part of the Democratic Party machine, 
but were closely integrated into the party campaign strategy.  This pro-Roosevelt 
strategy provided a considerable boost to his campaign. 
The Good Neighbor League was formed in April 1936 with the intention of 
bringing non-political community leaders into the campaign.  Co-chaired by social 
worker Lilian Wald and philanthropist George Foster Peabody, the League created a 
network of pro-Roosevelt churchmen, school and university teachers, social workers 
and intellectuals operating in twenty states.  It was estimated that 40 per cent of its 
supporters were registered Republican voters.  During the course of the campaign, the 
League organised many local events designed to appeal to independent-minded, 
middle-class voters.  The most important of these were six mass rallies held on 
September 21, 1936, for African-American voters.  The African-American vote had 
been so long part of the Republican coalition that Landon and Lemke did little, if 
anything, to court it.  In contrast, Roosevelt’s address at the New York rally, before a 
wildly appreciative capacity crowd, and broadcast nationally (excluding southern 
states), rallied African-American voters to join the New Deal coalition.105     
The role of Labor’s Non-partisan League was equally important.  Intended to 
educate workers on Roosevelt’s extensive pro-labour record, under the leadership of 
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John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America and a lifelong 
Republican, the League brought together a powerful alliance of unions.  In addition to 
organisation and education, the League provided an avenue for fundraising.  With 
business reducing its contribution sharply, the $770,000 raised for the Democratic 
Party via the League marked a historic shift in the financial base of the party.   Of this 
new union funding, $469,000 came directly from the United Mine Workers’ union, 
making them the Democratic Party’s largest single contributor to the 1936 election.106 
 The final of the three organisations was the Progressive National Committee 
(PNC).  The various independent, radical reform movements had never been strongly 
co-ordinated.  The PNC was intended to serve as a temporary tactic to unite these 
groups behind a single issue – the re-election of the president.  The backing of a 
number of insurgents and radical reformers for Roosevelt’s re-election was a 
significant contribution to his ultimate success.  In July 1936, Farley commissioned 
social reformer Frank P. Walsh to co-ordinate the establishment of the PNC.107  
Working with insurgent Progressive senator Robert La Follette, Jr., who agreed to 
chair, Walsh received confirmation from 100 prominent radical reform-minded 
politicians that they would attend a conference on September 11, 1936, to agree a co-
ordinated plan of action for the upcoming campaign.  Conference attendees included a 
range of prominent insurgents and radical reformers, including Republican Mayor of 
New York Fiorello La Guardia; senators Lewis Schwellenbach (Democrat, 
Washington), Homer Bone (Democrat, Washington) and Hugo Black (Democrat, 
Alabama); many of the Wisconsin Progressives in the House of Representatives; 
Democratic Congressman Maury Maverick of Texas; and labour leaders Sidney 
Hillman and John L. Lewis.  Lemke and his backers, however, received no invitation.108 
Radical reformers, such as the La Follettes in Wisconsin, who joined the PNC 
felt that Roosevelt offered them the best option for passage of their legislative agenda.  
In addition, they believed the favour of the president would be reflected in various kinds 
of electoral support that the Democratic hierarchy would bestow upon faithful 
265 
 
supporters, including control of federal appointments, the distribution of federal grants, 
and direct funding for their campaigns.  Those who backed the PNC, willing to accept 
what historian Donald McCoy described as ‘half-a-loaf rather than continue to struggle 
for the whole,’ effectively rejected their radical reforming heritage and joined the 
centralist course offered by the New Deal.109  When the conference met, radical 
reform-minded voters across the nation were called upon to unite behind Roosevelt in 
order to ‘preserve liberty; establish security and re-create equality of opportunity.’  ‘It is 
unthinkable,’ announced insurgent Republican Senator George Norris of Nebraska in 
his keynote address, ‘that a liberty-loving people would displace him, when his work is 
but partially completed.’110  In particular, the PNC delegates could not risk a Landon 
victory with a Union Party vote.  In this context, great significance was attached to the 
formal presentation at the conference of a telegram composed on his deathbed by 
Floyd Olson, Famer-Labor Governor of Minnesota.  The choice, he wrote, was 
between Roosevelt and Landon.  He had the ‘utmost respect’ for Lemke and Coughlin, 
but ‘for the liberals to split their votes is merely to play into the hands of the Wall Street 
gang.’  He concluded, ‘The defeat of Landon is of the utmost importance to the great 
masses.’  The delegates listened to a short debate and issued a statement offering full 
support to Roosevelt’s re-election.111   
The PNC’s support for the president isolated the Union Party and divided the 
insurgent bloc.  As one conference attendee, E. W. Kibler, confirmed to Jim Farley, 
Lemke’s ‘influence was greatly lessened by the Chicago parley of liberals.’112  As Kibler 
had suggested, following the PNC conference, support for the Union Party amongst 
national legislative figures evaporated.  Of those twelve senators who could be 
identified as part of the insurgent bloc upon Roosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933, 
one (Cutting) was dead, six backed Roosevelt’s re-election (Johnson, Norris, Norbeck, 
Couzens, La Follette and Shipstead) and two backed Landon (the relative 
conservatives Capper and McNary).  Only Lemke’s closest associates, Borah, Nye and 
Frazier, continued their endorsement of the Union Party.  Yet, despite its passionate 
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advocacy for the president, the platform of the PNC is remarkably similar to that of the 
Union Party.  Indeed, it maps almost entirely onto the Union Party platform.  For 
example, principle two, ‘The right of every American on the farm and in the city to earn 
a comfortable living by useful work,’ echoes the Union platform’s point four, ‘Congress 
shall legislate that there will be an assurance of a living annual wage for all laborers 
capable and willing to work.’  Principle three, ‘The right of American youth to develop 
their talents through public education…and to find a place in the life and work of the 
country,’ matches Union point fifteen, ‘Congress shall re-establish conditions so that 
the youths of the nation as they emerge from schools and colleges will have the 
opportunity to earn a decent living.’  Finally, principle four, ‘The right of men and 
women…to face their declining years free from fear of want,’ links to Union point six, 
‘Congress shall legislate that there will be assurance of reasonable and decent security 
for the aged.’113  The similarity of the two platforms suggests that, under usual 
circumstances, sharing a loosely aligned ideology, the Union Party and the PNC might 
have been natural allies.  This was not going to happen in the political climate of 1936.  
With the insurgents divided, it became increasingly difficult to separately identify the 
radical reforming stream in American politics.   
It is possible to estimate the potential damage the backing of the regional 
radical reform movements did to Lemke’s campaign with an analysis of the vote that he 
received in the states of Wisconsin and Minnesota.  These were states where, 
respectively, the Progressive Party and Farm-Labor parties held widespread support 
amongst the electorate.  In addition, they were states where significant third party 
candidates had previously polled strongly.  Yet, even though these states ranked within 
the top six in terms of the popular vote for Lemke as a percentage of total votes cast, 
his candidate did not appeal with local voters to the extent of previous significant  
third-party candidates.  The average vote for the previous significant third-party 
candidate was 23 per cent higher than the votes received by Lemke in Minnesota and 
19 per cent higher than his vote in Wisconsin.  The PNC contributed towards the 
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consolidation and enhancement of Roosevelt’s support amongst the group of voters 
most likely to be attracted particularly to the Union Party.  Even in Lemke’s home state 
of North Dakota, his relatively impressive showing of 13 per cent was actually 28 per 
cent lower than the average achieved by previous significant third-party candidates.114   
Detached, ineffective, isolated, weak and irrelevant, the Union Party failed 
because it could not overcome the simple argument that a vote for Lemke was a 
wasted vote.  His Democratic opponents argued that Lemke stood no chance of 
making any impact in the election.  In this circumstance, a vote for Lemke only 
effectively reduced votes for the president, increasing the chance that the conservative 
Landon might win the election.  Nellie Dougerty, former Democratic Committeewoman 
from North Dakota, wrote to Farley in August 1936 articulating the practical approach to 
be taken with Lemke supporters.  ‘It is my opinion,’ she explained, ‘that all speakers 
should emphasise the fact that a vote for Lemke is really a vote for Landon.’115   
In the dire circumstances that Lemke found himself in as the campaign reached 
its final stage, the wasted vote argument was one they were simply unable to deny.  
The wasted-vote argument was echoed repeatedly by Democrats in speeches and 
publications throughout the campaign.  Guidance issued by the PNC’s speakers’ 
bureau urged speechmakers to emphasise and repeat to their audiences the idea that 
a ‘vote cast for any other than Roosevelt will divide liberal strength and will constitute a 
vote for Landon!’116  Leaflets issued by the committee offered voters a stark choice: ‘a 
vote against Roosevelt is a vote for Landon – and the danger of: war, Hoover 
starvation, Republican reaction, [and] suppression of civil liberties.’117  Union Party 
supporters were forced to defend their right to access to the electoral system in their 
national publications.  Labelling the wasted-vote argument ‘a foul misstatement,’ a 
series of articles published in Social Justice and the National Townsend Weekly 
pleaded with voters not to turn away from Lemke.  ‘It is strange,’ concluded an editorial 
in Social Justice regretfully, ‘that an intelligent people, so sophisticatedly skeptical of 
268 
 
commonplaces, should be so gullible in matters that affect them so vitally.’118  These 
calls had little effect however.  
The wasted-vote argument was the final and most effective tool used to 
enhance and consolidate support for Roosevelt.  The need to concentrate the majority 
of its meagre resources on registration drives meant that there was little left to dedicate 
to overcoming damaging perceptions of Lemke’s intentions.  Marginalised, easily 
exploited and lacking any counter to his opponent’s simple argument, Lemke and his 
supporters were left desperately imploring for support. ‘Can we stick together – when 
victory is within our grasp and restore prosperity to America?’ challenged the National 
Townsend Weekly in September.  ‘A decent citizen will vote for principle rather than for 
a winner,’ pleaded Social Justice in October.119  Looking back on the campaign, Lemke 
expressed the intense frustration felt by Union Party activists at their inability to 
persuade grass-roots voters to retain support for his campaign: 
The people may like a program but too many of them still spend 
their money on booze and other useless things rather than 
contribute their bit to help bring about conditions that will make 
them better men and women.120 
Yet, the reality was that Lemke had simply failed to persuade the electorate that a vote 
for the Union Party would provide him with the victory he required to implement his 
reform platform.  Swept away by the Democratic tide, rather than being an enabler of 
reform, the Union Party was easily presented as a barrier.  Lemke’s final voter tally 
would thus ultimately reflect that the key issue for voters in 1936 was simply to elect 
the only pro-reform candidate capable of victory: Roosevelt.  
Townsend, Smith and Coughlin’s personal ambition to mobilise voters behind 
the Union Party as a protest to defeat the president did not appeal to the significant 
majority of voters who felt they had personally benefitted from the economic and social 
reforms introduced as part of the New Deal.  They wanted to protect and enhance 
these benefits, not see them ended or undermined.  Equally, this centralist coalition of 
voters, content with progress made under the Democratic administration and not 
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attracted by the conservative alternative offered by the Republicans, rejected Lemke’s 
notion that a third national party was necessary to force the passage of reform more 
radical than that advocated by the president.  The result was a landslide victory for 
Roosevelt.  In comparison, Lemke’s chaotic, poorly funded and easily undermined 
campaign, though entertaining for the press, was unable from the fringes of the political 
spectrum to establish its appeal with pro-reform voters and ultimately succeeded in 
attracting only a small and particularly needy group of individuals to his cause.   
The Union Party campaign was an embarrassing failure for its candidate and its 
backers.  In the final count, Lemke’s fringe voters were not enough to register as much 
more than part of the footnotes of American history.  They do, however, represent an 
element of the electorate left behind in the construction of Roosevelt's grand centralist 
electoral coalition.  Such fringe voters were unlikely to provide the necessary finance 
and functional national organisation that Lemke required to transform his small national 
vote into a sustainable, national political party.  In contrast, Roosevelt’s victory would 
be recorded as one of the greatest in American history.  In November 1936 he could be 
confident that the actions taken by his administration had succeeded in united the 
nation behind his goal to place the nation squarely back upon the road to recovery.  
Yet, Roosevelt’s grand coalition did not appeal to all pro-reform voters.  If the Union 
Party achieved nothing more, it provided a voice for this small, alienated section of the 
electorate to express their legitimate opposition to the president and by doing so got 
him to recognise the continued difficulties of their everyday lives.  In this way, at least, 
Lemke's grand folly must be considered in some small way a success.  
 
 
                                                 
1  GLKS to Sheldon Marcus, February 6, 1970, SMP. 
2  NYT, June 17, 1936. 
270 
 
                                                                                                                                               
3  Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ 
U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives. 
4  Dave Leip, ‘1936 Presidential Election Results,’ Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections.   
5  Document titled ‘Minutes of the 1936 National Conference of the Union Party,’ 
December 19, 1936, WLP. 
6  Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 112. 
7  Document titled ‘Discussion of Presidential Polls,’ undated, EHP; Leroy D. Brandon, 
‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ U.S. House of 
Representatives, History, Art & Archives. 
8  Ibid.  For evidence of Lemke’s support amongst western legislators, see vote on 
Farm Mortgage Refinance Bill, NYT, May 14, 1936.  For evidence of the reach of 
Coughlin’s radio audience, see Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 206-207. 
9  See Figure 6, Chapter 4.  Significant third-party candidates included in the average: 
James Weaver, People’s Party, 1892, Theodore Roosevelt, Progressive Party, 
1912 and Robert La Follette, Progressive Party, 1924.  Election data derived from 
Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections; Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the 
Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ U.S. House of Representatives, 
History, Art & Archives. 
10  Ibid. 
11  St. Petersburg Evening Independent, November 6, 1936. 
12  Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 32-35, 37. 
13  Ibid, 36; Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 
1936,’ U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives. 
14  Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952), 
143.   
15  Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 31, 35, 40, 41. 
271 
 
                                                                                                                                               
16  James P. Shenton, ‘The Coughlin Movement and the New Deal,’ Political Science 
Quarterly, 73 (1958), 366. 
17  Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 32, 37. 
18  Ibid, 36. 
19  Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks, 72. 
20  Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 37. 
21  Ibid, 34, 37. 
22  Dave Leip, ‘1936 Presidential Election Results,’ Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections. 
23  FDR to Josephus Daniels, November 9, 1936, Elliot Roosevelt ed.  The Roosevelt 
Letters, 191. 
24  McElvaine, The Great Depression, 229-236. 
25   Burns, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 266-268. 
26  Democratic National Committee, ‘Democratic Party Platform, 1936,’ The American 
Presidency Project; SJ, June 22, 1936. 
27  St. Petersburg Evening Independent, November 6, 1936. 
28  Blackorby, Prairie Rebel, 223. 
29  NYT, July 7, 1936. 
30  Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 148-150. 
31  NYT, June 21, 1936. 
32  WL, Statement announcing the formation of the Union Party, undated, WLP. 
33  Transcripts of taped interviews between Sheldon Marcus and CC, SMP. 
34  SJ, July 6, 193-6. 
35  NYT, August 16, 1936. 
36  NTW, July 27, 1936; NYT, July 20, 1936; NYT, July 21, 1936. 
37  Blackorby, Prairie Rebel, 224. 
38  John Nystul to WS, July 13, 1936, WLP. 
272 
 
                                                                                                                                               
39  SJ, July 20, 1936; Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Campaign 
Expenditures of Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial Candidates in 1936 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937) 24-28.  
40  JAF private file note, July 1936, JAFP. 
41  Copies of WL’s contributions and expenditures to the Special Committee to 
Investigate Campaign Election Expenses, July-August, September and October, 
1936, WLP. 
42  WL to CH, May 2, 1936, WLP. 
43  WL statement announcing the formation of the Union Party, undated, WLP. 
44  Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: 
Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 32; Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 152-153. 
45  NTW, July 27, 1936; NYT, July 18, 1936; NYT, July 21, 1936. 
46  NYT, August 14, 1936. 
47  Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 152-153. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Document titled ‘List of Contact Men for Filing Union Party in Each States,’ August 
7, 1936, WLP; H.F. Swett to William Skeeles, July 30, 1936, WLP; William Skeeles 
to H.F. Swett, August 4, 1936, WLP. 
50  Document titled ‘Discussion of Presidential Polls,’ undated, EHP; NYT, August 9, 
1936; NYT, September 4, 1936. 
51  Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 150; NYT, October 
23, 1936; NYT, October 24, 1936; document titled ‘Discussion of Presidential Polls,’ 
undated, EHP. 
52  NYT, July 21, 1936. 
273 
 
                                                                                                                                               
53  Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ 
U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives; Powell, ‘The Union Party of 
1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 150-151. 
54  Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ 
U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives; document titled ‘Discussion 
of Presidential Polls,’ undated, EHP.  Significant third party candidates included in 
the average: James Weaver, People’s Party, 1892, Theodore Roosevelt, 
Progressive Party, 1912 and Robert La Follette, Progressive Party, 1924.  Election 
data derived from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. 
55  Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Organisation and Finance,’ 148-150. 
56  SJ, July 20, 1936. 
57  David O. Powell, ‘The Union Party of 1936: Campaign Tactics and Issues,’ Mid-
America, 46:2 (1964), 128. 
58  NYT, August 17, 1936.   
59  Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 196-197. 
60  GLKS to Sheldon Marcus, February 6, 1970, SMP. 
61  Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 212. 
62  Frank L. Kloeb to JAF, August 19, 1936, POF. 
63  E.C. Amos to JAF, September 11, 1936, POF. 
64  SJ, August 17, 1936. 
65  J.F. Trump to JAF, October 5, 1936, POF. 
66  George Q. Flynn, American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency 1932-1936 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), 203-204. 
67  Ibid, 237. 
68  Maurice Sheehy to Margaret Lehand, July 18, 1936, PPF. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Stephen Early to FDR, September 30, 1936, PPF. 
274 
 
                                                                                                                                               
71  Mrs Stanley V. Hodge to JAF, July 13, 1936, POF. 
72  Stephen Early to FDR, September 30, 1936, PPF. 
73  Maurice Sheehy to Margaret Lehand, October 5, 1936, PPF. 
74  JAF private file note, July 20, 1936, JAFP.  
75  JAF private file note, July 27, 1936, JAFP. 
76  NYT, August 13, 1936. 
77  Holtzman, The Townsend Movement, 178. 
78  NTW, October 12, 1936. 
79  WEB to Henry Johnson, July 8, 1936, WEBP; WEB to Alex Gumberg, July 8, 1936, 
WEBP; WEB to Charles Coughlin, August 2, 1936, WEBP. 
80  Carl G. Bachmann to WEB, September 3, 1936, WEBP; Edward J Margett to WEB, 
October 6, 1936, WEBP. 
81  Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 238. 
82  St. Petersburg Evening Independent, November 6, 1936. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Gerald P. Fogarty, The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965 
(Washington, D.C.: Michael Glazier, 1985), 248. 
85  GLKS to Sheldon Marcus, February 6, 1970, SMP; Charles R. Gallagher, Vatican 
Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 52. 
86  Marcus, Father Coughlin, 122. 
87  Tull, Father Coughlin, 143. 
88  Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 255. 
89  Tull, Father Coughlin, 144. 
90  Dean AlFange to JAF, September 25, 1936, POF. 
91  Tull, Father Coughlin, 467-468. 
92  Flynn, American Catholics, 227. 
275 
 
                                                                                                                                               
93  Shenton, ‘The Coughlin Movement and the New Deal,’ 366. 
94  Flynn, American Catholics, 228. 
95  FDR to John Ryan, October 6, 1936, PPF. 
96  JAF private file note, October 1936, JAFP. 
97  Mary Dewson to Ann Ryan, October 21, 1936, DNC Women’s Division Papers. 
98  JAF private file note, October 1936, JAFP. 
99  Flynn, American Catholics, 233. 
100  Fogarty, Vatican and the American Hierarchy, 246-248. 
101  Ibid. 
102  John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, (London: Viking, 
1999), 177. 
103  Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 36. 
104  St. Petersburg Evening Independent, November 6, 1936. 
105  Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 646. 
106  Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 188.   
107  JAF private file note, July 1936, Ernest Cuneo Papers. 
108  Blackorby, Prairie Rebel, 225. 
109  Ibid.  
110  Feinman, Twilight of Progressivism, 112; McCoy, ‘The Progressive National 
Committee,’ 461. 
111  Ibid, 460; Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 595. 
112  E. W. Kibler to JAF, September 14, 1936, POF. 
113  SJ, June 22, 1936; McCoy, ‘The Progressive National Committee,’ 468. 
114  Leroy D. Brandon, ‘Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1936,’ 
U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives; document titled ‘Discussion 
of Presidential Polls,’ undated, EHP.  Significant third party candidates included in 
the average: James Weaver, People’s Party, 1892, Theodore Roosevelt, 
276 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Progressive Party, 1912 and Robert La Follette, Progressive Party, 1924.  Election 
data derived from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. 
115  Nellie Dougerty to JAF, August 7, 1936, POF. 
116  McCoy, ‘The Progressive National Committee,’ 465. 
117  Ibid, 461. 
118   SJ, August 17, 1936. 
119  NTW, September 14, 1936; SJ, October 12, 1936. 







As William Lemke reached the climax of his speech at the Union Party’s inaugural 
conference on December 19, 1936, it became clear that his focus was not on the 
failings of the past, but the potential of the future.  ‘Go out of this room united on the 
principles of the Union Party platform,’ he declared, ‘and we will not be defeated 
because you cannot defeat right.  You can postpone it – we just postponed it on 
November third.’  Lemke’s mood of optimism in the face of defeat set the tone for the 
meeting.  Despite his fundamental disagreement with his erstwhile union of backers, 
Lemke and his colleagues expressed no bitterness, instead formally resolving to 
express thanks for the ‘loyal support rendered by Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, Dr. 
Francis Townsend and Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith and the officers and members of 
the organizations which they represent.’  The absence of bitterness and recrimination 
evident from the minutes of the meeting is striking.  Speaker after speaker followed 
Lemke’s lead and focused on the brightness of the future and not the darkness of the 
past.1   
As the morning turned to afternoon and evening and the delegates left to make 
their way home through the dark Chicago streets, they had elected Lemke the 
inaugural president of the party and confirmed John Nystul in his position as chairman.  
Furthermore, they resolved to begin a concerted effort to establish the Union Party at 
state level in preparation for the 1938 congressional elections.  Their combined 
ambition was clear.  ‘I believe with proper organization,’ declared Lemke, ‘we should 
have sufficient strength to put over say fifteen or twenty Congressmen in 1938 and in 
1940 we will sweep the Nation.’2  Ever confident, Lemke and his Union Party 
colleagues underestimated the enduring appeal of the New Deal, the strength of the 
labour and urban voting base, and the looming World War.  The radical reformers and 
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their Republican insurgent colleagues soon found that in an era of collectivism and 
internationalism, their calls for individual self-determination and isolation made them 
not proponents of radicalism, but of conservatism.  Lemke’s predictions thus failed him 
once again.  His party was unsuccessful in capturing the public’s attention, but their 
focus on isolation ensured a renaissance of sorts for the radical reformers.  
Three major political and social changes between 1937 and 1940 hastened the 
return to relevance for the radical reformers and their insurgent colleagues in the 
Senate: first Roosevelt’s attempts to rebalance the machinery of government to 
enhance the authority of the president; second, the return to economic recession; and 
third, the growing threat of war.  The Union Party had enshrined within its platform a 
core belief in the primacy of the individual against concentrations of power, whether 
that was big business, the wealthy or government itself.  The role of the federal 
government, specifically the powers invested in the executive branch under Roosevelt, 
had been one of the dominant issues in the Union Party’s campaign of 1936.  The 
Union Party and its backers had embarked upon a negative campaign questioning 
Roosevelt’s thirst for centralised power and variously accused him of being a dictator or 
a Communist.  These charges had been dismissed, but Roosevelt’s actions in the 
months following his second inauguration in January 1937 seemed to sustain the 
radical reformers’ earlier calls and fuelled their concerns over the accretion of power 
within the executive branch.  
Frustrated that key elements of New Deal legislation had been struck down by 
what he considered a Republican-leaning Supreme Court, in February 1937, the 
president presented a bill intended to rebalance the membership of the court in his 
favour.  The so-called ‘court packing’ plan surprised members of Congress from all 
parties and established a new alignment between the Republicans and the southern 
Democrats, who feared that Roosevelt might use the proposed powers to push through 
radical pieces of legislation that favoured northeastern urban voters, in particular 
African-Americans.  Importantly, court-packing also had the effect of reuniting the 
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Republican Party.  The insurgent bloc in the Senate was diminished by the deaths of 
senators Couzens of Michigan and Norbeck of South Dakota in the late autumn of 
1936, but of those 8 senators who took the oath in January 1937, 6 immediately sided 
with the Republican old guard in their opposition to the president’s plan.  Only La 
Follette of Wisconsin and Norris of Nebraska, both of whom had favoured Roosevelt’s 
campaign for re-election in 1936, expressed any support for the president.  In the 
House, Lemke too shared the concerns of his senatorial colleagues, objecting to what 
he considered to be clear evidence of the president’s undemocratic leanings.  In July 
1937, following 5 months of debate, the Senate voted 70 to 20 to recommit the bill, and 
Roosevelt conceded defeat.3   
The insurgents’ reintegration within the mainstream Republican Party was 
further accelerated by the administration’s proposed ‘Reorganization Act,’ through 
which the president sought to expand the White House staff, extend the civil service by 
placing a number of independent agencies under the control of cabinet-level 
departments, and create two new cabinet departments of Social Welfare and Social 
Works.  Outside of Congress, Coughlin took once again to the airwaves to rally his 
supporters to oppose what he termed the ‘Dictator Bill.’  As a result, 100,000 telegrams 
reached Washington, D.C., by the following Monday.  In Congress, the president’s 
opponents rose under Borah’s leadership to counter this apparent attempt to enhance 
Roosevelt’s direct authority.  The bill eventually passed in the Senate by 49 votes to 42 
(with La Follette and Norris again the only insurgents voting with the president), but 
opposition within the House eventually saw its defeat by 204 to 196.  Roosevelt directly 
attributed to Coughlin the source of the propaganda that had defeated the bill.  Most 
importantly, such was the party regularity exercised by the insurgents on these core 
issues that it was almost impossible to identify them separately from their conservative 
party colleagues.4    
 In the past, the president had successfully deflected the criticisms levelled 
against him, citing the success of the New Deal in returning the economy to a stable 
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footing and in providing a safety net for those Americans who had yet to feel the 
benefits of prosperity.  The truth was, however, that the economic recovery was 
sustained largely by federal investment.  In the months following his second 
inauguration, Roosevelt sought to rebalance expenditure by cutting the federal payroll.  
As a result, by March 1938, unemployment had risen to 20 per cent and the economy 
had entered a period of sharp recession.  The infallibility of the New Deal’s economic 
solutions suddenly looked questionable, and the president’s opponents took their 
chance to reiterate their earlier concerns.  
The faltering economic recovery was coupled with an apparent failure in the 
social safety net.  Roosevelt had placed the introduction of Social Security in January 
1937 at the forefront of the final stage of his presidential campaign.  However, the 
implementation of the plan was not uniformly positive.  Not wishing to increase the 
federal deficit, the administration’s plan had only ever been intended to pay 
contributions by an investment fund generated from the introduction of a new payroll 
tax.  As payments were not intended to be made until the fund reached a sustainable 
level (estimated to be 1942), only very small pensions (on average $20 per month) 
were received by those reaching retirement age soon after the introduction of the 
scheme.  Existing pensioners, who had paid nothing into the fund, were not eligible for 
any benefit.  Furthermore, the investment of $2 billion in the Social Security investment 
fund in 1937, without the balance provided by the introduction of pension payments, 
had the effect of reducing purchasing power in the economy and contributed directly to 
the economic downturn.5   
With the president’s promises apparently compromised, Townsend attempted to 
re-establish his credibility as the pre-eminent pension expert, and membership in his 
organisation rose once again.  Pressure from Townsend and his congressional 
supporters saw the administration launch a review of Social Security in 1937.  In the 
summer of 1939, following considerable congressional and public debate, the 
administration conceded significant changes to the legislation, most notably the 
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immediate universal entitlement to an old-age pension for all those reaching or already 
having reached 65, irrespective of their individual contributions to the pension fund.  
His movement rehabilitated, Townsend remained an active figure in the on-going 
debates regarding Social Security until his death aged 93 in 1969.  The Townsend 
Movement itself campaigned for a close variant of the $200 per month plan proposed 
by the elderly doctor until its eventual closure in 1980.6 
Insurgent support for Townsend’s campaign to amend Social Security was not, 
however, matched by action from the insurgents to move forward with the 
implementation of further economic and social reform.  Instead, unhappy with the 
increasing radicalisation of the industrial workforce, they became a barrier in any 
attempt by the administration to expand the scope of the New Deal.   
The fall into recession galvanised industrial workers as never before.  Coughlin, 
Lemke and the senatorial insurgents had supported the passage of administration 
legislation enabling the unionisation of the industrial workforce.  They viewed the 
empowerment of the workforce as an important counterbalance to the concentrated 
power of big business.  As their dreams became a reality, however, they recognised 
that they had underestimated how the creation of mass industrial unions, collected 
under the newly established Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), represented a 
concentrated power bloc itself.  Furthermore, the CIO encouraged the radicalised 
collective workforce to take direct action against employers, resulting in mass sit-ins 
across the rubber, steel and automotive industries.  In March 1937, there were 170 sit-
down strikes involving 167,210 industrial workers.  Employers including General 
Motors, General Electric, Firestone and RCA, finding the administration unwilling to 
support the use of federal troops to remove striking workers, were forced to recognise 
unions and enhance wages and conditions in return for access to their own private 
property and the resumption of production.  With business being held to ransom, the 
insurgents in Congress attempted to exert what pressure they could to stem the rising 
tide of union power.  When the administration proposed the introduction of a minimum 
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wage and maximum hours, the insurgents aligned with the Republican old guard in 
their condemnation of what they considered the federal government’s attempts to limit 
personal freedom through exerting control of the economic and working lives of the 
American people.7  Though their policy positions had largely remained the same, in the 
face of these new economic and social realities, the ideological distance on social and 
economic issues between the radical reformers and the Republican Party had closed 
considerably. 
The radical reformers’ ideological move towards the Republican Party was 
further reinforced by the increasing relevance of the second central tenet of the Union 
Party: its belief in national economic and political isolation.  Lemke, Coughlin, 
Townsend and Smith shared with the insurgents a belief that the Depression had been 
caused by the manipulation of the currency by international bankers and the so-called 
‘gold families.’  The rise of militant unionism enhanced their paranoid belief that 
international agents were working to undermine the American government.  In 
particular, outside of Congress, Henry Ford’s response to militant unionism became the 
key driver in the resurgence of both Coughlin’s and Smith’s political careers.  Ford was 
a brilliant engineer, and his revolutionary approach towards automotive production had 
made him one of the richest men in the world.  Personally, however, he was eccentric, 
puritanical and paranoid.  He saw a direct connection between the rise of radical 
unions in America and the spectre of international Communism.  A zealous anti-
Semite, Ford alleged that Communism was itself a Jewish plot, designed to enlist the 
weak-minded industrial workforce in a plot to establish control of the world.  Seeking an 
outlet to promote his theory, in 1937 Ford approached Coughlin.  Together the priest 
and the industrialist represented a potent force. 
Coughlin had not previously been an explicit anti-Semite, but in 1937, prompted 
by Ford, the priest adjusted his economic theories to establish a wider conspiracy.  
Coughlin alleged that Jewish bankers and their Communist agents sought to overthrow 
the American government.  To assist Coughlin in the new fight, Ford provided 
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generous funding first for an attempt by the priest to establish a company-owned union 
at the Ford plant – the Workers’ Council for Social Justice.  This endeavour having 
failed, Ford funded enhancements of Social Justice, extending the page length and 
improving the paper quality and typeface.  In addition, Ford provided Coughlin with 
material drawn from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious forgery that 
described a supposed meeting of Jewish elders in 1897 in which they outlined plans to 
undermine Gentile civilisation.8   
Although the congressional insurgents did not share Coughlin’s explicit anti-
Semitism – Lemke personally condemned any group that attacked people ‘because of 
their race or religion’ – they shared the priest’s view that America needed to be isolated 
from a world war engineered in Europe.  ‘It seems,’ wrote Lemke, ‘that many of our 
people are forgetting that there is no room for European hatreds in the United States of 
America.’9  With war looming, Coughlin further extended his theory, alleging that the 
Jews, through their attempts to destabilise the German economy, had forced the Nazis 
to protect the nation by rising up against them.  In a radio broadcast delivered on 
November 20, 1938 (to an audience which, although smaller than its height, still 
totalled in the millions), Coughlin claimed that Nazism was merely a defence 
mechanism against Jewish Communism and compared the death of German Jews to 
the twenty million Christians allegedly murdered by the Communist government of 
Russia between 1917 and 1938.10   
Coughlin might have taken an extreme position, but his views proved popular 
with a proportion of the electorate who wished America to maintain a strictly isolationist 
position in global affairs and to avoid the nation’s entanglement in another world war.11  
Inside Congress, isolationism was championed by the insurgents and their new old-
guard Republican allies.  Lemke supported their campaign, and as war approached, he 
became a passionate advocate of a reduction in the nation’s military spending.12  In the 
Senate, the insurgents proposed a series of measures intended to enshrine American 
isolationism into law, and in January 1937, they were successful in passing a Neutrality 
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Act that strengthened earlier legislation by restricting loans to nations at war and 
putting in place a strict arms embargo.  When the Democratic administration attempted 
to repeal elements of the Neutrality Act in both 1939 and 1940, insurgents (with the 
exception of Norris) led the unsuccessful opposition, voting en masse against the 
changes.13         
The increased relevance of the radical reformers to national debate and 
Republican Party politics did not, however, translate into a surge in support for the 
Union Party.  In the rural west, where the Union Party had found much of its support, 
the Democrats’ focus on urban, industrial voters increasingly turned the electorate 
away from the administration and back towards the Republican Party as the traditional 
regional power.  The west’s embrace of Republicanism was accelerated as the war 
approached by the increased affluence of farmers, who benefited from the disruption of 
the global market and the dependence on American-grown produce both at home and 
overseas.  The shift in Lemke’s personal political position was reflective of the 
increased conservatism of his constituents.  Whereas Lemke had once campaigned on 
behalf of the poor debtor farmers, he became a voice of protest against government 
regulations that inhibited the expansion of their now-profitable businesses.14  Lemke’s 
own movement mirrored developments within the Union Party and insurgent columns 
more broadly.  Indeed, with the radical reform message focusing on Jewish insurrection 
and the insurgents’ commitment to the Republican Party, the Union Party increasingly 
found itself an empty vehicle drained of any relevance or support whatsoever.  
Although Lemke and Nystul struggled to keep the party functional between 1937 and 
1938, it lacked state-level operations, and they were unable to stop local units, for 
example in Illinois, from being subsumed by Nazi groups.  In the spring of 1938, Nystul 
closed the party headquarters in Chicago; by 1939, all traces of the movement had 
disappeared.15         
The radical reformer and insurgent focus on isolationism had galvanised 
support amongst an element of the electorate, but it eventually proved their undoing.  
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The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, discredited their isolationist 
arguments that the United States was safe from direct attack and without need for its 
own defences.  Following the Japanese assault, the American electorate switched to 
support direct intervention, and Roosevelt overcame isolationist opposition in 
Congress.  The rapid escalation of U.S. involvement in World War Two undermined the 
radical reformers’ isolationist campaign and made their attacks upon the failure of the 
New Deal to restore the economy moot.  Placing the nation onto a war footing 
addressed the nation’s economic difficulties in fundamental and direct ways, and the 
shared collective endeavour, as well as the extension of government control over 
industry, suppressed worker unrest.  Although it proved impossible to repeat the 
success of the 1936 landslide election, Roosevelt’s broad appeal and success as a 
wartime leader saw him uniquely re-elected to serve two further terms in 1940 and 
1944.16    
In contrast to Roosevelt’s success, in the light of the new social and economic 
conditions brought about by the war, the radical reformers and their insurgent 
colleagues looked dated and out of touch with the needs of modern America.  In 
Congress, Borah, McNary of Oregon and Johnson of California died in office in 1940, 
1944 and 1945 respectively.  Capper of Kansas retired in 1948; Frazier and Nye of 
North Dakota, Shipstead of Minnesota and La Follette of Wisconsin lost their seats in 
1941, 1944 and 1946.  Lemke, mellowed by the war, focused his remaining years on a 
successful campaign to secure the designation of a national park in North Dakota.  He 
died seeking re-election in 1950.17  
Of the president’s critics outside of Congress, Coughlin’s move towards anti-
Semitism proved the last straw for a Catholic Church attempting to align itself with the 
increasingly internationalist Democratic administration.  In 1938, under orders from his 
new superior Archbishop Edward Moody, Coughlin ended his radio broadcasts.  Social 
Justice, however, continued its publication under the priest’s control until in 1942.  
Under threat of a sedition charge, Coughlin was forced by Archbishop Moody to cease 
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its publication and end his political activities.  Constrained by his church, Coughlin 
maintained his silence until 1966, when he briefly returned to the national political 
scene by publishing two books heavily critical of the American Catholic Church and its 
relationship with the Vatican.  Coughlin died in 1979 un-reconciled with the leadership 
of the church he had provided with a lifetime of service and largely forgotten by the 
American people.18   
The only Union Party backer to prosper in the post-war years was Gerald 
Smith.  Coughlin had dissolved the union of the independent radical reformers in 
August 1936, concerned that Smith was attempting to usurp his position.  History and 
circumstance would ultimately prove him correct.  Coughlin’s removal from the 
airwaves created an opportunity for Smith.  Although the entry to the war had shifted 
mainstream American opinion towards internationalism, there remained a significant 
fringe who supported isolation.  This group became the basis of a political network for 
the Baptist preacher and turned him into a wealthy man by the time of his death in 
1976. 
Taken under Henry Ford’s wing, Smith replaced Coughlin on his 48-station 
radio network, absorbed the remaining units of the NUSJ into his own political 
movement, the ‘Committee of One Million,’ and upon the closure of Social Justice 
began his own publication The Cross and the Flag.  By 1942, Smith claimed the 
membership of his movement, which he had rechristened the ‘America First Party,’ to 
be in excess of 3 million, though it was estimated more accurately to be in the region of 
1 million.  Although a fringe politician, Smith was able to galvanise a significant minority 
of voters.  In 1942, for example, although unsuccessful, his campaign in the Illinois 
Republican senatorial primary saw him receive 109,000 votes.  By 1944, he was 
generating in excess of $5,000 per week profit from his direct mail, publications and 
personal appearances.19  Although his political aspirations were thwarted, Smith’s 
variously racist, anti-Communist and anti-Semitic publications found a minority 
marketplace, and he thrived in the anti-Communist crusades of the 1950s and in his 
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opposition to the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s and the white backlash of the 
1970s.  In the 1950s, donations to his organisations averaged over $150,000 per year 
and by the 1960s had risen to well over $300,000.  In addition to his extremist 
publication business, in his last years of life, Smith dedicated himself to the 
establishment of a religious theme park in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas.  It was 
this that would prove to be his lasting legacy.  Opened in 1969, his ‘Passion Play of the 
Ozarks’ attracted 28,852 visitors.  By the time of his death, the total number of visitors 
had exceeded 1 million.  His attractions brought about a complete transformation in the 
local economy.  Including the new hotels and shops established to provide for the influx 
of visitors, the municipal product of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, increased from under $1 
million in 1964 to over $15 million in 1972.  Few visitors to Eureka Springs would today 
know of the legacy of its founder, but Smith’s sacred projects remain one of the top 
tourist attractions in Arkansas.20      
Coughlin, Lemke, Smith, Townsend and Borah would never regain the mass 
support they had enjoyed in the mid-1930s, but as a significant element of the 
American electorate moved politically towards the right in the years immediately 
following Roosevelt’s overwhelming victory, they returned temporarily to political 
relevance.  This could not, however, overcome the fundamental problems that had 
undermined the Union Party’s campaign in 1936.  Unable to establish itself as a 
legitimate political party, the Union Party found much of its core doctrine of 
individualism, self-determination and isolation absorbed within the Republican Party.  It 
thus ultimately proved as irrelevant to the pre-war shift towards conservatism as it had 
during the height of the pro-reform drive of the 1936 election.   Its eventual dissolution 
generated not one single line of press comment. 
The legacy of the Union Party, while small, should not be ignored.  Although 
historians have largely disregarded the role of the Union Party in the 1936 presidential 
election, the argument presented in this thesis suggests that the Union Party emerged 
from a wide base of popular political opposition to the New Deal.  Its failures were 
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many, both as a party and as a coherent force.  Ultimately, the Union Party faced a 
considerable power in the shape of the New Deal coalition, and the newly formed party 
proved incapable of draining voters away from the president.  The New Deal, 
moreover, was singularly successful in galvanising the American people.  By turning 
his 1936 election campaign into a referendum on the success of the New Deal, 
Roosevelt challenged the electorate to choose the nation’s future direction: an America 
where collective prosperity would be maintained, or a return to the divisive, 
individualistic self-interest that had brought about the Depression.  The electorate 
made their choice clear: over 27.5 million Americans voted for Roosevelt – over 10 
million more than for Landon.  Only 892,000 voted for Lemke.   
Roosevelt had won the 1932 election promising economic and social 
transformation in America.  Although initially supportive of the president’s plans, the 
five men who would ultimately be central the formation of the Union Party – Coughlin, 
Townsend, Long, Lemke and Borah – individually sought to capitalise upon the 
discontent of the newly unemployed middle class who had lost everything in the 
Depression and felt that the First New Deal’s limited reform agenda had done little to 
restore their economic position.  These radical reformers shared a loose set of 
ideological connections.  They each blamed international manipulation of the banking 
system for the economic collapse and favoured economic and social reforms intended 
to protect the American people from the excessive influence and abuses brought about 
by the concentration of economic and, increasingly, political power.  In addition to the 
popular appeal of their separate reform proposals, they were innovative in the way in 
which they sought to promote both themselves and their reform plans.  Working outside 
of the political system, Coughlin and Long utilised the power and reach of the radio to 
build popular support and generate momentum for their individual political campaigns.  
They were able to harness this support by transforming their radio audiences into 
quasi-political protest movements.  Similarly, Townsend sought to bypass traditional 
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routes of party-based political action by establishing his grassroots, mass-participation 
pension movement.   
Although their challenge to the president had emerged from individual actions, 
the opposition of the Democratic administration led to their gradual convergence into a 
series of transitory alliances.  Lemke was able, for example, with Long’s and Borah’s 
support, to ensure the passage of his Farm Bankruptcy Bill in 1934.  In addition, they 
had success in blocking individual pieces of Democratic legislation, most notably 
Coughlin, Long and Borah’s combined campaign to defeat the World Court resolution 
in January 1935.  More often, however, they found their personal ambitions thwarted 
even if the Roosevelt administration co-opted aspects of their individual movements 
within the Second New Deal.  These agitators, however, had built their success on 
independence from the Washington political machine, and they were at times 
ineffectual in their attempts to turn popular support into votes for their particular plans in 
Congress.  When finally unified beneath the banner of the Union Party, the radical 
reformers and insurgent politicians proved incapable of cohering behind a core 
message and sustaining the party.  With the exception of Lemke and his ardent 
supporters, the Union Party was expedient – a means to protest against Roosevelt 
rather than promote an ideologically coherent platform.  Its failure as an electoral 
vehicle thus lay largely with the diffuse and eclectic origins of the party and the 
movements that constituted it. 
The Democratic administration was able to limit the growth in support for the 
independent radical reformers by taking direct action to undermine their credibility.  
Coughlin was discredited, for example, by the administration’s release of information 
on his trading of silver that revealed he was one of the largest owners of the metal in 
the nation.  Similarly, the administration supported actions taken by former Long 
loyalists to normalise Louisiana following the death of the senator that in turn 
undermined Gerald Smith’s attempts to establish himself as the new leader of the SoW 
movement. Finally, Townsend was humiliated at the hands of the Democrat-led 
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congressional committee established to investigate his leadership of the OARP.  In 
addition to reducing the radical reformers’ appeal amongst the electorate, such actions 
pushed them into active opposition to the administration.     
Beyond the measures adopted to reduce the credibility of the radical reformers 
in the minds of the electorate, the Democratic administration was flexible in its 
response to the challenges presented by the radical reformers.  The mass movements 
established by Long, Coughlin and Townsend lacked the formal structures of traditional 
political parties, and they inspired only limited allegiance in their supporters.  The 
passage of Second New Deal legislation drawn directly from threads of the radical 
reformers’ proposals not only undermined the appeal of the independent radical reform 
movements, but saw the transfer of their followers to the Democratic president.  
Isolated and outmanoeuvred, Townsend, Coughlin and Smith found themselves drawn 
together into a loose union with a single sole purpose: to defeat the president.  They 
initially directed this support behind Borah’s campaign for the Republican presidential 
nomination; he, however, failed to overturn the powerful conservative leadership of the 
party, who were convinced that the time had come to scale back the New Deal reforms.  
Having few other choices and requiring a candidate behind whom they could direct 
their pro-reform, anti-Roosevelt campaign for the 1936 election, they decided to back 
the launch of the Union Party.  Lemke, believing that the polarisation of the political 
parties brought about by the New Deal left a gap for a new political party in favour of 
individual freedom, self-sufficiency, isolationism and economic independence, took the 
opportunity presented to him by his backers to establish this new party.  There was, 
however, no shared understanding of the purpose of the party. Coughlin, Smith and 
Townsend, unwilling to support either candidate of the Republican or Democratic Party, 
were motivated to create the Union Party purely to provide a vehicle through which to 
mount their anti-Roosevelt campaign.  Lemke, by contrast, believed in the party 
platform, but he was in a minority even among supporters of the union. 
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The plan to launch the Union Party was ill-conceived and poorly executed.  
Desperate to protect their self-interest and uninterested in its long-term future, Coughlin 
and Townsend were unwilling to put in place the proper organisational and financial 
support the party needed to become an effective political machine.  In the absence of 
such resources, the Union Party was doomed to fail.  Yet, these internal organisational 
issues should not disguise the central reasons for the Union Party’s electoral disaster.  
The Democrats’ moves to integrate elements from the radical reformers’ positive social 
reforms within the Second New Deal left the Union Party without a distinctive platform 
from which to campaign.  Moreover, Lemke’s vision for a third political party held little 
appeal for the majority of the electorate content with the progress of reform achieved 
under the Second New Deal.   
New Democratic voters strengthened the party’s hold, ensuring a remarkable 
landslide in 1936.  Buried beneath was the Union Party, whose support crumpled in the 
days preceding the election.  The support for the Union position began to wane once 
Townsend, Coughlin, Smith and Lemke ran negative campaigns that focused not on 
their positive ideas for reform, but cast doubts upon the president’s character.  Such 
increasingly desperate and extreme appeals merely served to broaden and consolidate 
Roosevelt’s centralist support amongst the electorate, opened up the fault lines 
between his radical opponents, exposed the weakness of its party machinery to 
external influence, and ultimately limited the Union Party’s already marginal appeal.   
Although historians have long mentioned – albeit usually in passing – the 
failures of the Union Party, the party nevertheless still polled some 892,000 votes.  
These figures were substantially reduced from Emil Hurja’s predictions, but they 
represented a class of deeply marginalised Americans who, despite the president’s 
best efforts, had been left behind by the New Deal’s economic recovery or social safety 
net.  For these individuals, the Union Party was both a protest and a statement from a 
minority who, despite Roosevelt’s success, remained isolated from his grand electoral 
coalition.   
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The story of the Union Party cannot, of course, be complete without recognising 
the success and power of Franklin Roosevelt’s political and social alliance.  Elected on 
the promise of a ‘New Deal’ for America, Roosevelt had steered the nation out of the 
depths of the immediate post-crash recession.  He articulated a vision of social and 
economic change and as this thesis has indicated, he ably co-opted and exposed his 
political opponents, be they the radical reformers or the Union Party itself.  The Union 
Party proved to be a ‘first rate fizzle’ but its backers, though now mostly forgotten, are 
important historical figures who pioneered the use of mass media to generate political 
pressure outside of the traditional party system.21  Coughlin, Smith, Lemke and 
Townsend’s subsequent failure to turn their individual protest movements into an active 
political party ultimately demonstrates the difficulty of turning a diverse mass of popular 
discontent into a single, unified political movement that represented more than just 
opposition.  As the New York Times commented in June 1936, Lemke ‘is the candidate 
of blind protest and his strength will be in the strength of the blindness.’22  In contrast to 
the Union Party’s hostility, division and myopia, Roosevelt provided a positive, 
bipartisan vision built upon the proven success of the social and economic reforms of 
his first administration.  The Union Party did indeed fizzle out, but its marginalised 
voters and candidates still spoke for an isolated America that the New Deal had 
seemingly passed by. 
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